States, Markets and Society – Looking Back to Look Forward by Leach, Melissa
Transforming Development Knowledge
Volume 47 | Number 2A | November 2016
‘Defining a new era 
for development 
– going beyond
aid‑related
paradigms,
emphasising
transformations
to meet global
challenges, and a
universal agenda
that affects everyone,
everywhere – in
Brighton and Boston
as much as Beijing
or Bamako.’ ISSN 0265-5012 (print), 1759-5436 (online) DOI: 10.19088/1968-2016.173
Volum
e 47 | N
um
ber 2A
 | N
ovem
ber 20
16
Transform
ing D
evelopm
ent Know
ledge
Tr
an
sf
or
m
in
g 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
Kn
ow
le
dg
e
States, Markets and Society – New 
Relationships for a New Development Era
Editor Melissa Leach
Volume 47 | Number 2A | November 2016 
Introduction: States, Markets and Society – Looking Back to Look Forward
Melissa Leach
PART I: LOOKING BACK – ARCHIVE ARTICLES
Politics, Class and Development (Editorial)
Robin Luckham – Article first published January 1977, IDSB9.1
The Retreat of the State (Editorial Introduction)
John Dearlove and Gordon White – Article first published July 1987, IDSB18.3
Alternatives in the Restructuring of State–Society Relations: Research Issues 
for Tropical Africa
David Booth – Article first published October 1987, IDSB18.4
Towards a Political Analysis of Markets
Gordon White – Article first published July 1993, IDSB24.3 
Strengthening Civil Society in Africa: The Role of Foreign Political Aid
Mark Robinson – Article first published May 1995, IDSB26.2
No Path to Power: Civil Society, State Services, and the Poverty of City Women
Hania Sholkamy – Article first published January 2010, IDSB41.2
PART II: LOOKING BACK TO LOOK FORWARD – NEW ARTICLES
States or Markets – Twenty-Five Years On
Christopher Colclough
Inequality and Exclusion in the New Era of Capital
Violet Barasa
Inclusive Innovation, Development and Policy: Four Key Themes
Amrita Saha
Consequences of Inequality for Sustainability
Sunita Narain
Accelerating Sustainability: The Variations of State, Market and Society 
Dynamics in Diverse Contexts
Ramy Lotfy Hanna
Political Challenges of Addressing Climate Change through the 
‘Entrepreneurial State’
Rachel Godfrey-Wood
Civil Society and Civic Engagement in a Time of Change
Becky Faith and Pedro Prieto-Martin
State, Market and Society Relations: The Roaring Last Fifty Years
Luka Biong Deng Kuol
State–Society Relations and the Dilemmas of the New Developmentalist State
Evelina Dagnino
Back to the Future?
Michael Edwards
Restoring Development Dharma with Toad’s Eye Science?
Dipak Gyawali and Michael Thompson
STATES, MARKETS AND SOCIETY 
– NEW RELATIONSHIPS FOR
A NEW DEVELOPMENT ERA
IDS Bulletin The IDS Bulletin is an open access, peer-review journal 
exploring emerging international development challenges. It is 
published bi-monthly and is the flagship publication of the Institute 
of Development Studies, a leading global institution for research, 
teaching and learning, and impact and communications, based at the 
University of Sussex. Progressive economic, social and political change 
for everyone needs new kinds of action and relationships, shaped 
by new kinds of research and engagement. The IDS Bulletin aims to 
transform development knowledge, through its unique thematic 
issues developed by global learning partnerships that bridge academic, 
practice and policy discourse.
Publishing Manager/Bulletin Editorial Coordinator Alison Norwood 
Marketing and Production Officer Gary Edwards 
Publisher The IDS Bulletin is published by the Institute of 
Development Studies, Library Road, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK. 
Tel: +44 (0)1273 606261. 
Cover photo London, United Kingdom. People shelter from the rain 
during a rally in Trafalgar Square at which tens of thousands of people 
protested the outcome of the EU referendum and declared their support 
for the EU.
Photographer Andrew Testa/Panos
Disclaimer The Publisher and Issue Editors cannot be held responsible 
for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information 
contained in this journal; the views and opinions expressed do not 
necessarily reflect those of the Publisher and Issue Editors, neither 
does the publication of advertisements constitute any endorsement 
by the Publisher and Issue Editors of the products advertised. 
Copyright and photocopying IDS Bulletin © Institute of Development 
Studies 
This issue is published under a CC BY-NC licence.
This is an Open Access issue distributed under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 4.0 International 
licence, which permits downloading and sharing provided the  
original authors and source are credited – but the work is not used 
for commercial purposes.  
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode
Online open access This journal is available online at bulletin.ids.ac.uk. 
Visit the site to search for articles and authors and register for table 
of contents email alerts. 
Information for subscribers The IDS Bulletin is published in six issues 
per year. Institutional subscription price for 2016 is £395 (no VAT 
applicable). 
Advertising enquiries Gary Edwards, Marketing and Production Officer, 
IDS Communications and Engagement Unit, idsbulletin@ids.ac.uk 
IDS Bulletin © Institute of Development Studies 2016 
www.ids.ac.uk IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and 
registered in England (No. 877338). 
Volume 47 (2016) 
No. 1 Opening Governance 
No. 1A Connecting Perspectives on Women’s Empowerment 
No. 2 Development Studies – Past, Present and Future 
No. 3 Ruptures and Ripple Effects in the Middle East and Beyond 
No. 4 Foresight in International Development 
No. 5 Power, Poverty and Inequality
Volume 46 (2015) 
No. 1 Towards Systemic Approaches to Evaluation and Impact 
No. 2 Graduating from Social Protection? 
No. 3 Business, State and Society: Changing Perspectives, Roles and 
Approaches in Development  
No. 4 Beijing+20: Where Now for Gender Equality? 
No. 5 What is the Unique Contribution of Volunteering to 
International Development?  
No. 6 Life in a Time of Food Price Volatility
Volume 45 (2014) 
No. 1 Undressing Patriarchy: Men and Structural Violence 
No. 2–3 New Perspectives from PhD Field Research 
No. 4 China and International Development: Challenges and 
Opportunities 
No. 5 Localising Governance 
No. 6 Rethinking Impact Evaluation for Development
Volume 44 (2013)
No. 1 Piecing it Together: Post-conflict Security in an Africa of 
Networked, Multilevel Governance  
No. 2 Real Time Monitoring for the Most Vulnerable 
No. 3 Seeing the Unseen: Breaking the Logjam of Undernutrition 
in Pakistan  
No. 4 China and Brazil in African Agriculture 
No. 5–6 Whose Goals Count? Lessons for Setting the Next 
Development Goals
Periodical ID statement The IDS Bulletin (ISSN 0265-5012 print) is 
published bi-monthly in January, March, May, July, September and 
November. Mailing agent: Gary Edwards, Institute of Development 
Studies, Library Road, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK.  
Tel: +44 (0)1273 606261 idsbulletin@ids.ac.uk
Postmaster Send all address changes to IDS Bulletin, Gary Edwards, 
Institute of Development Studies, Library Road, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK. 
Tel: +44 (0)1273 606261 idsbulletin@ids.ac.uk
Journal customer services For ordering information, claims and 
any enquiry concerning your journal subscription please contact 
Gary Edwards, Institute of Development Studies, Library Road, 
Brighton BN1 9RE, UK. Tel: +44 (0)1273 606261 idsbulletin@ids.ac.uk 
Print details printed in the UK by Nexus Design & Print Ltd, 
Studio 38, Adur Business Centre, Little High Street,  
Shoreham-by-Sea BN43 5EG.
Delivery terms and legal title Prices include delivery of print journals 
to the recipient’s address. Delivery terms are Delivery Duty Unpaid 
(DDU); the recipient is responsible for paying any import duty or 
taxes. Legal title passes to the customer on despatch. 
ISSN 0265-5012 (print), 1759-5436 (online) 
Tr
an
sf
or
m
in
g 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
Kn
ow
le
dg
e
Tr
an
sf
or
m
in
g 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
Kn
ow
le
dg
e
States, Markets and Society – 
New Relationships for a New 
Development Era
Editor Melissa Leach
Volume 47 | Number 2A | November 2016
Transforming Development Knowledge
Introduction: States, Markets and Society – Looking Back to Look Forward
Melissa Leach 1
PART I: LOOKING BACK – ARCHIVE ARTICLES
Politics, Class and Development (Editorial)
Robin Luckham 19
Article first published January 1977, IDSB9.1 
The Retreat of the State (Editorial Introduction)
John Dearlove and Gordon White 23
Article first published July 1987, IDSB18.3 
Alternatives in the Restructuring of State–Society Relations: Research Issues  
for Tropical Africa
David Booth  29
Article first published October 1987, IDSB18.4
Towards a Political Analysis of Markets
Gordon White 45
Article first published July 1993, IDSB24.3 
Strengthening Civil Society in Africa: The Role of Foreign Political Aid
Mark Robinson 59
Article first published May 1995, IDSB26.2
No Path to Power: Civil Society, State Services, and the Poverty of  
City Women
Hania Sholkamy 77
Article first published January 2010, IDSB41.2
PART II: LOOKING BACK TO LOOK FORWARD – NEW ARTICLES
States or Markets – Twenty-Five Years On
Christopher Colclough 89
Inequality and Exclusion in the New Era of Capital
Violet Barasa 93
Inclusive Innovation, Development and Policy: Four Key Themes
Amrita Saha 101
Consequences of Inequality for Sustainability
Sunita Narain 113
Accelerating Sustainability: The Variations of State, Market and Society  
Dynamics in Diverse Contexts
Ramy Lotfy Hanna 117
Political Challenges of Addressing Climate Change through the  
‘Entrepreneurial State’
Rachel Godfrey-Wood 125
Civil Society and Civic Engagement in a Time of Change
Becky Faith and Pedro Prieto-Martin 137
State, Market and Society Relations: The Roaring Last Fifty Years
Luka Biong Deng Kuol 145
State–Society Relations and the Dilemmas of the New Developmentalist State
Evelina Dagnino 157
Back to the Future?
Michael Edwards 169
Restoring Development Dharma with Toad’s Eye Science?
Dipak Gyawali and Michael Thompson 179
Glossary 191
Vol. 47 No. 2A November 2016: ‘States, Markets and Society –  
New Relationships for a New Development Era’  
DOI: 10.19088/1968-2016.173
Acknowledgement
This IDS Bulletin draws on inputs and discussion at the 
IDS 50th Anniversary Conference on ‘States, Markets and 
Society’ held on 4–5 July 2016. Grateful thanks are due to 
all the conference participants for their contributions and 
insights, and to the conference sponsors: the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC), CARE International, the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Practical 
Action Publishing, Wiley, and the Department for International 
Development (DFID) through its Accountable Grant to IDS. 
Opinions represented here are nevertheless the authors’ own 
unless otherwise stated.
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 2A November 2016: ‘States, Markets and Society – New Relationships for a New Development Era’ i–vi | iii
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Notes on Contributors*
Violet Barasa is currently pursuing a PhD at the Institute of  
Development Studies (IDS) and her research focuses on social and 
cultural drivers of  zoonotic diseases among Maasai pastoralist groups 
in northern Tanzania. Violet’s background is in gender and rural 
development and her research interests include health, nutrition and 
rural livelihoods in developing countries. Prior to joining IDS, Violet 
worked at the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR), where she was involved in designing and 
implementing a gender strategy for the CGIAR centres, aimed at 
improving participation and optimising benefits for men and women 
smallholder farmers in agricultural value chains.
Christopher Colclough is Emeritus Professor of  Education and 
International Development, and Life Fellow of  Corpus Christi College, 
University of  Cambridge. He is also an Emeritus Fellow of  IDS. 
Christopher was the founding Director (2002–04) at the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) of  the 
Global Monitoring Report Education for All. At Cambridge he was, 
until 2014, Director of  the Centre for Education and International 
Development. Earlier research, as a Professorial Fellow of  IDS, 
included work on linkages between primary education and economic 
development; social-sector financing; development theory; and 
economic adjustment, particularly in Africa.
Evelina Dagnino is affiliated to the University of  Campinas, S. Paulo, 
Brazil. She has a PhD in Political Science (Stanford University, USA) 
and has published extensively on democracy and citizenship, the 
relations between culture and politics, social movements, civil society 
and participation. She has been a Visiting Professor at Yale University, 
Goteborg University, the Latin American Social Sciences Institute 
(FLACSO), the National University of  General Sarmiento/Institute 
of  Economic and Social Development (UNGS-IDES), Buenos Aires, 
and the University of  Costa Rica. Her most recent book is Disputing 
Citizenship (Policy Press, 2014) co-authored with John Clarke, Kathleen 
Coll and Catherine Neveu.
Michael Edwards is a writer and activist based in upstate New York who 
has worked for a variety of  international non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), the World Bank and the Ford Foundation. He is a Distinguished 
Senior Fellow at Demos, New York and the editor of  Transformation, a 
web-magazine hosted by www.opendemocracy.net. His books include 
Future Positive: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (Earthscan, 1999), 
Civil Society (Polity Press, 2004), The Oxford Handbook of  Civil Society (Oxford 
University Press, 2011), Just Another Emperor: The Myths and Realities of  
Philanthrocapitalism (Young Foundation, 2008) and Small Change: Why 
Business Won’t Save the World (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2010).
iv | Notes on Contributors DOI: 10.19088/1968-2016.174
Vol. 47 No. 2A November 2016: ‘States, Markets and Society – New Relationships for a New Development Era’
Becky Faith is a researcher based in the Digital and Technology research 
cluster, IDS. Becky’s professional experience and research interests 
encompass mobile communication studies, human computer interaction 
and technology for social change. Becky has 15 years’ experience 
working in programme and strategic roles in technology for human 
rights, transparency and accountability, and development organisations. 
Her PhD research looked at the use of  mobile phones by homeless and 
unemployed young women in the UK. Becky served as a Director of  the 
Sussex Community Internet Project and was on the selection committee 
for the Young Foundation’s first Social Innovation Camp.
Rachel Godfrey-Wood is a researcher specialising in areas relating 
to social policy, climate change and community politics. She has a PhD 
from IDS in the wellbeing of  older people in the Bolivian Altiplano and 
has worked as an independent consultant for IDS, the International 
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), and the Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI). She has several years’ experience in 
organising and undertaking qualitative research in Latin America, 
sub-Saharan Africa and India.
Dipak Gyawali is a Pragya (Academician) of  the Nepal Academy of  
Science and Technology as well as chair of  Nepal Water Conservation 
Foundation (an NGO) and Interdisciplinary Analysts (a research firm 
specialising in quantitative and qualitative surveys). He was trained as a 
hydroelectric power engineer at Moscow Energy Institute and in political 
economy at the Energy and Resources Group of  the University of  
California at Berkeley. He was Nepal’s Minister of  Water Resources in 
2002/03 and serves on the advisory board of  several national, regional 
and international organisations, including the IDS/University of  
Sussex Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) STEPS (Social, 
Technological and Environmental Pathways to Sustainability) Centre.
Ramy Lotfy Hanna is a doctoral researcher at IDS. His research 
interests encompass resource politics, sustainable use of  natural 
resources, and trans-boundary water governance. His academic 
background is economics and international relations, and he has 
a master’s degree in Environmental Studies from York University, 
Toronto. As an economic development researcher and environment 
specialist in Egypt and the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) 
region he has worked with the African Development Bank (AfDB), the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
the former Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and 
many United Nations agencies.
Luka Biong Deng Kuol is Associate Professor at the University of  
Juba, South Sudan and a Global Fellow at the Peace Research Institute, 
Oslo. He served as a Director of  the Centre for Peace and Development 
Studies at the University of  Juba, and was a minister in the Office of  the 
President of  Southern Sudan and in the ministry of  Cabinet Affairs of  
Sudan. He has also worked as a senior economist for the World Bank. 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 2A November 2016: ‘States, Markets and Society – New Relationships for a New Development Era’ i–vi | v
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Luka received his PhD from IDS and earned an MA in Economics from 
the Catholic University of  Leuven, Belgium.
Melissa Leach is Director of  the Institute of  Development Studies 
(IDS) at the University of  Sussex. She founded and directed the ESRC 
STEPS Centre (www.steps-centre.org) from 2006–14, with its pioneering 
pathways approach. A geographer and social anthropologist, her 
interdisciplinary, policy-engaged research in Africa and beyond, links 
health, environment, technology and gender with particular interests in 
knowledge, power and the politics of  science and policy processes.
Sunita Narain is a Delhi-based environmentalist and author. A 
graduate of  the University of  Delhi, she is currently the Director 
General of  the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE). Sunita 
plays an active role in policy formulation on issues of  environment and 
development in India and globally. Her work on air pollution, water 
and waste management, as well as on industrial pollution has led to an 
understanding of  the need for affordable and sustainable solutions in 
countries such as India where the challenge is to ensure inclusive and 
sustainable growth. She serves on many national and international 
committees on the environment.
Pedro Prieto-Martin is a researcher based in the Digital and 
Technology research cluster of  IDS. His activist-researcher work has 
focused on the areas of  open government, human-centred design and 
digital practices, tools and methods for citizen engagement and social 
change. Pedro’s academic background includes degrees in computer 
science, business administration and sociology. Pedro worked for six 
years for Hewlett-Packard in Germany, as Technical Lead of  a B2B 
platforms development team. Pedro’s PhD research looked at municipal 
participation, transparency, participatory budgeting and information 
and communications technology (ICT) for social change in Brazil, 
Guatemala and Spain.
Amrita Saha is a Research Officer at IDS, where she works on 
pathways to inclusive innovation and structural change. She has a PhD 
in Economics, University of  Sussex. Her previous roles include work 
on trade policy and global value chains (Commonwealth Secretariat, 
London). She has also been a Teaching Fellow at the School of  Oriental 
and African Studies (SOAS), and associate tutor at the University of  
Sussex. She has worked as an independent consultant for the United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(UNESCAP). Her research interests include trade policy, political 
economy, value chains and innovation.
Michael Thompson is an anthropologist and policy analyst trained 
at University College London (BSc, PhD) and Oxford (B.Litt). He is 
currently a senior researcher at the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria, and author of  many 
books and articles including Cultural Theory (Westview, 1990) and 
vi | Notes on Contributors DOI: 10.19088/1968-2016.174
Vol. 47 No. 2A November 2016: ‘States, Markets and Society – New Relationships for a New Development Era’
Organising and Disorganising (Tirarchy, 2008). Michael develops and 
applies the concept of  plural rationality (‘cultural theory’) to policy 
issues and technology choices: people doing very different things and 
yet still behaving rationally, given their different sets of  convictions as to 
how the world is and people are.
Note
* Biographies for contributors to the archive articles are not available.
© 2016 The Author. IDS Bulletin © Institute of Development Studies | DOI: 10.19088/1968-2016.175
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 4.0 
International licence, which permits downloading and sharing provided the original authors and source are credited – but 
the work is not used for commercial purposes. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode
The IDS Bulletin is published by Institute of Development Studies, Library Road, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK
This article is part of IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 2A November 2016: ‘States, Markets and Society – New Relationships for 
a New Development Era’.
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Introduction: States, Markets and 
Society – Looking Back to Look 
Forward
Melissa Leach
Abstract The period since IDS was founded in 1966 has seen the rise 
and fall of state-led, market-led and society-focused approaches to 
development, accompanied by critique and counter-critique. Today, 
relationships are shifting amidst new interconnections and configurations 
of global and local power, and while in some contexts new alliances are 
opening up important opportunities, in others spaces are closing down. This 
article introduces a special issue of the IDS Bulletin which tracks key threads 
in the history and future of these major debates, and the contributions of 
IDS and its partners. Combining archival material with new articles drawn 
from debates at the IDS 50th Anniversary Conference in July 2016, this 
IDS Bulletin ‘looks back to look forward’, asking what combinations of state, 
market and citizen action in different contexts can help achieve more equal, 
sustainable and inclusive futures for all. 
Keywords: state, market, civil society, citizens, inequality, sustainability.
Development has always involved the interaction of  states, markets 
and society. Whether thought of  in terms of  actors or institutions, 
the roles and relationships of  the public sector, the private sector and 
civil society have been central themes in analysis and action around 
the progressive social, economic and political change that constitutes 
development in its broadest terms. In various guises, this triad has 
also loomed large throughout the history of  development studies, 
from its origins in the post-independence era to the present day. Not 
surprisingly then, it is a theme that has also run through the history 
and work of  the Institute of  Development Studies (IDS) since its 
founding in 1966. Engaging with many others, IDS work has explored 
state–market–society relationships both analytically, asking ‘How does 
change happen?’, and more normatively, asking ‘How should change 
happen and how can it be enabled?’ – recognising that the meanings 
of  development, or ‘good change’, vary enormously amongst different 
people and over time and place.
2 | Leach Introduction: States, Markets and Society – Looking Back to Look Forward
Vol. 47 No. 2A November 2016: ‘States, Markets and Society – New Relationships for a New Development Era’
Ambitious and broad as it is, then, a renewed reflection on the state–
market–society triad seemed an apt undertaking for the Institute’s 
50th Anniversary year – a year in which we have wanted to look back 
not for its own sake, but in order to look forward to future challenges 
and how to meet them. This special issue of  the IDS Bulletin offers such 
a reflection. Part I looks back, drawing a selection of  articles from the 
IDS Bulletin archive1 to highlight key angles of  debate over the decades, 
and some of  the contributions that IDS Fellows and partners have made 
to these debates. Part II looks forward, drawing on contributions to 
our 50th Anniversary Conference, which took place 4–5 July 2016, on 
‘States, Markets and Society: Defining a New Era for Development’. 
This event brought together around 200 researchers, policymakers and 
practitioners from around the world – including many IDS alumni and 
partners – for two intense days of  what proved to be enormously rich 
and stimulating discussion, challenging us all to think about current 
and future configurations of  state, market and societal actors, and the 
politics of  these relationships amidst the emerging challenges of  the 
twenty-first century – challenges that will be key as development and 
development studies navigate the next 50 years. 
The articles in Part II, and the debates they draw on, go some way to 
defining a new era for development. Going far beyond old aid-related 
paradigms, this era emphasises transformations to meet global 
challenges such as inequality, unsustainability and insecurity, and a 
universal agenda that affects everyone, everywhere – in Brighton and 
Boston as much as Beijing or Bamako. It also documents the political 
dynamics and tensions that characterise this particular moment, 
including the emergence of  multipolar politics and rising powers on 
the world stage; the rise of  right-wing nationalist politics in many 
countries; a closing of  many forms of  civic space; and the growth of  
less ‘ruly’ forms of  social and political action. Changing relationships 
between states, markets and society are part and parcel of  these political 
dynamics. Understanding these, and charting their implications for the 
emerging challenges that increasingly affect us all, presents a crucial set 
of  opportunities for the development studies of  the next 50 years. 
1 Looking back 
The last half-century has witnessed several eras of  development, in 
which state, market and civil society actors have been attributed varying 
roles, and seen as significant in different ways. The articles in Part I 
of  this IDS Bulletin help track these changing roles and relationships 
through the lens of  some key contributions from IDS and its partners 
through different decades.
Very broadly, the period of  the 1960s and 1970s, in which the Institute 
was founded and conducted its early work, was one of  state-led 
development. Post-colonial state building aligned with an emphasis on 
national state planning – a ‘state developmentalism’ that had also been 
evident earlier in the twentieth century in colonial and non-colonial 
settings alike. Development ideas and practices from the 1960s focused 
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on supporting post-independence governments through planning, 
modernisation and technology transfer, towards a dominant vision 
of  economic growth and a good society emerging from a stable, 
modern state. Indeed, when IDS was founded, many believed that 
this state-led modernisation process would be done and dusted in a 
couple of  decades; development was to be a short-lived process of  
transition. That IDS is still here 50 years later – amidst development 
challenges that have changed but not been overcome – belies this simple 
technocratic and bureaucratic dream. Indeed, the greater complexity 
of  development was already evident to the Institute’s founders. Dudley 
Seers, IDS’ first director, dismantled the idea that there was a single 
path that all countries would follow, with so-called developing countries 
catching up with the West, in his path-breaking essay on ‘the limitations 
of  the special case’ (Seers 1963). Even if  state-planned, pathways were, 
and should be, varied. Nor could development progress be assessed 
by economic measures such as gross domestic product (GDP) alone. 
In writings that now seem remarkably contemporary, questions of  
inequality and redistribution, employment and a rounded notion of  
‘need’ that we might cast today as ‘wellbeing’ were already on the 
agenda of  development studies and advisory missions, IDS style. 
Nor was the role of  the state taken at face value. The article from 1977 
reproduced in this IDS Bulletin – Robin Luckham’s introduction to an 
issue on ‘Politics, Class and Development’ (January 1977, Volume 9 
Issue 1) is an early example of  the political science analysis that has 
been a longstanding feature of  the work of  IDS. Arguing that ‘the State 
is a powerful reality and a still more powerful abstraction’, this issue 
explored how actors of  different political persuasions imagined and 
sought to engage with the state, and how state institutions operated in 
practice – in diverse ways in different settings. This sense that context 
and diversity matter and require attention has been a persistent theme 
in IDS research ever since.
The 1981–2000 period saw a relative retreat of  the state in dominant 
development discourse and practice. The publication of  the World Bank 
report on accelerating development in sub-Saharan Africa (Berg 1981) 
and the so-called Washington Consensus (see Williamson 1989) helped 
usher in an era of  market liberalism, economic reform and structural 
adjustment, with policies reflecting the growth of  market ideologies, 
as well as global penetration of  monopoly capital. The article by 
John Dearlove and Gordon White – an introduction to an IDS Bulletin 
collection on ‘The Retreat of  the State’ (July 1987, Volume 18 Issue 3) 
discusses these trends. Although country contexts differ, the collection 
documents a fundamental process of  restructuring across the world, in 
which states were ‘rolled back’ in favour of  a turn to market mechanisms 
in the delivery of  goods and services. Often reflecting aid conditionalities 
and donor-led economic reform programmes in so-called developing 
countries, but also manifested in Europe and North America, this shift – 
at once ideological, political and economic – had profound implications. 
The undervaluing of  non-marketable dimensions of  human worth, 
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activity and progress, and the restriction of  service access to those who 
could pay, undermined human and social development and the reduction 
of  poverty, and contributed to rising inequalities. There were many 
vibrant critiques and debates around the neoliberalism of  this period, 
and IDS made significant contributions – for instance to ‘Adjustment with 
a Human Face’ (Cornia, Jolly and Stewart 1987), and in the landmark 
collection ‘States or Markets?’ (Colclough and Manor 1991) to which 
Christopher Colclough’s article in Part II of  this IDS Bulletin refers. 
These interacted with critiques from Marxist, feminist, social activist 
and other traditions. Along with critical analysis of  market operations 
and outcomes, this period also saw important analyses of  ‘real markets’ 
as not just economic, but fundamentally socially and politically shaped 
and embedded. IDS contributions such as Gordon White’s article on the 
political analysis of  markets (July 1993, Volume 24 Issue 3), reproduced 
here, were significant in bringing these debates into development studies. 
This era also saw the rise of  non-state actors, from non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and civic groups to social movements and 
business associations, along with a diversity of  forms of  democratisation 
taking root across the world. The rise of  concern with ‘civil society’ 
in development cooperation and policy aligned with neoliberal ideals 
around supporting (social democratic) market societies, and became 
part of  the ‘good governance’ conditionalities promoted by aid donors. 
The article by David Booth from this period (‘Alternatives in the 
Restructuring of  State–Society Relations: Research Issues for Tropical 
Africa’, October 1987, Volume 18 Issue 4) explores these trends and 
policies in a number of  African contexts, and their implications both for 
the particular kinds of  civil society organisation that are able to flourish, 
and for state effectiveness. 
Donor preoccupation with civil society continued into the 1990s. In 
some quarters, this was coupled with arguments for a return to a greater 
role for a ‘developmental state’, but now with democracy at its core (see 
White 1995). By this time – as the archive article by Mark Robinson, 
‘Strengthening Civil Society in Africa: The Role of  Foreign Political 
Aid’ (May 1995, Volume 26 Issue 2) argues – it had become evident 
that interventions aimed at promoting democracy were often premised 
on vague definitions that overlooked the highly varied, contingent and 
sometimes conflictual realities of  civil society in practice. With the 
negative impacts of  naive engagements emerging, donors were urged 
to proceed with caution. At the same time, many researchers and 
activists around the world were starting to draw attention to the diverse, 
contextually-embedded ways that different groups of  citizens actually 
placed demands and claimed rights in relation to the state – in vibrant 
forms of  social and political action and claims-making that extended 
well beyond, and sometimes bore little resemblance to, the civil society 
organisations imagined and promoted by aid agendas. The article by 
Hania Sholkamy, documenting the attempts of  poor women in urban 
Cairo to demand their rights (January 2010, Volume 41 Issue 2), is 
just one example in the IDS Bulletin from an array of  work by IDS and 
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partners in this period. The work of  the consortium of  researchers and 
activists who came together in the Development Research Centre on 
Citizenship, Participation and Accountability (2001–11) provided many 
others (Gaventa, Shankland and Howard 2002). 
Thus, in these first three overlapping eras, mainstream development 
discourses and practices have respectively emphasised state-led, 
market-led and (civil) society-engaged processes and drivers of  progressive 
change. These have defined and assisted development progress in 
different ways. There have also been many critiques and counter-
critiques, addressed variously towards the normative and ideological 
emphasis of  these approaches; at their material impacts for different 
groups of  people; and at the disconnect between the imaginations (and 
therefore intervention attempts) of  aid donors and policymakers, and the 
on-the-ground realities of  people’s lives and practices. 
So what of  current times, and of  the future? 
2 States, markets and society – changing roles and relationships
The period from the 2000s to the present has seen many continuities with 
the past but also some important shifts. New global and development 
challenges are emerging, as established priorities around economic growth 
and poverty reduction are joined by pressing concerns with tackling 
inequalities, addressing climate change and environmental degradation, 
mitigating conflict and violence, and more. Global interconnectedness is 
also intensifying. From climate change to epidemics, finance to food, war 
to terrorism, recent events underscore how hazards arising in one part 
of  the world increasingly extend through mobile ideas, people, microbes, 
atmospheric particles, money and information in a highly networked 
world to affect others elsewhere. Novel risks and hazards are generated 
which affect all people and places, albeit in very different ways. 
The global political and economic landscape is also shifting fast. The 
influence of  the so-called rising powers of  Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa (BRICS) and others is fundamentally challenging old 
North–South axes in global governance. It is increasingly clear that 
global action on climate, health, economy, finance and related issues 
will depend fundamentally on the positions of  these national players in 
global negotiations, while their own experiences in tackling poverty and 
building resilience at home are increasingly relevant as they emerge as 
significant development actors and donors, in relation to other countries 
in Africa, Asia and beyond. Meanwhile, countries of  Europe and the 
USA – once pre-eminent in global aid and development systems – have 
experienced financial crisis and recession, and face interconnected 
problems of  poverty and inequality themselves. 
The global knowledge economy is also changing, as technology and 
increasingly complex information ecosystems have affected the flow and 
dissemination of  ideas, data and knowledge. Old notions of  North–South 
technology transfer as the engine of  development are challenged by 
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vibrant grass-roots, citizen and business innovation in all corners of  the 
world, including by aspirant young people. The Open Access and data 
revolutions, and technologically-savvy policy actors and practitioners, 
pose challenges to traditional producers and curators of  knowledge.
Related to this context of  complex, globally interconnected challenges 
is a fundamental shift away from old aid-related paradigms and 
their framing in North–South terms, towards an assumption that 
development challenges are as relevant in Europe and North America 
as they are in Africa, Asia or Latin America, with scope for comparative 
insights and learning in multiple directions. This taken-for-granted 
sense of  what one can term a ‘universal agenda’ – where development 
is a matter for everyone everywhere, and comparative experiences and 
mutual learning in all directions are valued – was a striking feature 
of  the IDS 50th Anniversary Conference. It signals a different set of  
discourses from even a decade earlier, when the IDS 40th Anniversary 
Conference marked out such a universal take as an aspiration (Edwards 
2007). This reframing of  development aligns with important changes in 
the international policy context; whereas the Millennium Development 
Goals of  2000–15 were framed in terms of  North–South aid, the 
post-2015 agenda defines a set of  universal Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), which all countries have committed to implement 
in order to contribute to progressive change both for their own 
populations, and to meet shared global challenges. 
In this context, longstanding but marginalised perspectives and debates 
from what was once called the global South offer new value: they are 
not confined to a North–South axis or a view of  development just 
as aid; they are not underpinned by a commitment to markets or 
states, but suggest emergent alliances and alternatives, and they are 
not led by the concerns of  Northern intellectuals and policymakers. 
On the other hand, local subaltern alternatives are not enough to 
address the challenges of  an interconnected world, with multipolar 
and multilayered axes of  power, and connections that are both vertical 
– from local to global – and horizontal, across localities, nations and 
regions. As the IDS conference discussions highlighted, this is a world 
of  complex and varied capitalisms, involving a vast array of  forms of  
wealth and financial flows, including the illicit; diverse hybrid forms 
linked to different political economies, and where global corporations 
play central roles in what some term ‘post’ politics. It is a world where 
diverse interconnected risks, shocks and stresses challenge the image of  
stable, secure societies on which earlier development eras were built. 
Response and innovation are happening through novel partnerships and 
sometimes unexpected alliances that challenge conventional divisions 
between market and state, public and private, formal and informal, 
across local to global and diverse nodes of  power.
In broad terms, then, this is the context that framed the conference 
contributions and debates. These asked how the roles and relationships 
of  states, markets and society are changing amidst these new 
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configurations of  power. It was asked what these relationships should 
look like if  challenges such as reducing inequality, accelerating 
sustainability and building inclusive, safe societies in a globally 
interconnected world are to be met. Indeed, this set of  challenges – 
equality, sustainability and security – emerged as a second triad in the 
conference discussions, raising questions about how the state–market–
society triad might help to meet these. The short opinion piece by 
Christopher Colclough draws from his plenary talk which helped to 
set the stage; as one of  the authors of  the IDS collection on ‘States 
or Markets’ in 1991, he reflects from a development economist’s 
perspective on the 25-year history of  neoliberalism and on what such a 
volume might focus on today.
A series of  five parallel streams ran throughout the conference. Each 
included a set of  panels where presentations and discussion addressed 
the shifting configurations of  state, market and society from different 
angles and in relation to particular themes, which plenary sessions 
also picked up in different ways. These streams focused on inequality 
and inclusion; finance, business and innovation; sustainability and 
its acceleration; institutions and accountability; and citizen voice 
and agency. IDS early career researchers and PhD students acted as 
‘hunter-gatherers’ for each stream, collecting and collating key insights, 
and five of  the articles in Part II of  this IDS Bulletin are built from their 
work – giving voice to the syntheses and reflections of  development 
studies’ future scholars. The other articles and short opinion pieces here 
build on the contributions of  plenary speakers, elaborating cross-cutting 
arguments around emerging state–society–market relationships in 
current times, and for the future. 
2.1 Inequality and inclusion 
Frances Stewart’s opening plenary2 on ‘the inequality paradox’ set the 
stage for this stream. Rising inequalities are a fundamental challenge 
of  our era, adding to persistent problems of  poverty. The figures are 
stark and well known: for instance, in 2015 almost half  of  all household 
wealth was owned by 1 per cent of  the global population (Credit 
Suisse 2015), while the 62 wealthiest individuals owned as much as the 
bottom half  of  humanity (Oxfam 2016). Rising economic inequalities 
find their origins in the neoliberal period of  the 1980s and since, and 
have continued even in many of  the countries recording high rates of  
economic growth during the last decade. The character, causes and 
consequences of  contemporary inequalities, their implications for the 
future, and how they might be addressed are explored in the 2016 World 
Social Science Report co-led by IDS (ISSC, IDS and UNESCO 2016). 
As Stewart’s talk emphasised, there is a need to refocus research and 
political attention on the challenge of  rising inequalities. However, the 
paradox is that both states and civil society find themselves constrained 
by the power of  the market, just when they are most needed to tackle 
inequality. Civil society mobilisation is increasingly around identity, not 
class. A key challenge for research is to identify transformative pathways 
that avoid inequality-increasing patterns of  growth. 
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The conference deliberations contributed to this challenge. Violet 
Barasa’s article (this IDS Bulletin), which draws from these deliberations, 
makes it clear that the problem of  inequality goes beyond inequality 
between households in their incomes from work and asset ownership. 
Important too are intersecting inequalities along lines of  gender, age 
and ethnicity, as well as inequalities in access to public services and 
security schemes. Her article looks at the challenges of  addressing 
inequality through three focal issues that were discussed at the 
conference: gender inequality, youth unemployment, and inequality in 
access to social protection. In each sphere, part of  the challenge is that 
inequalities are themselves embodied in the ways dominant institutions 
operate – for instance, labour markets are significant bearers and 
re-enforcers of  gender relations. Furthermore, the overall dominance of  
market forces is producing and exacerbating inequalities. This suggests 
that a rebalancing is needed to enable greater power to state and civil 
society institutions if  problems of  inequality are to be addressed. 
The deepening challenges of  inequality and unemployment in cities 
received much attention, including in a panel devoted to this theme. 
This underlined the new importance of  urbanisation as a global 
process creating many challenges, and a new focus on cities in IDS 
work. Optimism lies in the emergent forms of  informal organising and 
work in cities across the world, and the growing importance of  cities 
as sites of  ‘exemplar governance’, sometimes engaging in governance, 
livelihood and social experiments in a semi-autonomous way from their 
enveloping nation states. 
2.2 Finance, business and innovation 
In the face of  these changing configurations, what is the role of  
businesses in development and what balance of  state, market and 
societal forces can help meet the challenge of  inclusive growth?
Alluding to earlier debates on markets as political (White, this IDS 
Bulletin), deliberations on this theme placed strong emphasis on the role 
of  the state in shaping markets. As Mariana Mazzucato’s plenary talk 
emphasised, the financial crisis of  2008 proved that state intervention 
was critical to fix market failure. But states can be ‘entrepreneurial’ 
(Mazzucato 2016), shapers as well as fixers, for instance in building 
exploratory public sector organisations that can invest in new 
innovations that will push the frontiers of  existing markets and lead 
to the creation of  new ones. A combination of  carefully monitored 
strategic public finance – whether provided by national governments, 
or international actors such as development banks – and public–private 
partnerships emerged as key in market creation.
Amrita Saha’s (this IDS Bulletin) article picks up on this argument 
and on further conference deliberations, relating it to the particular 
challenge of  promoting inclusive innovation – broadly understood as 
innovation that involves, meets the needs of  and empowers technology 
users, including poor and vulnerable groups. With examples from 
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agriculture to health, the article draws attention to the array of  
factors that shape innovation, creating conditions for technology to 
be developed, adopted and finally diffused in ways that enable local 
capacity and inclusive outcomes. The factors span the triad of  state, 
market and society, and often involve alliances between them. Inclusive 
and participatory approaches to innovation can valuably draw on the 
everyday knowledge and creativity of  citizens and civic society – a 
theme that Dipak Gyawali and Michael Thompson pick up in the 
context of  Nepal in their article later in this IDS Bulletin. They propose 
innovation as a distributed activity where communities can innovate and 
organisational structures are built on local knowledge.
Particular opportunities and challenges in this respect relate to 
technologies and investments promoted by the so-called rising powers in 
low-income countries, such as through Chinese and Indian investments 
in African agriculture. The interactions between firms and local actors 
seem to be key in whether or not such technology investments are able 
to build local capability that contributes to the creation of  livelihoods 
at the level of  the domestic firm or farm. Yet further questions concern 
how far small and medium enterprises and small-scale farmers can 
upgrade and link into the emerging global value chains potentially being 
led by the rising powers. As the conference debates underlined, critical 
questions concern the political economy of  innovation, and how to 
ensure that the process is not only inclusive for all actors, including the 
poor and marginalised, but actually creates structural change that leads 
to growth and development outcomes that are more broad-based. 
2.3 Sustainability and its acceleration 
The conference stream on accelerating sustainability was driven by 
recognition that the world is now facing unprecedented environmental 
shocks and stresses. Intertwined human and natural processes, 
accelerating especially since the 1950s as a result of  shifting and 
intensifying patterns of  production and consumption, as well as 
market neoliberalism has undervalued nature, and produced deeply 
unsustainable development pathways. Environmental problems such 
as climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution, land degradation and 
disease emergence are all interrelated, and affect everyone – locally, 
nationally and globally. The current and future development era must 
be an era of  sustainable development (Schmitz and Scoones 2015); one 
in which ‘green transformations’ in society and economy are required 
(Scoones, Leach and Newell 2015).
Sunita Narain opened this theme with a plenary talk, included as a 
short opinion piece in this IDS Bulletin, which lays out the challenge 
of  unsustainable growth and its relationship to increased inequality 
and marginalisation, leading to an insecure future. She underlines that 
sustainability and (in)equality are inextricably linked, and addressing 
one without the other will be ineffective. The vivid illustrations she 
draws from urban India confirm that ‘solutions have to work for the 
poor if  they are going to work for the rich’. 
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Following this opening, four dynamic panels discussed the intersection 
of  states, markets and society in accelerating sustainability. Ramy 
Lotfy Hanna’s article draws from these, offering arguments and 
evidence of  the roles of  market-led, state-led and citizen-led processes 
in transformations to sustainability. A particular focus is how alliances 
in favour of  sustainability transformations are forming between state, 
market and civic actors, and the processes holding these together. Yet 
as shown in conference case studies around issues such as water and 
sanitation in India, renewable energy in Kenya, and agriculture in 
Argentina, within each part of  the state–market–society triad there are 
forces that are against, as well as for, positive change. Understanding and 
engaging with these politics is essential in building green transformations. 
As Hanna’s article indicates, conference discussions also focused on the 
capitalisation of  nature, exploring the unexpected alliances between 
NGOs, private investors, conservation entrepreneurs and states in 
commodifying and financializing ecosystems, carbon and biodiversity for 
sale in international markets. This contemporary phenomenon, based 
on extending neoliberal ideas and institutions into nature, nevertheless 
requires state and civil society alliances in its operation. The result can, 
however, be the undermining of  ecosystem processes that are actually 
vital for sustainability, while such marketised ‘green growth’ approaches 
can all too easily become ‘green grabs’ that dispossess local land users 
and contribute to inequality (Fairhead, Leach and Scoones 2012).
Across the conference deliberations, a recurring theme was that 
sustainability is being constructed in different ways in different contexts, 
with implications for who gains and who loses. Such versions of  
sustainability – and the pathways towards or away from them – also 
depend very much on the politics of  a particular place; in transformations 
to sustainability, there is no one-size-fits-all. This theme of  localisation was 
also emphasised in a conference session on the SDGs, led by IDS alumni. 
Examples from Nepal, Mexico, Brazil, Tanzania and Kenya highlighted 
the need to make the global goals meaningful in national and local 
settings. In meeting the pressing challenges of  implementation, citizens 
and businesses have roles to play, but commitment by governments – and 
their accountability to the public in delivery – is critical. 
2.4 Institutions and accountability 
States, markets and society consist of  institutions and this conference 
stream saw panellists grappling with the institutional challenges of  
development at different scales. Key discussions addressed the extent 
to which institutions are able (or not) to update themselves to be fit for 
purpose, the actors which influence them most and to whom they are 
accountable. Across a range of  issues, from taxation to global governance, 
two overriding questions emerged about the character of  institutions 
for a new development era. How are institutions shaped? And how are 
they made accountable? Both these themes are picked up in Rachel 
Godfrey-Wood’s article in this IDS Bulletin, which addresses in particular 
the politics of  institutions in meeting the challenges of  climate change.
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A recurring theme is the acknowledgement that institutions are 
not free-floating, and are themselves the products of  interventions 
by particular actors. As Godfrey-Wood’s article emphasises, even 
institutions which are frequently assumed to be pre-existing, such as 
markets, are in fact outcomes of  interventions, meaning that more 
attention needs to be given to the actors who have brought them 
about and who exert decisive influence over them. Much conference 
deliberation emphasised the dangers of  ‘capture’ of  key institutions 
by elites: for example, media outlets might be decisively influenced by 
private sector actors in favour of  their interests rather than the right to 
information of  citizens, while wealthy elites are often able to evade or 
avoid taxes because of  their political connections. 
However, while there was broad agreement over this, there was less 
consensus over the types of  actors who are more likely to have both 
the strength and will to ensure that institutions are pro-poor and 
democratic. This question of  how institutions are made accountable 
loomed large in the conference discussions. Some speakers emphasised 
the importance of  social movements and civil society organisations in 
holding powerful actors to account, such as tax campaigners in Uganda 
who collected 4.2 million signatures to pressurise the president into 
vetoing a law which would have made politicians’ perks tax-free. At the 
same time, others pointed out the importance of  local-level bureaucrats, 
who can have surprisingly high leeway for defining the role of  the state 
in the provision of  health care, as is the case in much of  rural China. 
Others still emphasised the re-emergence of  ‘strongmen’ leaders in 
the ‘developmental patrimonialism’ of  Ethiopia and Rwanda. This 
raises the question of  path dependency, and whether or not particular 
conditions are likely to facilitate the emergence of  some actors but not 
others, or whether on the other hand there is more margin for agency 
than is often assumed. 
2.5 Citizen voice and agency 
This question of  accountability in turn links to the fifth conference 
stream on citizen voice and agency – what are the opportunities and 
modalities for citizens to hold powerful institutions to account? Here, 
a series of  panels explored the contemporary nature of  civil society 
engagement in both rhetoric and reality. A strong convergence of  
debates between North and South reflected the universalist perspective 
on development pervading the conference, and again underlined 
the value of  comparison and cross-learning across countries. As one 
participant put it: ‘… we are all fighting the same battles now. This is an 
opportunity for civil society more generally – how do we change power 
dynamics in our own country?’
The article by Becky Faith and Pedro Prieto-Martin (this IDS Bulletin) 
that draws from this theme opens with the recognition that in many 
contexts this is a particularly challenging moment for civic engagement. 
On the one hand, formal spaces for civil society voice and participation 
are closing in many spheres; a phenomenon also explored in 
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Evelina Dagnino’s article in this IDS Bulletin. Threats to civil society 
organising are being felt very keenly in many countries, whether in 
official moves to quell advocacy or in increasing government control 
of  mainstream media. In other contexts, civil society organisations are 
being co-opted by state or business interests. Discussions identified many 
of  the failings of  conventional ‘civil society’, understood as NGOs, 
whether local, national or international, in achieving progressive change 
that addresses global challenges. 
On the other hand, we are also seeing the emergence of  alternative 
means to represent citizen voice and claims. Sometimes this is through 
‘unruly politics’ and protest; sometimes through informal spontaneous 
forms of  community organising and advocacy, and sometimes 
through social movements and their networks, extending from local 
up to national and global scales. As Faith and Prieto-Martin explore, 
digital technologies and social media occupy vital but ambiguous 
places in these new politics of  citizen engagement, offering important 
opportunities to open up space but also selective in which voices are 
represented. Meanwhile, it is important to be aware of  how unruly 
politics and digital spaces are used, not just in the service of  progressive 
forces to redress inequality, sustainability and security, but also by 
extremist groups with quite different aims. 
This ambiguous moment for the ‘society’ part of  the triad highlights 
important agendas for future analysis and action. As Faith and 
Prieto-Martin suggest, these include developing a new agenda on 
collaborative politics, exploring the new institutional frameworks 
through which participation and citizen engagement can flourish 
locally – for instance, when the local state creates mediating spaces 
through community development programmes/projects, and through 
which citizens can hold states and businesses to account. There was 
also discussion of  how to reconfigure and reinvigorate alliances 
between localised and Southern-based movements, and Northern and 
international NGOs and civil society – without ‘sucking the oxygen out’ 
of  vibrant, engaged local politics. 
3 Forging new alliances?
The theme of  alliances looms large in the final set of  articles. These 
draw from plenary talks at the conference to reflect more broadly on 
changing state–market–society relationships in development in current 
times, and for the future. Each looks back to look forward. And each 
offers powerful arguments and illustrations of  the potential of  new 
alliances in tackling challenges such as inequality, sustainability and 
inclusivity – yet also some important words of  caution.
Luka Biong Deng Kuol’s article offers an insightful comparison between 
global changes over the past 50 years, and those in the USA during 
the decade known as the ‘Roaring Twenties’. Both, he argues, saw 
reactions to economic downturn followed by trends that saw increasing 
aggregation of  wealth for a small proportion of  the population. He 
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argues that the relative roles of  the state (shaping development paths), 
markets (the ‘Washington Consensus’ and neoliberalisation) and society 
(the rise of  global civil society and social movements to prominence) 
over the last 50 years have produced a development paradox, in 
which massive increases in global economic growth and technological 
innovation have coincided with rising global wealth inequality, and 
divergence in prosperity and development outcomes. Yet, he suggests 
optimistically that new public–private–civil society alliances and hybrid 
forms of  governance hold the potential for ‘fairer global governance, 
checking greed and achieving equitable growth’ in the future.
In his article, Michael Edwards warns against confusing such alliances 
with the blurred and blended institutions that are now becoming 
popular in development discourse – as donors, business leaders, 
philanthropists, consultants and commentators emphasise the potential 
of  social enterprises, and social and impact investing. He sees this as 
an extension of  the ideological turn towards the market that began 
in the late 1970s, ‘now being supercharged in the softer language of  
blending and blurring’. In practice, he argues, such blended institutions 
are actually less numerous and significant than many imagine. 
Moreover, they carry dangers, as blurred boundaries can all too easily 
mean blurred accountabilities. History shows us that alliances work 
best when government, business and civil society work as equal and 
complementary sets of  institutions that can hold each other in mutual, 
constant and creative tension, rather than when they mix and merge 
their identities. New opportunities for radical innovations in society 
and economy are certainly emerging, but to make the most of  these, 
he urges a move ‘back to the future’ by re-emphasising the differences 
between government and civil society and their autonomy from each 
other, even as they enter into alliances with business and the market. 
Evelina Dagnino’s article focuses on another contemporary reaction 
to neoliberalism – the resurgence of  arguments for strong states in 
shaping development. Emerging strongly in several Latin American 
countries (and with diverse echoes in other parts of  the world, from 
Ethiopia and Rwanda to China), the discourse and practice of  the 
‘new developmentalist state’ has much in common with the older 
‘developmental states’ of  1980s and 1990s development thinking – but 
are more than ever now expected to coexist with (and regulate) strong 
markets. In countries such as Brazil, the new state developmentalism 
has certainly helped in tackling poverty and inequality, and in 
promoting social exclusion. However, it has come at a cost to state–
society relations, undermining and overturning several decades of  
innovation in participatory democracy, the involvement of  citizens 
in public policy decisions, and institutional models to promote such 
engagement. Instead, there is a re-emerging conception of  the state as a 
self-sufficient entity, in which citizen participation and voice are reduced 
to mechanisms of  representative democracy (such as voting), many of  
which are dominated by elites. 
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Finally, the article by Dipak Gyawali and Michael Thompson links this 
question of  the appropriate balance between state, market and societal 
forces to the politics of  knowledge. With a focus on Nepal’s recent 
experiences of  development, they take the locally salient notion of  
dharma as a lens to suggest that the balance of  complementary forces is 
off-track. This is partly because, they suggest, each element is distorted: 
in practice, the trusteeship functions of  government too often become 
rent-seeking; the market’s ‘hidden hand’ role with private goods too 
often becomes crony capitalism, and civic action and demands are 
too often muted within the politics of  organised civil society and large 
NGOs. Intersecting with this problem is the disjuncture between what 
they term ‘eagle’s eye’ views of  development from the top down, and 
how everyday realities on the ground are experienced by Nepal’s diverse 
populations. Understanding these requires a different, bottom-up 
‘toad’s eye science’ attuned to and grounded in ethnography, citizen 
knowledge and lived experience. Development paths and progress, 
and the rebalanced state–market–society triad to achieve them, must, 
they suggest, be defined, assessed and evaluated in ways that include 
such toad’s eye views – requiring a different politics of  knowledge in 
development and by implication, development studies.
4 Towards the future
If  ‘looking back’ on the last 50 years of  development reveals – as 
the archive articles in this IDS Bulletin indicate – a succession of  
different emphases in the state–market–society triad over different 
eras, ‘looking forward’ suggests that each element, and the question of  
balance between them, is more important than ever. To quote Michael 
Edwards’ article, ‘Traditionally… government, business and civil society 
were seen as different but equally valuable parts of  a healthy whole, 
complementary but necessarily separate from each other’.  He suggests 
that this model is ‘so unfashionable today that it is seen as retrograde 
or even irrelevant’, yet in various forms it was the framework that 
underpinned shared prosperity in many parts of  the world. As many 
articles in this IDS Bulletin have documented, in broad-brush terms the 
over-dominance of  market forces with respect to the others, through the 
neoliberal period of  the 1980s onward, accounts for the rise of  many 
of  the challenges we see today – growing inequalities, environmental 
degradation, exclusion of  marginalised groups and rising insecurities, 
with all their consequences for development.
So the question arises, is this triad still relevant to tackling these challenges 
in the future, and what new roles and relationships are emerging, and 
will be required? Across the articles here, the answer to the first question 
is a resounding yes – this remains a highly relevant framework. But in 
different ways all suggest a rebalancing, to give – in both development 
discourse and practice – greater weight and influence to state and societal 
forces with respect to those of  the market. The question of  new roles and 
relationships is inevitably more complex, and the conference deliberations 
and articles here document numerous dilemmas and ambiguities, as well 
as clear directions. Much depends on the issue in question, and on the 
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embedded configurations of  power and institutions in different places that 
shape what is possible, and indeed imaginable.
What is clear is that in the context of  emerging global challenges such 
as the triad of  inequality, unsustainability and insecurity, a vibrant set 
of  agendas for development research and action is emerging. What 
new alliances and relationships between states, markets and society 
will enable the meeting of  future development challenges, locally and 
globally? The articles in this IDS Bulletin and the conference debates 
prefigure some of  the specific questions that such an agenda must 
address, and begin to answer them. They also suggest some cross-
cutting themes, which will need to guide future agendas.
One is the importance of  transformation. Beyond the focus on quick fixes 
(whether technological, or in the market) that have dominated much of  
the last few decades of  development thinking and practice, evident is a 
renewed emphasis on deep structural changes in economy and social 
relations to meet the extent and depth of  global challenges.
A second is diversity. The theme that ‘one-size-does-not-fit-all’ recurred, 
suggesting that development must be (re)conceived as a matter of  plural 
pathways towards plural goals. A key challenge, though, remains how 
to connect micro-diversity plausibly and effectively with questions of  
macro-structural change; to relate global challenges to diverse local 
experiences and vice versa.
Third is the emergence of  uncertainty and complexity as key features of  a 
contemporary and future world beset with shocks and stresses, whether 
associated with climate change, conflict, financial crisis, epidemics 
or more. Conference discussions drew out how planning blueprints 
and mainstream control-focused approaches flounder amidst such 
uncertainties, requiring analyses and action geared more to building 
resilience and adaptability in turbulent times. 
Fourth, and perhaps most fundamental of  all, is the importance of  power 
and politics. Debates about the relationships between states, markets and 
society are fundamentally debates about the politics of  development. 
An analysis of  power infused the conference debates, whether seen 
in material terms or discursive ones; in approaches emphasising 
political-economic structures, or those attending more to political 
agency and power relations. Political analysis of  states, markets and civil 
society has infused the work of  IDS and its partners since its origins, 
and must continue to do so in the future, in ways attentive to power’s 
shifting configurations and guises. 
This in turn will require approaches that are both interdisciplinary and 
transdisciplinary, integrating high-quality research with the knowledge 
of  people working in state, business and civil society organisations; 
that mobilise evidence for impact, and that are international in their 
partnerships, linking global understandings with local contexts and 
the perspectives of  people on the ground. Indeed, the anniversary 
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conference itself, with its mix of  participants from diverse international 
settings, academia, and policy, practice and activist backgrounds, 
exemplified this type of  integration – and the approach that we now 
term ‘engaged excellence’ at IDS. 
In such ways, I hope that the conference and this IDS Bulletin have 
charted some contours of  a future map of  development studies, in a 
new era. 
Notes
1 The archive, which was opened for the 50th Anniversary year, makes 
available online and in fully Open Access form the entire back 
catalogue of  the IDS Bulletin since the journal’s foundation in 1968. 
See http://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/idsbo.
2 See www.ids.ac.uk/news/exploring-the-state-market-and-society-
triad-for-a-new-development-era.
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Politics, Class and Development 
(Editorial)
Robin Luckham
Article originally published January 1977, Volume 9 Issue 1; original 
IDS editing is retained here.
Abstract The State is a powerful reality and a still more powerful 
abstraction. An abstraction which conservatives who believe in ‘political 
order’ affirm; which revolutionaries hope to smash or negate; which 
planners and technocrats make use of in order to propound ideologies of 
state managed development; and the influence of which others who see 
it as the captive of class forces minimise. All the essays in this issue of the 
IDS Bulletin attempt to penetrate behind this abstraction by looking at 
various state institutions in a concrete way. In concentrating on the State 
we may, ourselves, in conclusion contribute to the myth of its omnipotence. 
Development studies may be as much in need of a theory of revolutionary 
change as of a theory of planning. 
The State is a powerful reality and a still more powerful abstraction. 
An abstraction which conservatives who believe in ‘political order’ 
affirm; which revolutionaries hope to smash or negate; which planners 
and technocrats make use of  in order to propound ideologies of  
state‑managed development; and the influence of  which others – who 
see it as the captive of  class forces – minimise. 
All the essays in this issue of  the IDS Bulletin attempt to penetrate 
behind this abstraction by looking at various state institutions in 
a concrete way. The first three articles – by Gabriel Bolaffi, Alan 
Lindquist and Robin Luckham – examine the phenomenon of  
militarism in various national and international contexts. They are 
followed by a paper by Geoff Lamb on the interconnection between 
US influence and the post‑colonial State in the Caribbean and three 
articles – by Steven Langdon, Tom Forrest and Carlos Fortin – on 
various aspects of  the interaction between governments, the indigenous 
bourgeoisie and multinational capital. Lastly, an article by José Villamil 
calls for a reconsideration of  planning, to make it a more suitable 
instrument of  the major structural transformation of  dependent 
capitalist societies. 
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They share the view that the State cannot simply be viewed in terms 
of  the utilitarian calculus of  conventional development economics: 
as providing in the bureaucracy, political parties, the military and the 
development agencies a set of  instruments through which economic 
resources may be allocated and ‘development’ more (or less) efficiently 
managed. 
In the first place the state machinery itself  is typically badly co‑ordinated, 
contradictory and driven by struggles for power. Such struggles are 
not ‘externalities’ which can be assumed away for the purpose of  
determining priorities for the allocation of  resources. They are intrinsic 
in the state machinery itself  and in the struggles for economic resources, 
power and cultural values between social classes over which it presides. 
The army for instance might seem to be the most perfect expression 
of  the unity and power of  the State. Yet as the articles by Bolaffi, 
Lindquist and Luckham demonstrate, in no other institution are social 
contradictions more sharply concentrated. 
Second, the State is a repository of  certain use values of  a negative 
as well as a positive kind. To be sure it secures certain basic minimum 
conditions of  stability and order (from which, however, all social classes 
do not benefit equally) and a framework of  coercion within which 
the allocation of  resources can be managed. But through it the ruling 
classes can also repress, terrorise and exploit. 
The trend towards authoritarian government in the Third World has 
made many well-meaning people concerned about violations of  basic 
human rights. But it is little use Western statesmen, newspaper editors 
and scholars criticising such violations without attempting to understand 
the economic and social forces which bring them about. The articles by 
Bolaffi, Lindquist, Luckham and Lamb all account for the dynamics, 
and consequences, of  state repression. Bolaffi in particular shows how 
the violent exclusion of  the mass of  the population from politics in 
Brazil follows from the logic of  the strategy of  national development 
adopted by the country’s military rulers and from the nature of  their 
hegemonic pact with the multinationals and certain sections of  the 
national bourgeoisie. And Lindquist shows how Bangladesh lost the 
opportunity of  a more participatory kind of  development after its 
secession from Pakistan as the result of  the creation of  a corrupt one-
party government under Sheikh Mujib and of  the seizure of  power by 
the professional military establishment. His analysis of  the forces – both 
domestic and international – which blocked the creation of  a ‘people’s 
army’ during and after the civil war is of  especial interest.
Three of  our contributors pursue the interaction between state 
managers of  the economy, national ruling groups, the indigenous 
bourgeoisie and foreign capital in more detail. Langdon examines five 
case studies which illustrate the complex way in which the Kenyan State 
mediates between local entrepreneurs and multinational corporations, 
integrating the former and their political allies more fully into 
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transnational capitalist production. Tom Forrest asks why, despite the 
availability of  substantial oil revenues, state intervention has not created 
the conditions for a productive pattern of  capitalist development in the 
Nigerian economy; and suggests that it is partly because commercial 
relations with the international economy and reliance on foreign 
technology support the dominance of  the commercial and managerial 
fractions of  the bourgeoisie. Carlos Fortin examines the reasons why 
in recent years widely divergent ruling groups have come to adopt 
natural resource ideologies, bringing about more active state regulation 
of  international investment in Latin American mineral production. In 
a number of  countries the nationally dominant classes have actually 
succeeded in capturing an increasing share of  the surplus generated 
by this production; though the final result may only be a new form of  
insertion in the world capitalist system in which multinational firms 
secure their profits through transfers of  technology rather than by direct 
ownership of  productive enterprises.
The ability of  the nationally dominant classes to secure and allocate 
resources through the State should not be underestimated. But how can 
one ensure they are used to create a less dependent pattern of  national 
development? In a most interesting article, José Villamil suggests 
that the existing structure of  planning in most developing countries 
is inadequate for this purpose. A more realistic model would have to 
take account of  – indeed make use of  – the struggle between classes. It 
would have to envisage major structural change in the economy and the 
dislocation and uncertainty created by this change. In sum, planning 
would be a much more political exercise requiring major strategic 
choices, rather than a technological function involving the allocation of  
resources in order to achieve their most ‘efficient’ utilisation. 
In many ways, however, Villamil’s analysis is incomplete. For he 
assumes at the beginning of  his article that the political conditions for 
structural transformation have already been created. But in most Third 
World countries it is precisely this which is in question. The existing 
ruling classes and their international allies have little interest in a 
transformation which would undercut their own power and privilege. 
A process of  mass struggle would be required to remove them or to 
create the conditions under which some of  them would be prepared to 
implement genuine change. But in most countries such a struggle is in 
its infancy. 
Not least among the difficulties it faces is international intervention 
by the large powers. Carlos Fortin analyses how the destabilisation of  
the Allende regime in Chile by the US government and multinationals 
ended its attempts to increase national control over copper and the 
national economy. Geoff Lamb examines the pervasive influence of  the 
US in the Caribbean and the manner in which pressure is brought to 
bear, whether to bring down regimes unfavourable to US interests like 
Dr Cheddi Jagan’s in Guyana, or to stabilise more compliant regimes 
like that of  Dr Eric Williams in Trinidad. Alan Lindquist examines 
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how India’s help ensured the success of  Bangladesh’s secession, but also 
helped determine the nature of  the groups which succeeded to power 
(he also examines other foreign – including US – influences on the 
consolidation of  the national class structure). Gabriel Bolaffi and Robin 
Luckham examine great power influence on counter‑revolutionary 
military doctrines of  ‘National Security’. Robin Luckham also takes a 
more general look at the various ways in which large powers may bring 
military and political influence to bear at the periphery.
All this does not, however, mean that change is impossible. Indeed the 
contributions to this issue of  the Bulletin suggest that underdevelopment 
and national dependence create multiple contradictions and discontents 
which can be made use of  to create the impetus for change. Robin 
Luckham examines the internal fractures which in appropriate 
circumstances radicalise sections of  the military establishment. He 
also takes account of  the international contradictions which lessen the 
ability of  the large powers to intervene. Gabriel Bolaffi examines the 
apparent disintegration of  the Brazilian military establishment and its 
inability to justify or sustain its hegemony. Steven Langdon and Carlos 
Fortin examine the factors which make the alliance between the State, 
local capital and multinational unstable as well as those which hold it 
together. Fortin also analyses the international conjuncture which made 
it difficult for multinational firms to mount a direct challenge against 
the Allende regime’s nationalisation of  their copper investments. And 
finally Geoff Lamb calls attention to the interesting differences between 
Guyana, where working class struggles have pushed the regime away 
from the imperial umbrella, and Trinidad where they have intensified 
the government’s reliance on external support. In the former the regime 
is beginning to implement strategic alterations in its relations with 
foreign capital of  a kind which might fit Villamil’s model of  planned 
self‑reliance. But even in Trinidad the alliance between oil and sugar 
workers may bring change, though this might involve an outright 
confrontation with the regime.
In concentrating on the State we may, ourselves, in conclusion 
contribute to the myth of  its omnipotence. Development studies may be 
as much in need of  a theory of  revolutionary change as of  a theory of  
planning. 
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The Retreat of the State 
(Editorial Introduction)
John Dearlove and Gordon White
Article originally published July 1987, Volume 18 Issue 3; original IDS 
editing is retained here.
Abstract We are currently witnessing a global process of economic 
restructuring in both North and South, East and West. Though country 
contexts may differ, there is one strikingly common element: the criticism 
of statist modes of development and provision and the move towards 
greater use of market mechanisms in the delivery of goods and services. 
As the case studies covered in this Bulletin suggest, this reaction against 
statist forms of development is common to both Western Europe and 
the Third World. This similarity is hardly surprising given their economic 
interdependence, the activity of international disciplinary institutions 
such as the MF and the World Bank, and the historical link between the 
emergence of developmental states in the newly independent territories 
and the system of managed capitalism practised by their former colonial 
masters. Do the contributors to this Bulletin offer any ways forward for 
both theory and practice? Certain analytical points emerge which arc 
important guides to thinking about policy.
We are currently witnessing a global process of  economic restructuring 
in both North and South, East and West. Though country contexts may 
differ, there is one strikingly common element: the criticism of  statist 
modes of  development and provision and the move towards greater use 
of  market mechanisms in the delivery of  goods and services.
The problems which this economic ‘liberalisation’ are designed to tackle 
vary widely: in Western Europe, there is a perceived need to respond to 
accelerating technological change, internationalisation of  markets and 
(in the British case at least) relative economic decline, but in developing 
countries there is a multiple crisis, visible in economic stagnation and 
debt, social deterioration and governmental incapacity, and the sheer 
problem of  hunger and starvation. Though their cases are complex, 
one central element stands out: the problem of  state failure, whether this 
takes the form of  Keynesian macro-economic management and welfare 
provision in the First World, ‘developmental states’ in Third World 
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countries, or central planning and party power in socialist countries. 
The crisis is held to be rooted not merely in state policy, but in the state 
itself  – its political and organisational substance and its characteristic 
modes of  operation. Politics is thus central to our understanding of  
economic restructuring: in its causes, its conduct and its impact. 
Concurrent with these trends in the real world has come a ‘paradigm 
shift’ in thinking about the roles of  states and markets in the process of  
development. While earlier theorists focused on the inadequacy of  the 
market and provided an implicit or explicit rationale for state provision, 
current orthodoxies highlight the inadequacy of  political solutions and 
argue for a reduction in the role of  the state. This trend of  thought 
is true for both ‘neo-liberalism’ in capitalist contexts and ‘economic 
reformism’ in socialist contexts. In academic circles there has been 
a movement towards analytical approaches characteristic of  liberal 
economic theory in the discipline of  economics itself  and in political 
science, as John Dearlove demonstrates in his critical review of  public 
choice theory.
As the case studies covered in this Bulletin suggest, this reaction against 
statist forms of  development is common to both Western Europe 
and the Third World. This similarity is hardly surprising given their 
economic interdependence, the activity of  international disciplinary 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, and the historical 
link between the emergence of  developmental states in the newly 
independent territories and the system of  managed capitalism practised 
by their former colonial masters, whether in the form of  Anglo-
American Keynesianism or French dirigisme, a relationship discussed 
by Brett and Dutkiewicz and Williams in their articles. Holmes alludes 
to this link when he describes the Liberation of  France in 1945 as the 
equivalent of  independence for ex-colonial states and refers to France as 
‘the first NIC’. 
One can trace certain central politico-economic features common to 
both contexts. First, they share a similar critique of  the deficiencies of  
state-led development: the incapacity of  state officials to manage the 
economy in efficient ways (Leys documents the inability of  African 
governments to foster agricultural growth and Morgan attributes 
part of  the impulse to liberalisation in the telecommunications sector 
in Britain to the technical and commercial inadequacies of  the Post 
Office, later British Telecom); the distortions in strategic development 
strategy induced by the dominance of  the state (Fuhr relates this to the 
preference for ‘bigness’ in projects and enterprises in Latin American 
industrialisation which impeded the growth of  the small-scale sector, 
while in the Chinese context White shows how the harnessing of  
Chinese agriculture to a heavy industrialisation drive imposed a ‘triple 
subordination’ on the peasantry which obstructed rural development); 
and the fact that the dominance of  the state is often based on the 
emergence of  a new class or stratum whose power is rooted in political 
or administrative office (Fuhr and Dutkiewicz and Williams point to 
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the rise of  a political or state class in the African and Latin American 
contexts which uses the state for its own interests). These criticisms 
are particularly strong where developmental states have failed to live 
up to the optimistic assumptions of  the post-war era. Even in France, 
however, where dirigisme is generally regarded as successful and state 
corporations have had a relatively good track record, by the mid l980s 
the impulse towards economic liberalisation and outright privatisation 
had become a common plank in the platforms of  both left and right, as 
Holmes points out. 
Perceptions of  state failure have generated powerful political impulses 
towards economic restructuring in both First and Third Worlds, not 
to mention the market-oriented economic reforms in Eastern Europe 
which began relatively early, in the 1960s. The variation in response, 
the specific nature and impact of  restructuring programmes, has been 
greatly influenced by the particular constellation of  political forces at 
work in each national context. Morgan argues, for example, that though 
the pressures operating to impel restructuring of  the telecommunications 
regulatory regime in Britain and France were similar, their political 
responses have been different and the outcomes of  restructuring differ 
markedly. It is particularly important to understand the specific pattern 
of  political interests embedded in the previous, state-dominated system 
of  regulation, to draw a map of  winners and losers; this in turn helps 
us to identify the supporters and opponents of  reform. In Britain, 
for example, the previous system of  telecommunications generated 
widespread dissatisfaction, particularly among business users, but the 
move towards privatisation was opposed by a coalition of  embedded 
interests, notably the unions worried about job security and the principal 
supplier firms threatened by foreign competition. Particularly important 
in the British context was the rise to power of  the Conservative Party 
in 1979, a party that was committed to a neo-liberal perspective and 
to radical change and was prepared to override opposing interests in 
the telecommunications sector and elsewhere. In the Chinese context, 
conservative rural cadres were overridden by the Communist Party 
which was committed to rural reform.
In the African and Latin American contexts, the political obstacles faced 
by economic reforms are more impervious to change, rooted as they 
are in the institutionalised dominance of  state interests and patron-
client relations between state organisations and specific social interests. 
Any significant change in policy direction requires the political force 
necessary to challenge and if  necessary dismember these networks 
of  power and interest. Though their hand may be strengthened by 
the very seriousness of  the problems they confront, and forced by 
the pressure of  international institutions such as the World Bank 
and IMF, the political task is still prodigious. In the African context, 
Dutkiewicz and Williams remain pessimistic about the political capacity 
of  governments to take on this challenge. In the Latin American 
context, though a move towards small-scale industry is developmentally 
rational in the current context of  indebtedness, relative stagnation and 
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increasing unemployment, the politico-administrative obstacles posed 
by the intersecting interests of  ‘state segments’ and powerful business 
pressure groups, and the characteristic nature of  state administrative 
interventions make this industrial restructuring very difficult. It requires 
basic political and institutional change. It is significant, however, 
that where the potential beneficiaries of  reform – in this case, small 
entrepreneurs – are better organised to press their claims, as in Ecuador 
as opposed to Peru, a greater degree of  reform has been possible. 
These examples raise the crucial issue of  the political nature of  economic 
reform coalitions and the relation between economic reform ‘from above’ 
(state-sponsored) and ‘from below’ (socially demanded). One may well 
doubt the capacity of  state elites to transform themselves and undermine 
the basis of  their own power and privilege (unless in unavoidably dire 
straits). The political basis of  economic restructuring will be stronger 
if  there is the possibility of  alliances between reform-minded elements 
of  the established regime and those social interests from below that are 
dissatisfied with the status quo and set to benefit from reform. White’s 
study of  the Chinese rural reforms provides a vivid example of  such an 
(implicit) alliance – between reformist leaders in the Chinese Communist 
Party and large sections of  the peasantry who combined to outflank 
conservative officials in the state and commune hierarchy. 
To the extent that the political constraints embedded in the 
previous statist mode of  development are ruptured and a more or 
less thoroughgoing process of  economic restructuring is actually 
achieved, there will be important political consequences. New patterns of  
beneficiaries and losers emerge to condition the future policy agenda: 
for example, Morgan shows the uneven pattern of  benefits deriving 
from the privatisation of  British Telecom. More fundamentally, to the 
extent that economic restructuring transfers economic power from 
state to society and the economy operates in a more decentralised and 
competitive fashion (and this obviously varies greatly), there is a change 
in the political balance between state and civil society that may redefine 
the rules of  the political game and the character of  the political process. 
In socialist contexts at least, as White’s analysis of  China suggests, it 
may lead towards a more ‘pluralistic’ political system in the long run.
Do the contributors to this Bulletin offer any ways forward for both theory 
and practice? Certain analytical points emerge which are important 
guides to thinking about policy. The case for the market and against the 
state is now widely accepted, not the least among socialist economists, 
but there is a need for caution when faced with the policy bandwagons 
of  ‘liberalisation’ and ‘privatisation’. First, it is important not to accept 
a simple dichotomy between ‘state’ and ‘market’ but to recognise the 
interdependence and potential complementarity of  these two modes of  
social organisation. To develop effective market institutions there is a 
need for an effective state to coordinate market sectors and set strategic 
directions, to set and enforce rules, handle conflicts and inequalities, 
correct distortions, regulate external transactions and so on – several 
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of  our authors make this same point in different contexts. Holmes, 
for example, argues that state planning in France was not intended to 
displace the market, but to create a new, more modern type of  capitalist 
economy which would eventually outgrow its patron, the state; Japan 
and South Korea are also cited as examples of  the interdependence 
and complementarity of  state and market. At the deepest level, it is the 
politics of  a society and the interests within it which regulate the nature 
of  this interaction between state and market. 
This implies that, even where the state has failed, the developmental 
problem cannot be solved by turning to the market alone. There is 
still the need to reconstitute an effective developmental state. Creative 
thought is necessary here, not least, as Brett suggests, through an 
attempt to reconstitute that branch of  inquiry formerly known as 
‘development administration’. This may involve a move away from 
Weberian principles of  ‘rational’ bureaucracy and an eclectic fusion of  
ideas and practices from political science, organisation theory, business 
and management studies and public sector economics. The central 
focus would be on the question of  restructuring the state, devising new 
institutional forms and methods of  intervention which may serve to 
reduce its bureaucratised power and well-established developmental 
deficiencies.
The second point which emerges from the studies in this Bulletin is the 
need to adopt a critical perspective on the ‘new orthodoxy’ and its 
policy implications. Liberal principles of  economic restructuring are 
often presented as a simple panacea for what ails the First, Second and 
Third Worlds. As the articles by Dearlove and Brett point out, however, 
there are serious analytical deficiencies in the new paradigm. There is 
also the danger that the new orthodoxy counterposes a realistic view 
of  the (vices of  the) state to an idealised view of  the (virtues of  the) 
market. As Brett argues, although we can accept much of  the current 
case against the state, it is also important not to forget the original case 
against the market and the concomitant rationale for state intervention, 
much of  which is still valid, though clearly in need of  rethinking. There 
is a common problem which crosses the state-market divide – that of  
monopoly power in the economy and the polity – and it is important to 
tackle this through plans for democratising political organisation and 
securing real competition in the economic sphere.
Moreover, if  part of  the new orthodoxy’s critique of  the developmental 
state is that it leads to the politicisation of  economics, our authors show 
that markets and market actors, both international and domestic, are 
themselves highly politicised (for example, Cawson’s analysis of  Western 
European firms as political actors). This once more reinforces the 
centrality of  politics across both state and market – a theme to be taken 
further in the next issue of  this Bulletin.
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Alternatives in the Restructuring 
of State–Society Relations: 
Research Issues for Tropical Africa1
David Booth
Article originally published October 1987, Volume 18 Issue 4; original 
IDS editing is retained here.
Abstract This article considers the possible long‐run implications of the 
liberalisation programme currently under way throughout Tropical Africa. 
A strengthening of private‐sector institutions and a corresponding shift 
in the relationship between the state and civil society is clearly on the 
agenda, but – the paper argues – it would not be fruitful for research to 
remain focused on the public‐private or state‐society balances as such. 
The more challenging and important questions have to do with (i) the 
substantially different kinds of private‐sector and civil society development 
which might result from the current policies, and (ii) the implications of any 
strengthening of civil societies for the emergence of more autonomous and 
effective states.
The existence on a world scale of  an apparent trend towards more 
market-oriented approaches implying the withdrawal of  the state from 
certain long-established areas of  activity is hard to deny. To the extent 
that they are effective such processes of  ‘liberalisation’, ‘privatisation’ 
or ‘economic reform’ may entail a shift in the relationship between the 
state and civil society,2 with important implications for long-run political 
and social dynamics.3 However, the apparent parallelism between these 
processes currently under way in widely different parts of  the globe may 
be deceptive – more the result of  the undoubted ascendancy of  free-
market economic theories and political discourse in some of  the central 
capitalist states than a faithful reflection of  their objective sources and 
significance. 
While obviously influenced by world-wide ideological trends as well as 
directly and indirectly by the policies of  the central states, the ‘retreat 
of  the state’ in Tropical Africa in the 1980s has its roots in quite specific 
features of  the profound crisis which has developed in the region since 
the end of  the last decade. The timing and intensity of  this crisis owe 
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much to international economic factors which have also been relevant 
elsewhere, but in its fundamental features, I would argue, the African 
crisis cannot be understood apart from the continent’s own economic, 
political and social transformations over the last 25 years or more. The 
long-run political and social implications of  the recovery measures now 
being adopted seem similarly sui generis.
To the extent that it does place a rearrangement of  the fundamentals 
of  state-society relations squarely on the agenda of  change, the 
current economic and social malaise in Tropical Africa is clearly 
of  momentous significance for the development of  the region. It 
deserves to be researched with adequate attention to detail and to the 
‘view from below’; and it also needs to be theorised about, calling for 
some initial sharpening of  our conceptual vocabulary and analytical 
sensibilities. We need studies of  the micro- and macro-politics of, for 
example, stabilisation programmes, new marketing arrangements and 
administrative reforms in individual countries, but we also need a better 
idea than we presently have of  the terms in which to evaluate the data 
produced by such studies. To be worthwhile, work on particular topics 
of  the above kind needs to be informed by a clear conception of  the 
major structural issues upon which they bear. 
The discussion in the literature to date has taken us some way towards 
such a clarification of  issues. At least it allows us to dispose of  a few red 
herrings, to establish some directions in which it would not be fruitful 
to proceed any further. It also suggests, mainly by implication, some 
alternative lines of  enquiry which are potentially both theoretically 
interesting and of  some considerable practical relevance. This paper 
identifies, not for the first time [Brett 1986; Sender and Smith 1984], 
one major pair of  non-starters in the recent discussion about Africa, 
and begins to sketch, in what I hope is a suggestive form, some of  the 
genuine research issues which underlie its unhelpful clichés. I am aware 
that the requirements of  this critique and the generality of  the subject 
make the whole discussion appallingly abstract, but the risk of  losing 
contact entirely with the national and local realities with which the 
theoretical categories are ultimately concerned seems, in the context, to 
be a risk worth taking.
I. The State versus Civil Society? The Argument Outlined
The notion I wish to dispose of  straightaway is that there is much mileage 
from a research point of  view in focusing on the state-society balance as 
such. In other words, the hesitant steps currently being taken in Africa 
towards the replacement of  state-led development models with more 
market-based arrangements are not suitably or interestingly analysed 
in terms of  a simple conceptual polarity of  the ‘regulation versus free 
enterprise’, ‘plan versus market’ or ‘state versus civil society’ type. At a 
preliminary level of  documentation and analysis we obviously do need 
to know to what degree these balances have been altered by the changes 
set in motion. However, unless the results of  a changeover to ‘market 
solutions’ are held to be entirely predictable and positive, or unless one 
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accepts a wholly zero-sum view of  the relation between private enterprise 
and the developmental role of  state in the African context, the really 
interesting questions are those which arise next. It is important not to 
allow these to be closed off by the poverty of  our conceptual resources. 
Intellectual influences which have just this effect are unfortunately 
not lacking, and not restricted to a single point on the ideological 
spectrum. On the one hand, free-market liberals are inclined to see 
the removal of  price controls, the stimulation of  the private economy 
and the restriction of  the state to a narrow range of  ‘proper’ concerns, 
as a wholly reliable means of  dealing with the market distortion and 
inefficiencies which lie at the back of  the economic deterioration in 
Africa. In this perspective – admittedly a minority view, probably even 
in such institutions as the World Bank – there are major obstacles 
on the path to a satisfactory outcome, but no real false turnings or 
dead-ends. This vision obviously takes strength from the continuing 
fashionableness of  the economic liberalism of  the past century, with its 
emphasis on rugged individualism and its view of  the state as a parasitic 
excrescence on the market. But while there is of  course much in the 
African situation to confirm neo-liberal prejudices about the state, there 
is not enough to support such unrestricted optimism about the private-
enterprise alternative. 
Radical critics of  the trend of  policy in Africa unfortunately tend simply 
to invert the terms of  the liberal view. Evidence of  the unreliability of  
private-sector models and of  the complicity of  the World Bank and 
other Western aid donors in Africa’s development disasters is used to 
pour cold water on the whole idea of  rethinking the role of  the state in 
development. The adoption of  reform programmes to revive agriculture 
and stimulate exports is viewed – despite much evidence to the contrary 
– as an externally-imposed and retrograde trend, with roots in the world 
political balance, but without genuine relevance to the actual problems 
of  raising the capacity of  African economies for sustained and equitable 
growth. While acknowledging for form’s sake that much needs to be 
done to improve the quality of  planning and the efficiency of  parastatal 
enterprises, radical critics often seem to cling to a Fabian-type vision 
of  the post-colonial African state as an all-seeing promoter of  long-run 
comparative advantage besieged by local – and especially international 
– supporters of  free-market capitalism personified by the IMF and the 
Bank. In practice, while they are prepared to discuss reform, they are 
very short on proposals in this area, and are often particularly weak on 
the possible politics of  a non-market attack on the anti-developmental 
roles of  African states. 
The debate between the liberals and the radicals (in the specific sense 
just defined) has so dominated the scene since the publication of  the 
Berg Report [World Bank 1981] that it has sometimes seemed that 
the only real issue to which research might be addressed is which 
‘side’ is likely to come out on top in any particular case. Fortunately or 
otherwise, the real issues are more complicated, both from a practical 
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point of  view and conceptually. In the African context, the ‘retreat of  
the state’, if  such it is, is neither a panacea nor an irrelevance, and what 
a sustained economic liberalisation might mean for the relationship 
between state and civil society is a complex issue calling for both 
empirical research and greater clarity about the central concepts. The 
remainder of  this article elaborates this contention with reference to 
recent literature, arguing in particular two things. 
First, there is certainly a case for thinking that the emergence and the 
political entrenchment of  new private-sector groups may be the best 
or only way of  sustaining a more balanced and equitable pattern of  
development in Tropical Africa (particularly, a pattern less hostile to the 
raising of  agricultural marketing and productivity). However, it cannot 
be said that any kind of  private-sector development and any ensuing 
flowering of  civil society whatsoever would be progressive from this 
point of  view. Several different possibilities need to be distinguished. 
As well as drawing on my own limited knowledge of  comparative class 
formation and politics in African societies, this part of  the argument 
draws strongly on the ‘urban bias’ debate, particularly on the work on 
Africa undertaken by the political scientist Robert Bates [1981]. 
Second, the matter of  the state and its development needs to be 
distinguished analytically from the question of  the state’s relation 
to civil society. While it is trivially, even tautologically, true that any 
strengthening of  civil society weakens the state (i.e. in its relations with 
civil society), the strength of  the state in the sense of  its capacity to 
realise given objectives is related in no obvious and univocal way to 
developments in civil society. The strengthening of  state capacity is very 
much on the agenda in most countries of  Tropical Africa in the 1980s. 
Moreover, it may be that the possible resurgence of  private-sector 
activity is important not just because of  its more or less direct 
contributions to economic revival, but also – and in the longer run, 
more importantly – as a stimulus to the development of  state capacities. 
In even the best surveys of  the African literature in this area [Crook 
1986; Mars and White 1986; Ravenhill 1986b], I find insufficient 
sensitivity to this possible interdependence between processes of  
class formation and state development, even when the independent 
significance of  the latter is acknowledged.
II. Two Paths of Civil Society Development for Tropical Africa
I do not want to say anything in this article which might be construed 
as reopening the important but long-running debate about the technical 
merits of  alternative policy-reform packages for economic recovery 
in Africa [Allison and Green 1983, 1985; Lawrence 1986; Mellor et 
al 1987; Rose 1985]. The outstanding issues between those specialists 
who emphasise pricing issues, institutional problems and inter-sectoral 
resource allocation, and those on the other hand who insist on longer-
run structural and technological constraints and the continuing need for 
planning, are not unimportant. But underlying the controversy there is 
a considerable measure of  tacit agreement both about what has gone 
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wrong in post-independence African states and about the immediate 
measures that need to be taken. There is wide agreement, notably, that 
in many countries the institutional and economic-policy regime has been 
hostile to either food production or agricultural exports or both – for 
reasons that have little to do with either equity or industrialisation, and 
that as a result African economies have done so poorly that the long-run 
constraints barely enter the picture.4 Although there is controversy about 
the likely efficacy of  a recovery strategy that relies heavily or exclusively 
on getting the prices right, there are no widely-canvassed proposals that 
do rely wholly on measures of  this type, and none in which action on 
prices and exchange rates does not play a fairly substantial part. 
While there is in this sense a fair amount of  shared understanding about 
the economic and technical side of  what needs to be done, there is 
almost no consensus, and very little direct discussion, about the sociology 
and politics of  successful reform. Serious research is now needed not 
just on the politics of  past economic failure, but on the types of  political 
realignments and social changes that are occurring, and which may 
or may not provide a stable basis for the implementation of  a well-
designed reform package over the medium and longer terms. To begin 
with this means investigating in some detail the ways socio-economic 
differentiation, interest-articulation and policy ‘implementation’ are 
interacting in the context of  reform in different countries. 
Hypotheses which might guide work of  this kind are not entirely 
lacking in the literature. Michael Lipton’s pioneering attempt to bring 
together the economic and social-structural aspects of  ‘urban bias’ into 
a single synthesis is obviously relevant here [Lipton 1977, 1982, 1984]. 
So is Bates’ analysis of  the way African governments use agricultural 
policies to appease powerful constituencies and confer benefits on 
their supporters [Bates 1981; also Bates and Lofchie 1980; Bienen 
1987; Commins et al 1986; Lofchie 1985]. On the whole I find the 
latter a more sensible starting point for a discussion like the present 
one, not only because it accommodates more fully the specificities of  
the African situation,5 but also on theoretical grounds. Although the 
argument has not yet been made in a fully convincing fashion, Lipton’s 
treatment of  the politics of  ‘urban bias’ is in my view correctly accused 
of  socio-economic reductionism. In other words, the interests which lie 
behind urban biased policies and institutions are taken too much as given 
by the structural locations of  socio-economic groups, and not enough as 
having been defined or constructed in action, either, so to speak, within 
civil society or, more significantly, through the operations of  a political 
system. The result is a rather unstable and self-contradictory estimation 
of  the intractability of  urban bias and the possible means of  defeating it 
[cf. Corbridge 1982; Lipton 1984; Moore 1985]. 
Bates may perhaps be accused of  the contrasting failing, of  ultimately 
dodging the important sociological questions his work raises 
[Konings 1986:1–6], but his basic analysis is useful in providing a 
non-reductionist context into which it is possible to reintroduce the role 
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of  socio-economic differentiation and class formation in the shaping of  
development policies and institutions.6 One major question that arises 
from Bates’ discussion is: what is the possible role of  socio-economic 
differentiation, and in particular the emergence or re-emergence of  
rich peasant or elite farmer groups, in consolidating given changes in 
the framework of  agricultural development? The central idea I want to 
propose in this section is that the Bates/Lipton framework suggests at 
least two quite contradictory answers to questions of  this type. 
On the one hand it is a major theme in both Lipton and Bates that the 
better-off rural sectors are frequently beneficiaries of  the policies which 
are responsible for depressing agriculture at large. Not only is biased 
resource allocation the result of  interlocking public and private-sector 
activities (so that economic liberalisation per se cannot be expected to 
do away with the problem), but the richer peasantry are ‘bought off’ by 
selective subsidies and preferential access to inputs and credit. Privileged 
agricultural groups or regions also benefit from special projects and 
programmes which help to undermine the general conditions for 
agricultural growth. To the extent that these kinds of  arrangements 
remain a part of  the picture in these more austere times, we obviously 
cannot discount the possibility that policy shifts achieved or consolidated 
with the support of  emergent elite farmer groups will turn out to entail 
large regionally and socially concentrated concessions to rural interests 
funded more out of  cuts in basic needs provision and other services 
benefiting the rural poor than out of  a genuine reversal of  urban/rural 
priorities. In this sense, some African countries may go overboard in the 
direction of  ‘capitalism’ as the solution to their current difficulties, and 
end up creating no more than a new version of  the same thing  
[cf. Brett 1986; Ravenhill 1986:28].
Although widespread, the incorporation of  the potential leadership of  
the rural sector into an anti-rural coalition is not, however, an absolutely 
invariant pattern. In any given case where the rural elite has come to 
be ‘bought off’ in this particular way, the explanation tends to involve 
subtle political factors, often highly specific to the country in question. 
In different political contexts other patterns seem possible. Indeed, 
Bates [1981:119–28] and others [e.g. Barker 1984:24, citing Hart 1982] 
have concluded from comparative historical evidence that a key to 
the adoption and permanence of  relatively unbiased policies towards 
agriculture has been the emergence and political entrenchment of  a 
significant group of  elite farmers from among the African peasantry. 
Crucially, under certain conditions the influence exercised by rich-
farmer groups within post-colonial political systems has inhibited the 
use of  output pricing and other policies to turn the internal terms of  
trade against agriculture. This suggests the possibility that in conditions 
of  high bias such as continue to prevail throughout much of  the region 
in the mid-1980s, the activation or reactivation of  links between such 
groups and other forces within the national political arena may be 
important, and even perhaps a sine qua non, in securing a transition 
towards a policy regime more favourable to agriculture.
(Endnotes)
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A flowering of  civil society as a result of  the economic strengthening 
of  the private sector in the rural areas of  Tropical Africa may, then, be 
the key to a more satisfactory and sustainable form of  development. 
Albeit in the pursuit of  their own particular interests, new pressure 
groups arising from liberalised economic sectors may contribute to 
the consolidation of  economic-policy regimes which favour general 
interests both at the sectoral and at the societal level. In this case other 
things too may become possible (on which more later). But the ‘turn 
towards capitalism’ in rural areas of  the continent may also turn out to 
be a dead end, economically and politically, leading to nothing more 
than new pockets of  politically-bestowed privilege and support for the 
status quo. Under which conditions each of  these possibilities becomes 
the more likely would seem to be a research issue of  the greatest 
importance.
III. Taking the State Seriously in the African Context
Among the numerous critics of  Berg-inspired liberalisation packages 
for Africa there are many who are clear-sighted enough to recognise 
that while the inefficiency of  African developmental states has been 
exaggerated in certain respects in the liberal case, there is a real need to 
increase the effectiveness of  state institutions, especially in their relation 
to agriculture. In this context it is sometimes pointed out that African 
states are to a greater or lesser degree ‘soft states’7 and more or less 
thoroughly penetrated, corruptly and otherwise, by particularistic social 
claims, suggesting that far from being overdeveloped and in need of  
curtailment, they need in crucial respects to be strengthened and given 
greater autonomy in relation to civil society. The point is an important 
one, but it suffers from a lack of  conceptual clarity which results in a 
rather superficial appreciation of  the possible long-run consequences of  
economic liberalisation.
As is now becoming fairly widely recognised [Evans et al 1985a; Hall 
1986] Western – especially post-war Anglo-American – social science 
has been powerfully influenced by what have been called ‘society-
centred’ as opposed to ‘state-focussed’ approaches to the analysis of  
historical change. In different ways, it is argued, both the pluralist 
and structural-functionalist tradition and Marxist and neo-Marxist 
theorising have been preoccupied with the influences upon politics and 
state action emanating from civil society (interest groups, classes) to the 
detriment of  investigation of  the specific structures of  states, of  the 
development of  those structures and of  their impact upon the evolution 
of  economies and societies [Skocpol 1985]. In other terms, interest in 
modes of  production and their transformation has not usually been 
accompanied by a parallel interest in modes of  political domination 
and their dynamics [Mouzelis 1986]. As a result of  these influences, 
questions about the variable aspects of  state organisation – notably, the 
development of  state autonomy and the capacities of  states in different 
areas of  activity – have only fairly recently come to be formulated as 
problems for historical and comparative research. I would argue that 
those engaged in the current controversies about Tropical Africa have 
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something to learn from this ‘neo-Weberian’ point of  view and the new 
avenues of  research that it suggests.
In the present context it implies a critique of  two types of  thinking in 
particular. One, obviously, is the reductionism of  the Marxist tradition, 
in either its class-instrumentalist or functionalist variants, in which 
state autonomy is treated by conceptual fiat as a limited and largely 
invariant feature of  all states within a mode of  production. This 
closes off almost entirely comparative research into such questions as 
why some states do and other states do not develop a high degree of  
autonomy [Skocpol 1985], including any evaluation of  the contribution 
to state development of  different patterns of  economic change and class 
formation. The problem extends of  course to the whole relation of  ‘the 
political’ to ‘the economic’. As Mouzelis puts it, we need to ‘try to deal 
with political phenomena in a way that does not build into their very 
definition (and therefore excludes from empirical investigation) the type 
of  relationship they are supposed to have with the economy’. It seems 
possible to Mouzelis to avoid this reductionism ‘without abandoning 
the “political economy” holistic approach, that is, without falling into 
the type of  compartmentalisation of  the political and economic spheres 
which is to be found in neoclassical economics and in non-Marxist 
political science’ [1986:203–4].
Perhaps less obviously, this trend of  thought also implies a break 
with what has been called a crudely Weberian imagery producing 
straightforwardly zero-sum propositions about state autonomy [Evans 
et al 1985b:353]. In this perspective, as described by Evans et al, ‘the 
increased ability of  a bureaucratic state to realise internally generated 
goals supposedly reduces the power of  all societal groups “outside” 
the state; conversely, the existence of  well-organised social groups with 
control over the disposition of  politically relevant resources implies a less 
autonomous state’. A further assumption, shared by the vulgar Weberian 
perspective and some Marxist treatments (Poulantzas), is that state 
autonomy and state capacities for effective socio-economic interventions 
invariably go hand in hand. Contrary to all of  these notions, the 
research assembled by Skocpol and her collaborators suggests a complex, 
dialectical relationship, both between state autonomy and the power of  
groups in civil society (‘state autonomy and the power of  social groups 
can increase or decrease together’) and between state autonomy and 
state capacities (while in general one might assume these to vary together, 
sometimes they are in contradiction) [ibid.:353–5]. 
All this, I think, is highly suggestive of  research themes for Tropical 
Africa during the next decade or so.8 With reference back to the 
observation with which I began this section, it is plainly time we 
stopped talking about the ‘strength’ of  states as if  this had a single and 
straightforward meaning, and about the strength or weakness of  civil 
society as if  developments in civil society had an obvious and univocal 
impact upon the evolution of  the state. We also need to consider more 
carefully the distinction between ‘civil society’ and plain ‘society’ and 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 2A November 2016: ‘States, Markets and Society – New Relationships for a New Development Era’ 29–44 | 37
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
its implications for analyses of  state development.9 It seems perfectly 
consistent to say, for example, that while by general assent civil societies 
in most countries of  Tropical Africa are very poorly developed (whence 
the old theme of  the ‘overdeveloped state’), it is also the case that states 
have, comparatively speaking, very little autonomy; they are in Mydral’s 
sense soft, and more generally uninsulated from the particularistic 
loyalties and ‘role diffuseness’ which prevail in African societies, perhaps 
precisely to the extent that they have not developed as civil societies.10 The 
most likely route towards increasing the state’s autonomy with respect 
to pressures of  these kinds – which seems in this case a precondition for 
raising its effectiveness as an agent of  development – is not completely 
clear. However a number of  hypotheses suggest themselves.
We cannot exclude in principle the possibility that African states will 
prove capable of  self-reform. It is, after all, by no means the case that 
there are no historical examples of  successful developmental states 
emerging out of  processes of  state development in which the role 
of  civil society was scant. Outside Africa, the most unambiguously 
successful developmental states from the Meiji Restoration onwards 
seem to have emerged out of  ‘revolutions from above’ in which 
non-state groups played an almost entirely passive role [Ruggie 1983; 
Trimberger 1978; White and Wade 1985]. On the other hand, one 
looks in vain in recent African experience for signs that within the 
military or civilian bureaucracies of  the continent there are the seeds 
of  a comparable transformation. Admittedly such things are by their 
nature hard to detect in advance, but the East Asian cases themselves 
indicate that there is a certain threshold of  state-bureaucratic autonomy 
which has to be reached before an effective revolution from above 
becomes a possibility, and it is at least doubtful whether this threshold 
has been crossed anywhere in Tropical Africa.
This being the case, a very different avenue seems worth exploring. 
For a long time some students of  the African scene interested in such 
matters as bureaucratic corruption have seemed to suggest that it is not 
inappropriate to put the African situation against the background of  the 
long struggle against corrupt practices in British history between the 17th 
and 19th centuries [Wraith and Simpkins 1963]. The implication appears 
to be that the development in civil society of  groups – thrusting self-made 
entrepreneurs, new-style professional associations – which are capable of  
imposing new standards of  public morality on politicians and bureaucrats 
may be the best or only route to higher levels of  state development in 
Africa as in some otherwise very different industrialising societies.
This type of  idea has been developed in one form11 in Goran Hyden’s 
No Shortcuts to Progress [1983] which argues that despite a superficial 
structural resemblance with its colonial predecessor, the post-colonial 
African state is ‘a state with no structural roots in society’. It is like 
‘a balloon suspended in mid-air’, and thus prone to be punctured by 
excessive demands as the ‘economy of  affection’ (i.e. the sphere of  
anti-bureaucratic, particularistic loyalties) swamps the public realm, 
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rendering it unable to function without an indiscriminate and wasteful 
use of  resources. According to Hyden, the only long-term solution to 
this state of  affairs lies in the adoption of  market-oriented economic 
policies which permit the growth of  new social forces that will battle 
against the pressures of  ‘clan’ politics. ‘The essence of  these new 
policies must be to strengthen the market, and through such measures, 
the development of  a core of  people ready to defend the market at any 
cost and to withstand the pressures of  the economy of  affection and its 
ensuing clan politics. These people will constitute the core of  a local 
capitalist class…’ [Hyden 1983:19, 52–3]. 
It must be said that a part of  Hyden’s case for capitalism in Africa rests 
upon ideas about the intrinsic limitations of  peasant production and 
the virtues of  large-scale enterprise which, although now more nuanced 
or perhaps contradictory, than in his earlier book on Tanzania [1980], 
remain highly questionable [cf. Kasfir 1986]. Nevertheless, the thesis 
that the state needs to become more effectively bureaucratised (in the 
Weber sense) and that this will happen, for social and political rather than 
economic reasons, only as society becomes more capitalist, is interesting.12 
Again, recalling our earlier discussion of  the prospects of  sustaining a 
new economic policy regime, it is by no means certain that in practice 
new ‘bourgeois’ groups would be as implacably opposed to the politics of  
special favours for ethnicity and region and the corresponding forms of  
state as Hyden hopes.13 Much, presumably, would depend on the precise 
terms on which the new forms of  enterprise were put in place. At the 
very least, though, Hyden’s vision is a hypothesis to which researchers will 
need to give attention in exploring and assessing the more permanent, 
long-term effects of  economic liberalisation. 
My purpose, once again, is not to legislate about these issues but to give 
an indication of  just how much there is going to be to find out about 
the pattern of  change in post-crisis African societies. As I have argued 
in this section, the newer forms of  civil-society development throughout 
the region are becoming vital subjects of  research not just for their own 
sake or in terms of  their implications for economic recovery in the short 
or medium term, but also, and perhaps above all, with a view to their 
eventual consequences for the development of  politics and the state. 
In the spirit of  Bayart’s [1986] review of  the prospects for democracy, 
there is a sense in which those interested in the future of  the state in 
Africa should begin by studying civil society. 
IV. A Concluding Note on Elitism and Participation 
In the interests of  simplicity and brevity, this article has concentrated on 
the major reasons for not viewing the current trend in Africa in terms of  
a simple polarity of  state versus civil society. This has meant dwelling on 
certain extreme alternative possibilities outlined in very stark as well as 
abstract terms. Since the resulting scenarios may seem unduly limiting 
and depressing, I should like before concluding to register two points 
about one aspect of  the matter – the strong emphasis given to the roles 
of  emergent elite or dominant-class groups to the apparent exclusion 
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of  the development of  new and effective forms of  democratic mass 
participation in the politics of  development. 
First, I would say that this initial stab at the problem does not at all 
exclude the possibility that reforms in the institutional framework for 
local political representation will enhance peasant political influence in 
some places to the point where the more oppressive aspects of  the state-
led model of  agricultural development can be replaced by a pattern 
based on more decentralised but non-market types of  organisation 
[Barker 1985; Brett 1986; Mackintosh 1985]. I note only that the 
literature is fairly uniformly discouraging about effective peasant 
political organisation, whereas the role and position of  elite farmer 
groups seems to have been critical almost everywhere. 
Second, more encouragingly, all such developments have to be viewed 
in a dynamic political context; they are not once-and-for-all changes 
which are likely to remain frozen in permanence. In particular, 
economic changes and institutional rearrangements which permit the 
expression of  elite farmer views in favour of  particular rural interests 
and limited improvements in the functioning of  state institutions, may 
in time generate irresistible pressures towards the broadening of  such 
participation. This at least seems to be one of  the lessons of  the Indian 
experience [Blair 1985]. I think it is at least worth considering that 
socially limited but strongly institutionalised arrangements for ‘self-help’ 
and local political representation such as have existed for example in 
Kenya may prove as productive of  wide participation in the long run 
as the theoretically more inclusive arrangements which exist elsewhere 
– for example, Tanzania [Holmquist 1984; Kleemeier 1986; Leonard 
1984]. In all events, these are important further issues to which research 
needs to be addressed. 
Notes
1 This paper outlines some of  the author’s thoughts at the beginning 
of  a major research project, not the results of  completed work; 
I am very conscious that it contains many questions, often of  an 
extremely general kind, and relatively few answers, especially in the 
form of  detailed and well-founded illustrations from the experience 
of  particular countries or regions. I am grateful to Teddy Brett, 
Jean-Marc Fontaine, Moises Ikonicoff, Jim Manor, Subrata Mitra, 
Mick Moore, Hugh Roberts, Paul Sutton and Gordon White for 
helpful comments on the first draft, which was presented to the IDS/
EADI Workshop on ‘The Developmental State in Retreat?’, IDS, 
June 30–July 1, 1987. 
2 Here and in what follows I take the expression ‘civil society’ in the 
now conventional sense derived from Hegel as referring to the social 
space ‘intermediate… between the close-knit, immediate dependency 
of  the family bond, and the universal interest and perspective of  the 
state’, or more simply as ‘socio-economic life as distinct from the 
state’ [Mann 1983:45].
3 Hugh Roberts and Gordon White, invitation to the Workshop.
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4 The essential facts are laid out in different but consistent ways by 
Fieldhouse [1986] and Sender and Smith [1986].
5 While suggestive in other ways, the attempts to theorise the sources 
of  the present crisis in terms of  concepts of  neo-patrimonialism or 
‘personal rule’ [Callaghy 1986a, 1986b; Medard 1982: Sandbrook 
1985, 1986] seem insufficiently general in their application.
6 With Mick Moore [1986], I would reject the suggestion that finding 
Bates’ political analysis useful logically entails either agreement with 
his somewhat oversimplified economic analysis, or acceptance of  
the wider claims of  the rational choice school of  political science to 
which he claims to belong.
7 That is, where policies decided upon are often not enforced and 
where the authorities are systematically reluctant to place obligations 
on people [Myrdal 1968].
8 Although perhaps not quite the same thing, asking questions about 
state capacities would seem to be consistent with approaching states 
as organisations [Mars 1986].
9 I owe this important further clarification and the points which follow 
from it to Hugh Roberts.
10 The distinction here is between the sphere of  voluntary association 
and market-oriented behaviour regulated by law – ‘where individuals 
pursue their own self-interest within universally recognized bounds’ 
[Mann 1983:45] – and that of  the family and its extensions. However, 
in the African context, where the ramifications of  kinship and 
ethnicity are so widespread, it is probably not sensible to maintain 
such a sharp distinction. Bayart, who defines civil society as ‘society in 
its relations with the state… in so far as it is in confrontation with the 
state’ [1986:111], develops a conception of  civil society in Africa in 
which the elements of  particularism appear extremely strong.
11 An alternative formulation would be that it is important to measure 
processes of  change in Africa against the yardstick of  a rigorous, 
if  seemingly ethnocentric, conception of  civil society [cf. fn. 10] 
because the development of  a ‘true’ civil society is a crucial 
precondition for the achievement of  higher levels of  state autonomy 
and capacity – for example, because of  the way it helps to strengthen 
the distinction between the public and private domains.
12 As applies more generally to the substance of  this section, it 
is a question of  recovering some of  the essential insights of  
modernisation theory, themselves mostly taken from the classics of  
European social theory, without reinventing the evolutionism and 
ethnocentrism with which that tradition has tended to be associated. 
Hyden, like Bill Warren, goes out of  his way to identify with the most 
strongly evolutionist tradition within Marxism, but it does not follow 
that the connection is inevitable.
13 As Ravenhill points out, moreover, to advocate capitalism as a solution 
to Africa’s political problems ‘is merely to move the argument one step 
backwards to the question of  how political coalitions can be constructed 
that will favour giving a greater role to markets’ [1986b:27].
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Towards a Political Analysis of 
Markets
Gordon White
Article originally published July 1993, Volume 24 Issue 3; original IDS 
editing is retained here.
Abstract This Bulletin stems from a dissatisfaction with the way in 
which the idea of ‘the market’ or ‘the free market’ is currently used in 
conventional discourse on development issues. One notion is particularly 
dominant, implicitly or explicitly: ‘the market’ seen as a flexible, atomistic 
realm of impersonal exchange and dispersed competition, characterized 
by voluntary transactions on an equal basis between autonomous, usually 
private, entities with material motivations. This etiolated model of the 
market derives from the universe of neo-classical economists and, in the 
world of development policy, serves to provide intellectual support for their 
prescriptions. This ‘ideal-type’ market has been elevated to the level of an 
ideological principle and ethical ideal, providing a policy panacea which 
promises both efficiency, prosperity and freedom. The main theme of this 
Bulletin reflects my own concern as a political scientist that, by and large, 
conventional economic theory, in most of its manifold incarnations, has 
either ignored or downplayed the role of power in economic processes 
generally and in markets in particular.
1 INTRODUCTION
The basic rationale for attempting a political analysis of  markets has 
been briefly laid out in the Editorial Introduction to this Bulletin. 
During the 1980s, ‘the market’, or the ‘free market’ became the 
key catchword of  international development discourse and took 
on virtually magical qualities as a developmental panacea. In the 
world of  ideas, it was an intellectual juggernaut given political force 
(and therefore intellectual credibility) not only by the dominance of  
neo‑liberalism in the key metropolitan countries (notably ‘Reaganomics’ 
and ‘Thatcherism’), but also by the notion of  ‘market socialism’ in 
the former (and, in the case of  China, still) state socialist countries. 
As a powerful ideological slogan, it had to rely only partly on its 
intellectual and practical plausibility. I have been constantly appalled 
by the simplistic way in which ‘the market’ is introduced into policy 
debates, not the least in the Chinese context with which I am the most 
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familiar, where ‘the market’ has taken on the aura of  an unproblematic 
economic and political saviour. 
Fortunately, some of  the ideological dust seems to be settling in the 
early 1990s and the time is ripe for a basic reconsideration of  both 
the concept and the reality of  markets. Much of  the intellectual and 
practical case for the beneficial economic consequences of  markets is 
now widely accepted across the political spectrum. Now we need to 
take our understanding of  markets one step further. At the conceptual 
level, it is important to move analysis away from an overly abstract, 
simplified and ideologically loaded conception of  markets which, when 
fed into policy, can have damaging results. To do this, it is necessary to 
go beyond the rarefied categories of  conventional economic analysis: 
through innovation within economics itself  and the introduction of  
ideas from other disciplines, ideally fused or overlapping in a cross‑
disciplinary fashion. At the empirical level, an effort to ‘deconstruct’ 
the market is all the more pressing in a new global politico‑economic 
context in which the old polarity between ‘centrally planned’ and 
‘market economies’ has been replaced by a situation in which, while 
only ‘market economies’ are on offer, it is becoming increasingly clear 
that there is a wide range of  variation between market economies. 
Today, we talk about the differences between Japanese and Western 
capitalist market economies; in future we will have to talk with much 
more precision about a far wider variety of  market economies which 
differ in fundamental ways (Korean capitalism, Chinese capitalism, 
Brazilian capitalism). If  the neo-classically derived paradigm of  ‘the 
market’ was inadequate in the past in elucidating the dynamics of  real 
markets, so much more in the future as the range of  systemic diversity 
increases. The kind of  analysis presented in this Bulletin represents 
merely one component of  a much wider intellectual and practical 
dissatisfaction with the conventional paradigm of  the market and its 
practical effects in the industrialized, industrializing and Third Worlds.
2 A POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF MARKETS
The main points of  my argument have already been stated in the 
Introduction to this Bulletin. The abstract conception of  the market 
deriving from neoclassical economics overrides variations in real 
markets which are very important for considering and tackling 
practical problems of  development. (For this issue, see Mackintosh 
1990.) It also abstracts from social, political and institutional aspects 
of  real markets which cannot be dismissed as ‘exogenous’ factors but are 
inherent, and indeed may be essential, characteristics of  the functioning 
of  markets in the real world. In particular, conventional economic 
analysis of  markets by and large ignores or marginalizes the presence 
of  power which is a glaringly visible characteristic of  real markets and 
a political analysis of  markets is needed to reveal the manifold ways in 
which power and power relations influence the structure and operation 
of  real markets. Using a power‑based notion of  the ‘political’, one can 
classify the politics of  markets into at least four major forms: the politics 
of  state involvement; the politics of  market organization; the politics of  
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market structure; and the politics of  social embeddedness. My purpose 
here is to discuss these ideas and arguments in more detail.
First, we need to be more clear about the notion of  power. The concept 
is much discussed and contested. (For valuable treatments of  the 
concept, see Bardhan 1991 and Lukes 1986.) Much of  the discussion 
tends to revolve around what could be called a behavioural and a 
structural view of  power. The first concentrates on power mainly in 
dyadic relationships between two agents; superior power is reflected 
in the ability of  agent A to influence the calculations and behaviour 
of  agent B to the effect that agent B chooses to do something which 
he/she otherwise would not have done (with the implication that B 
is somehow worse off as a consequence). If  one views a market as 
made up of  a myriad of  individual exchanges, this micro‑level notion 
of  power is essential for understanding the specific dynamics of  each 
exchange event. However, the behavioural notion of  power has severe 
limitations. It tends to take the initial endowments of  power resources 
of  each agent as given and is not concerned to inquire whence they 
came, preferring to focus on the mechanics whereby power is exercised. 
However, each real market is a patterned set of  social relations with its 
own specific constellation of  power; if  the power relation involved in a 
micro‑level market exchange is to be understood, therefore, it must be 
situated in the context of  a structural analysis of  this wider system. The 
power-patterning of  markets affects an agent’s choice by determining 
the boundaries of  available choices, influencing the operational calculus 
of  the chooser and shaping the relative attractiveness of  various choices. 
A combination of  behavioural and structural analysis also allows us 
to capture the dynamics of  the operation of  power within markets as 
a systemic process in which agents make their own market history, as 
it were, though not within circumstances of  their own choosing. Just 
as spectacles are usually preferable to monocles for good vision, the 
behavioural and the structural conceptions of  power are both essential 
to understanding power in markets.
If  we incorporate this idea of  power within our understanding of  
markets, their characteristic economic features embody political 
processes of  conflict and cooperation and political relations of  
domination and subordination. From this viewpoint, therefore, market 
man or woman is less interested in bartering and trucking’ or making 
rational choices in response to given signals and more interested in 
seeking to protect, consolidate or extend their power within the market. 
For example, Victor Keegan (The Guardian, 9 June, 1991), commenting 
on an OECD report warning about the escalating dangers of  oligopoly 
in the industrialized world, notes wryly that ‘The natural state of  
the sentient capitalist is one of  unqualified monopoly, with qualified 
monopoly as decidedly second‑best, but often the condition to which 
competition and regulation reduce him’.
This notion of  the market as an arena of  power struggle between 
competing interests is conveyed well by Alan Cawson who notes (1988) 
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that: ‘The real world of  trade politics is a far cry from the notion of  
competition as an impersonal mechanism for allocating resources, and 
much closer to the idea of  economics as war pursued by peaceful means’. 
Here Cawson is drawing explicitly on an intellectual tradition deriving 
from Max Weber who made a similar analysis of  prices and money: 
Money prices are the product of  conflicts of  interest and of  
compromises; they thus result from power constellations. Money is 
not a mere ‘voucher for unspecified utilities’, which could be altered 
at will without any fundamental effect on the character of  the 
price system as a struggle of  man against man. ‘Money’ is, rather, 
primarily a weapon in this struggle; [money prices] are instruments 
of  calculation only as estimated quantifications of  relative chances in 
this struggle of  interests:  
(Weber (1922) 1978: 108, cited in Granovetter 1992:8–9)
Weber is referring here to the specific instrumentalities of  economic 
power. However, power is a protean phenomenon and power resources 
in markets are many and various. We would therefore wish to extend 
our analysis to involve four dimensions of  market power – the 
state, association, economic assets and socio‑cultural status (labelled 
p1 to p4 for ease of  reference). Each of  these constitutes the basis for 
a specific form of  market politics. The substance of  market politics 
is characteristically about a number of  issues: about the position of  
an agent or agents in relation to others within a market and their 
differential ability to extract resources through exchanges with other 
market participants; about the rules of  the game and the nature of  
market institutions; and about the boundaries of  the market (for 
example, with the public sector or the household). Participants in the 
politics of  a specific market may involve both actors in that market, 
actors in other markets with intersecting exchanges and interests, and in 
other social spheres, such as the family or the state. 
With these analytical clarifications in mind, we can now investigate each 
of  the four categories of  market politics in more detail.
π1 The Politics of State Involvement 
This is the most familiar arena of  market politics since it is commonly 
discussed under the rubric of  the state‑market paradigm. Our analysis 
differs from the latter in two respects. First, the conventional state-
market paradigm predisposes us to think in dichotomous terms of  two 
distinct spheres: on the one side, there is the realm of  politics which 
has to do with the state and other institutions making up the system of  
formal public politics; on the other side, there is the realm of  economics 
in which economic agents of  diverse kinds produce, exchange and 
distribute through the modality of  markets. In the real world, of  course, 
the realms of  state and market, public political and economic systems, 
are densely and inextricably intertwined. Second, rather than separate 
the realms of  politics and economics as the state‑market paradigm 
does, we regard both the state/public political system and the economy 
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as matrices of  politics – from this perspective, ‘economic’ events and 
processes are not ‘outside politics’ or ‘non‑political’ but themselves 
embody diverse forms of  politics.
State involvement in markets takes two common forms. The first 
is when the state, usually through one of  its specific institutional 
components, is a direct participant in a market through direct control 
over production, accumulation or exchange (for example, industrial 
parastatals or state farms, state banks, agricultural marketing boards). 
State enterprises may play a monopolistic role in the provision of  
key industrial inputs to downstream private firms, notably energy 
and basic raw materials such as steel and coal. The state may play a 
crucial monopsonistic or hegemonic purchasing role in a variety of  
markets: for example, as contractor for the services of  private defence 
and telecommunications industries in Western European nations 
(Cawson et al. 1990) or in the purchase of  agricultural produce in many 
developing countries. In the latter case, the work of  Jonathan Barker 
(1989) and Robert Bates (1981) has been particularly valuable in tracing 
the political dynamics of  interactions between state agencies and 
peasant producers in the context of  African agricultural markets. Bates, 
for example, analysed African agricultural markets as political arenas 
characterized by specific constellations of  conflicting political actors and 
interests and showed how these political dynamics led to consequences 
which were economically deleterious but, from the point of  view of  
state actors at least, political rational.
The second dimension of  state involvement in markets is that of  
regulation, a phenomenon which has several layers of  market 
penetration. The first layer is the relatively superficial one of  
parametric policy intervention by the government of  the day to 
facilitate market operations, correct market distortions, achieve social 
or developmental goals and the like. At a deeper level, the state’s 
involvement is pervasive; it is the source of  a complex network of  
institutionalized arrangements which permeate markets and influence 
the way they operate: for example, the legal definition of  property 
rights, licensing laws, standardization of  weights and measures, creation 
and validation of  money and the regulation of  contracts. At an even 
deeper level, state power saturates market exchange in invisible ways, 
an immanent quality which is redolent of  Michel Foucault’s ‘capillary’ 
notion of  power which acts to ‘permeate, characterise and constitute 
the social body’ (Foucault 1976, in Lukes 1986, 228). For example, in 
the context of  a highly developed consumer market characterized by a 
dense network of  state regulation built up coral‑like over a long period, 
a simple transaction such as buying a bar of  chocolate is saturated by 
state power, which may regulate hours of  sale, precise measurement 
or description of  contents, the positioning of  chocolate on the counter 
and its proximity to other goods, the environmental soundness of  its 
wrapping, the price paid and the nature and value of  the money used to 
pay for it, and so on (and this is disregarding other provisions regarding 
its production and distribution).
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The nature and degree of  this institutionalized saturation by state power 
is intellectually important for classifying different types of  markets 
and measuring their degree of  ‘maturity’ and practically important 
in conditioning their operational effectiveness. This ‘institutional 
patterning’ of  markets by state power needs more investigation since 
one of  the features of  the development of  markets seems to be that this 
role is increasingly transferred from more traditional social institutions 
such as kinship, religion or locality (which we discuss under the heading 
of  π4) to the modern state, a process of  historical ‘re-embedding’.
π2 The Politics of Market Organization
This is a form of  power and politics internal to the market, whereby 
participants in the market act to alter the operation of  the market to 
favour their own interests and enhance their capacity to pursue them. 
They may do this among themselves or in cooperation/conflict with 
actors outside their specific market (in the state or in other markets). To 
the extent that their action results in the creation of  established rules 
of  the game or institutionalized practices within the market, this form 
of  politics can result in what might be called ‘endogenous regulation’. 
At its roots, this represents an attempt to achieve ‘organizational 
transcendence’ of  the market through various forms of  collective action.
From a Weberian perspective, this can be seen in terms of  two 
concomitant and competing processes: social closure or usurpation. 
Successful social closure undertaken through the collective action of  
market participants results in the establishment of  conditions which 
protect or extend the market position of  those actors, often at the 
expense of  other groups within the market. Usurpation represents a 
counter‑attack by threatened or subordinated actors, such as workers 
or consumers, to improve their power within the market (these 
notions are discussed in depth by Parkin 1979). As Cawson (1988) 
remarks, these ‘social bonds which develop out of  self‑interest between 
“competitors”… are not an aberration from the free market but define 
the essence of  the exercise of  power in the market’. 
The exercise of  associational power takes a number of  commonly 
observable forms, of  which three are particularly important: formal 
association, network and hierarchy.
Formal association provides much of  the substance of  the politics 
of  ‘civil society’ and takes a wide variety of  forms, e.g. business 
associations, commodity cartels, trade unions, consumer groups and 
professional associations. For example, highly skilled professionals 
provide classic examples of  occupational groups which feel themselves 
threatened by a potentially fully‑functioning competitive market and 
organize to evade or transcend it. Their strategy is based on what 
is called ‘credentialism’ (which is a major symptom of  the ‘diploma 
disease’) which gives rise to institutionalized mechanisms operating 
to define and protect their own privileged position in the market and 
to limit the claims of  other (actual or potential) market participants. 
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Obvious cases which spring to mind are the medical and the legal 
professions.
This phenomenon raises interesting questions about the role played 
by the formal associations of  ‘civil society’ within the market. Current 
political discourse tends to regard civil society as a ‘good thing’, 
particularly as a bulwark for freedom and autonomy in the face of  
potential state Leviathans. But what about its role in relation to the 
market? Opinion is much more divided on this issue. Some argue 
that the exercise of  associational power has a negative economic 
or developmental effect since it creates unearned rents and thereby 
distorts the ‘proper’ operation of  markets; others argue that such 
organizations may have many positive effects, for example in amassing 
and distributing information, setting and monitoring standards, and 
providing mechanisms for arbitration or sanctions. This needs more 
thought and investigation.
Networks take a variety of  forms, the basic idea being that of  informal 
coordination and cooperation between market participants, individuals 
or firms, who are ostensibly competitors in the market. Powell (1990), 
who has documented the importance of  networks in the craft, 
construction, publishing, film and recording industries in the United 
States, calls this ‘patterned exchange’ which ‘looks more like a marriage 
than a one‑night stand but there is no marriage licence, no common 
household, no pooling of  assets’. The network is a distinctive, semi‑
institutionalized form of  interaction which counteracts the workings of  a 
competitive market. (For a useful discussion of  the idea, see Granovetter 
1992: 9–13.) Examples would include collaborative ventures between 
firms, or agreements about market share or price based on reciprocity, 
trust and mutual dependence. Industrial economists have identified 
networks as a crucial ingredient in the success of  local industrial 
regions in Western Europe, notably the cases of  Baden-Württemberg 
in Germany and Emilia Romagna in Italy. (For example, see Schmitz 
1992, and Best 1990). Students of  East Asian business systems have 
also documented the crucial importance of  networks in coordinating 
activity between firms in Japan (in fact, Kumon 1992 has called Japan a 
‘network society’) and between business and government in China (Wank 
1992). In current discourse on industrial development, the economic 
role of  networks is regarded as positive, not the least because they have 
been identified as one component of  a number of  highly successful 
economic experiences in Western Europe and East Asia. As in the case 
of  formal associations, however, networks could well function as ways 
of  amassing unproductive rent as ‘conspiracies against the public’, so 
the phenomenon needs more investigation before any form of  policy 
prescription can be advanced with confidence.
Hierarchy: I am using Oliver Williamson’s word here (1975) to 
describe the most fundamental form of  social closure within the market, 
the firm. In Williamson’s view, the firm, and the hierarchy which it 
embodies, should be seen as an attempt to internalise transactions and 
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resource flows that might otherwise be conducted in a more costly 
fashion in the market; it is the substitution of  the visible hand of  the 
manager for the invisible hand of  the market. In other words, firms 
are ‘islands of  planned coordination in the sea of  market relations’ 
(Richardson 1972). While Williamson does not incorporate power into 
his analysis, the firm is in fact acting as a ‘governance structure’ (Coase 
1937) and as such is a node of  power and a rich field of  micropolitics 
– of  authority, control, cooperation and domination. From a power 
perspective, the firm can be seen as a kind of  ‘combat unit’ designed 
for battle in the market; hierarchical controls operate internally to 
maintain the discipline necessary to carry on the market struggle, 
competitive or otherwise, in ways which are economically advantageous 
to the firm’s owners, private or otherwise (in the Marxist tradition 
this involves the extraction of  surplus value). The firm expands and 
contracts, and changes its ‘foreign policy’ and internal organization in 
response to changing conditions in the market. As recent discussion of  
the rise of  ‘post-Fordism’ in the industrialized countries has suggested, 
the relationship between the micro-politics of  markets at the firm level 
and the politics and economics of  markets at meso/macro levels is 
interactive and highly dynamic.
π3 The Politics of Market Structure
This is a conception of  markets as a structure of  power relations between 
agents with differential control over market-relevant material and 
mental assets. At the micro level, participants come to specific markets 
with unequal endowments in terms of  resources (cf. Sen’s notions of  
capabilities and entitlements; 1984, chaps. 13 and 20). At the macro 
level, this results in widely different market structures characterized by 
more or less equal or unequal power; each specific structure of  power 
conditions the way markets operate at the macro‑level, shapes the 
character of  exchange relations between individual market participants 
and influences their relative returns from exchange. As Bardhan points 
out in a recent paper on power in economics (1991:267), ‘power may 
be centrally involved in causing the existing pattern (and in defining 
the existing parameters) of  trade in the first place’. This idea is also 
present in Bhaduri’s idea of  ‘forced commerce’ wherein ‘the “market 
mechanism” is… better understood not in terms of  its allocative 
efficiency, but as the mechanism for extraction of  surplus by one class 
from another… the function of  exchange is not to “clear” the market 
in some cases, but simply to gain advantage to one party at the cost of  
another’; he talks about the ‘class efficiency’ of  markets.
Whereas in π1 and π2, we were looking at the transcendence of  market 
exchanges by means of  conscious, organized political action, in π3 the 
politics is a process which is one aspect of  the relationship between 
market participants in the act of  exchange, operating whatever the 
degree of  competitiveness within that market. Markets can thus be 
analysed as political games in which outcomes are structured in terms 
of  choices taken in the context of  variable but structured asymmetries 
in the capacities of  participants, which vary across specific markets and 
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which may in certain contexts result in systematic exploitation through 
unequal exchange. Dyadic market exchanges may thus be expressions 
of  relations between dominant and subordinate classes.
Conventional economic analysis, through its work on monopoly, 
oligopoly and ‘market power’, and more recently game theoretical work 
on bargaining within markets, has made some limited contribution 
to understanding this process. (For assessments, see Bardhan 1991 
and the article by Baland and Platteau in this Bulletin.) In the context 
of  agricultural markets, the work by Indian economists on ‘fused’ or 
‘interlocking’ markets involving ‘triadic power relations’ (for example, 
Bhaduri 1986 and Bharadwaj 1974, discussed by Janakarajan and 
Olsen in this Bulletin) has analysed the ways in which the interlocking 
of  markets for credit, product, leasing, labour, processing and 
transportation in rural contexts serves to give certain strategically 
situated groups an ability to dominate transactions with other market 
actors and benefit from unequal exchange. As a means to track these 
locations of  strategic control, the method of  tracing filières is useful in 
that it identifies the chain of  exchange from production through various 
links in marketing, processing and circulation. A filière map helps one 
to pinpoint precise locations of  profit and accumulation (for example, 
Barker (1989) has argued that trade is a more favourable location than 
production for accumulation in agricultural markets in Africa) and 
thereby identify precise points at which privileged positions can form 
and, more generally, relations between super‑ and subordinate classes or 
strata can coalesce.
The above models of  ‘fused’ and ‘interlocking’ markets are limited in 
their application because they have emerged from and been applied 
to relatively undeveloped agrarian markets still in transition from 
pre‑capitalist systems of  economic exchange. However, recent work in 
the Marxian tradition on more advanced markets in the industrialized 
countries has attempted to demonstrate how asymmetrical power 
relations exert influence, and domination and exploitation take place, 
in markets which are operating in ways more closely approximating the 
standard model of  a competitive market. For example John Roemer 
(1982, 1988) has argued that ‘capitalist exploitation’ takes place within 
a context of  ‘free’, ‘voluntary’ competitive exchange by virtue of  
unequal ownership of  property. In their theory of  ‘contested exchange’, 
Samuel Bowles and Herb Gintis (1990) have attempted to establish ‘new 
micro‑foundations for political economy, one that illuminates rather 
than obscures the exercise of  power’. There is also work on international 
exchange by David Evans where he argues (1990: 1295) that ‘systematic 
consideration of  class, inequality and power can be brought to bear on 
trade and development issues without loss of  analytical rigour’.
From the point of  view of  a strict economist, this last methodological 
point is important since one of  the usual arguments against the 
incorporation of  power into economic analysis is that it cannot be 
done rigorously. However, conventional analyses of  monopoly and 
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game‑theoretical approaches have far more potential for incorporating 
a rigorous analysis of  power than they have so far demonstrated. The 
triadic power relations characteristic of  interlocked markets have been 
modelled formally by Subramanian (as an appendix to Janakarajan 
1992) and it has been suggested that the methodology of  neo‑classical 
economics can provide a precise and empirically testable measure 
of  power by extending the theory of  monopoly (Ritson 1977). One 
is tempted to conclude that it is really a question of  whether or not 
economists are willing to put their minds to it. A ‘power theoretic’ and a 
‘choice theoretic’ approach seem logically inextricable and empirically 
necessary. Take the prisoners’ dilemma, for instance, – the dilemma 
lies not merely in the fact that their choices have sub‑optimal outcomes, 
but also in the fact that they are prisoners in the first place.
π4 The Politics of Social ‘Embeddedness’ 
This idea is drawn from (but goes beyond) Karl Polanyi’s notion (1957) 
of  markets as ‘embedded’ in wider social values and institutions. It 
implies that other principles of  social organization permeate markets and 
shape their structure and dynamics. It also implies that the motives of  
market actors cannot be reduced to mere considerations of  maximising 
self-interest and making profit. The latter sentiment is echoed in de 
Gregori’s exasperated remark (1979: 55) that ‘the economic man in the 
marketplace of  conventional economics is an individual without culture 
and therefore without existence’. Much recent analysis, for example, 
has emphasized the crucial importance of  trust and moral conceptions 
such as fairness or duty in regulating exchange between actors in a wide 
variety of  markets in more ‘traditional’ and more ‘modern’ contexts. 
(For a discussion of  these issues, see Granovetter 1992: 58–63.)
The notion of  embeddedness opens up a vast area of  interaction 
between markets and social processes, uniting the terrain of  economics 
with the traditional concerns of  anthropologists, sociologists and 
psychologists: kinship systems, cultural values, religious beliefs and 
institutions, social differentiation based on gender, ethnicity and race, 
and so on. My own concern here is far narrower: with the effect on 
the operation of  markets of  the power relations which may themselves 
be embedded in these social beliefs and institutions. One example is 
the impact of  gender on the role of  women within markets – both 
materially through the influence of  the gender division of  labour in 
the economy at large and attitudinally through the influence of  gender 
ideologies inherent in established cultural or religious beliefs. (For an 
analysis, see the article by Alison Evans in this Bulletin.) These social 
factors often operate to subordinate women by restricting their access 
to markets, limiting the resources they can use in market exchange, 
defining rules of  the market game which are prejudicial to their interests 
and distributing them invidiously between markets. From this point of  
view, markets are one social arena in which the pervasive power game 
between male and female interests is played out. Similar analyses could 
deal, for instance, with the role of  race in the operation of  markets in 
South Africa, or the role of  religion in the operation of  markets in Iran.
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3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
At the analytical level, we hope to have convinced the reader that real 
markets are social amalgams interacting with and pervaded by the state 
and society at large, and political entities permeated by power relations 
of  diverse kinds. Though we have described the political nature of  
markets in terms of  four separate categories, there are, of  course, 
complex ‘boundary exchanges’ between them. For example, while we 
have emphasized the impact of  state politics (π1) on markets, we have 
not discussed the ways in which the associational politics of  π2 affect 
state politics (for example, through the influence of  powerful economic 
lobbies on officials or the ‘pull’ exerted by personal networks linking 
business people and politicians). There is also a systematic relationship 
between the power relations of  π3 and the associational possibilities of  
π2: a small group of  large landlords, for example, may well find it easier 
and more productive to organize in their own interests than a much 
larger number of  small tenants. The power definitions and distribution 
inherent in a religiously-based caste system (in category π4) may well 
structure the allocation of  market power in π3. We can thus conceive of  
class formation in political terms as the result of  a process of  mutually 
enforcing interaction between power differentials in these four spheres. 
By contrast, power relations in each sphere may be in conflict, as when 
powerful trade‑unions arise to challenge the power vested in unequal 
ownership of  the means of  production, or when workers influence state 
power, through votes or revolution, to secure regulation of  markets in 
their interests or to bring about a redistribution of  marketable assets 
(as through land reform). Using these categories, we can also approach 
the explanation of  market institutions in political terms, as a necessary 
complement to theories which stress transaction costs or information. 
Market institutions can be seen as a consequence and expression of  
power relations and political struggle in and between these four areas of  
market politics.
But does the political analysis of  markets have any practical value for 
the world of  development in which analysis exists for the purposes of  
action? In relation to successful policy intervention, it should caution 
against operating with too starveling or utopian a conception of  ‘the 
market’ or the ‘free market’ and sensitize policy-makers to the structural 
and institutional diversity of  real markets and the complex political 
processes which shape and underpin them. Any one‑sided and/or 
economistic definition of  market ‘distortion’, for example, runs the 
risk of  coming up with simplistic policy conclusions which mis‑specify 
the problem and underestimate the possibilities of  change. It not only 
faces the familiar problem that, even where markets may be working 
‘well’, they may have unacceptable welfare consequences, for example 
by increasing the vulnerability of  the poor to market fluctuations. 
It also faces awkward questions about the existence of  apparently 
highly successful markets which are systematically ‘distorted’ in ways 
analysed above. There is here an important range of  questions about 
how variations in the power structuring of  specific markets affects 
developmental outcomes. This goes beyond the usual questions about 
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the nature and extent of  state regulation to include the ‘endogenous’ 
regulation of  markets: for example, the pervasiveness of  networks 
in Japanese or Italian industrial markets; the function of  industry/
trade associations in improving their members’ ability to compete 
in international markets; or the role of  professional organizations 
in regulating skilled‑labour markets. The problems for investigation 
here are why some of  these forms of  markets organization are 
developmentally beneficial and some not, and how the former can be 
encouraged and the latter discouraged through policy.
Moreover, the manipulation (and in the Eastern European case, the 
creation ex nihilo) of  markets through policy intervention would seem 
to require far more than the application of  an analytical blancmange 
mould derived from conventional economics: a knowledge of  context 
and variation, and of  the complex social, political and institutional 
dimensions of  real markets. As I remarked at the outset, variations in 
markets partly reflect a wider differentiation between market systems, 
between forms of  capitalism, which offers a range of  alternative 
institutional incarnations of  markets. (For an example of  this range of  
options in the context of  current Chinese financial reforms, see Bowles 
and White 1993.) This variation does not bedevil analysis because these 
variations and processes can be classified and analysed systematically, 
ideally through inter‑disciplinary endeavour.
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Strengthening Civil Society 
in Africa: The Role of Foreign 
Political Aid
Mark Robinson
Article originally published May 1995, Volume 26 Issue 2; original IDS 
editing is retained here.
Abstract Strengthening civil society through the provision of financial 
resources and technical assistance is viewed by aid donors as an effective 
means of fostering political pluralism and consolidating fragile democracies 
in developing countries. Starting from the premise that donors lack a 
well‐defined notion of civil society which obscures its conflictual nature, 
this article considers a range of potential problems that aid donors might 
encounter in relation to the process of democratic consolidation when 
supporting civil society organizations. It argues that since donors are not 
well‐equipped to handle these types of interventions, they need to avoid 
undermining the autonomy and legitimacy of recipient organizations: 
their absorptive capacity is limited, only certain types of organization 
are able to contribute effectively to democracy promotion, and little is 
known about their impact. The objective of strengthening civil society may 
be laudable but since it is a difficult and potentially hazardous area for 
external intervention, donors should proceed cautiously and with modest 
expectations about what might be achieved.
Strengthening civil society constitutes an increasingly important element 
in the array of  positive aid measures adopted by aid donors as part of  the 
good government agenda. Although donors have long supported civic 
associations, often through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the 
volume of  aid allocated for this purpose has generally been small and it 
has been peripheral to the main aid policy agenda. The article begins 
by exploring the rationale behind this shift in emphasis, highlighting the 
interplay of  domestic and international factors. It then surveys the range 
of  meanings attributed to the concept in academic debate and the role 
of  civil society in the process of  democratic consolidation. The nature of  
the relationship between civil society and the state in Africa provides a 
basis for assessing the role of  foreign aid and its potential impact on the 
internal dynamics of  civic associations and their capacity to contribute 
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to political pluralism and democratic consolidation. The conclusion 
considers the benefits and limitations of  this type of  aid in strengthening 
civil society and the types of  interventions and funding mechanisms that 
hold most promise in this regard.
1 THE RESURGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
The 1990s have seen a major upsurge of  interest in the concept of  civil 
society and its relevance to understanding democratic transition and 
consolidation in the developing world. Although the civic realm was 
acknowledged to be an important locus of  organizational activity, few 
commentators gave the concept serious attention in view of  a general 
preoccupation with the role of  the state and authoritarian forms of  
government which prevailed in most developing countries. A number of  
factors help to explain a marked revival of  interest in a concept that had 
received limited attention in scholarly and aid policy circles, especially 
in Africa.1 
The experience of  democratization in most regions of  the developing 
world starting from the early 1980s was a major factor in shifting 
academic concerns from the state to societal institutions. It brought 
with it an interest in the capacity of  civic organizations and new social 
movements to play an active role in undermining authoritarian rule 
and contributing to the process of  democratic consolidation. This was 
especially important in Eastern Europe where the all-pervasive state 
had circumscribed an autonomous sphere of  associational life, but in 
which civil society provided the well-spring for the successful democracy 
movements of  the late 1980s, and a source of  inspiration for democracy 
movements elsewhere in the developing world.
A second explanation stems from economic factors which have political 
implications. Sustained economic decline and mismanagement in 
much of  Africa in the 1980s under the aegis of  statist regimes was often 
accompanied by disengagement from the formal economy, marked by 
the withdrawal of  the peasantry from the market back into subsistence 
production, outward migration and the spread of  the parallel economy 
characterized by hoarding, currency exchange, smuggling and other 
illegal activities. This process of  disengagement further undermined the 
legitimacy of  the state and weakened its links with societal institutions 
(Chazan 1988). In some contexts, such as Zambia, Côte D’Ivoire and 
Benin, the weakening of  the state’s legitimacy and its control over 
society gave succour to pro-democracy movements, whereas in countries 
such as Liberia and Somalia it gave rise to destructive tendencies 
promoted by ethnic and regional interests competing for political power 
(Bratton and van de Walle 1992). 
Third, the trend towards privatization and the rolling back of  the state 
as an integral element of  donor aid policy has focused attention on 
the scope for the provision of  public services through private sector 
organizations. In Africa, this has invariably centred the capacity of  the 
voluntary sector and local self-help organizations to contribute towards 
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health and educational provision given the unevenness of  formal sector 
provision, which has further shifted the balance of  power and social 
responsibility away from the state in favour of  societal institutions. This 
is reinforced by expectations on the part of  aid donors that NGOs in 
particular will play an increasingly significant role in service delivery 
and poverty alleviation programmes.
Fourth, problems encountered in the application of  political 
conditionality as a means of  fostering political reform and good 
government have focused donor attention on the potential for 
promoting these objectives through positive aid measures (Moore and 
Robinson 1994). This has included channelling aid to civic associations 
and organized interest groups with a view to enhancing democratic 
consolidation and political participation. The success of  these types of  
initiatives in Chile and South Africa has increased donors’ confidence in 
their potential elsewhere. Recipients of  such assistance typically include 
NGOs, business and professional associations (principally lawyers and 
journalists), trade unions, womens’ organizations, and human rights 
groups. All of  these are deemed as constituting key organizations in civil 
society, but there is little agreement about what is conveyed by the term 
or the objectives of  directing aid to such organizations.
2 CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
There are many competing interpretations of  civil society, which have 
their origins in various currents of  western political philosophy.2 In 
the liberal tradition, civil society is defined as a public realm located 
between the family and the state, consisting of  a plurality of  civil 
associations. The formation of  such associations by citizens of  their 
own volition can counteract the potential abuse of  power and wealth. 
They also function to nurture civil and political rights, to advocate 
popular demands and to promote democratic values. These ideas were 
challenged by theorists such as Hegel and Marx who espoused an 
historicist approach, in which civil society is seen as the product of  a 
long process of  historical transformation governed by the emergence 
of  a sphere of  market relations under capitalism. This notion was 
developed further by Antonio Gramsci, who treated civil society as an 
inherently conflictual arena, where civic institutions reproduce and 
disseminate the hegemonic ideas and values associated with capitalism, 
but which are subject to contestation. 
Clearly these two traditions are associated with very different 
interpretations of  civil society, which have significant operational 
implications, since most aid donors are inclined towards the liberal 
interpretation. However, some writers have discerned a degree of  
convergence between the two traditions centring on the claim that civil 
society is a distinct public realm located between the family and the state, 
where individuals join together to pursue collective goals (Bratton 1994: 
55-6). Civil society therefore includes a wide array of  organizations which 
have a range of  objectives stemming from the shared interests of  their 
members. According to Stepan (1988), it is distinct from political society, 
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which includes political parties, legislatures and elections, through which 
organized interests enter into coalitions and compete for political power. 
Diamond (1994) has classified civil society organizations into seven 
categories depending on their goals and membership: (1) economic 
(productive and commercial associations and networks); (2) cultural 
(religious, communal and ethnic associations); (3) informational and 
educational (organizations dedicated to the production and circulation 
of  ideas and information); (4) interest-based (designed to advance the 
interests of  workers, professionals, etc.); (5) developmental (NGOs and 
self-help groups); (6) issue-oriented (movements for environmental 
protection, womens’ rights, etc.) and (7) civic (aimed at strengthening 
the political system and imparting democratic values). According to 
Diamond civil society also encompasses the mass media and other 
institutions which contribute to the flow of  information and ideas 
(such as universities, publishing houses etc.) but which do not represent 
associations formed by organized interests. Such a typology resonates 
with the pluralist approach favoured by most aid donors who conceive 
civil society as an aggregation of  organized interests pursuing a benign 
and rational political agenda. For example, according to the UNDP:
Civil society is the sphere in which social movements become 
organized. The organizations of  civil society, which represent 
many diverse and sometimes contradictory social interests are 
shaped to fit their social base, constituency, thematic orientations 
(e.g. environment, gender, human rights) and types of  activity. They 
include church related groups, trade unions, cooperatives, service 
organizations, community groups and youth organizations, as well as 
academic institutions and others 
(Riddell and Bebbington 1995: 23).
For many commentators, the concept only attains practical significance 
when considered in relation to the state, and more specifically, the 
process of  democratization. As indicated in the previous section, civil 
society emerged into popular discourse in the late 1980s by virtue of  
the prominent role played by civic associations in democratic transitions 
in Latin America and Eastern Europe, especially by those representing 
the working class, professionals, students and new social movements 
which, in many instances, joined forces into a ‘popular upsurge’ against 
incumbent authoritarian regimes (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). 
The pivotal role played by mass protest in political transition in Africa 
has also received attention. According to Bratton (1994), three broad, 
primarily urban-based, groups have been important in the African 
context: the popular classes of  self-employed peasants, artizans and 
vendors; the unionized working class; and the middle classes consisting 
of  entrepreneurs, administrators and professionals. Prompted by a 
combination of  economic malaise and political atrophy, these strata 
joined forces to challenge the authority and legitimacy of  authoritarian 
regimes across the continent, in many cases giving rise to a process of  
democratic transition. This process was generally short-lived, culminating 
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in multi-party elections or in the installation of  a caretaker government 
to negotiate the form of  a successor regime. At this point, the institutions 
of  political society assumed a more prominent role in completing the 
transition from authoritarian rule, centred on political parties competing 
for power through elections. Having achieved their political objective, 
civic organizations, especially those representing professionals and the 
middle class, assumed a more neutral role, taking on responsibility for 
voter registration, election monitoring and human rights work. 
Now that this phase is largely complete, interest is increasingly focusing 
on the role played by civil society in democratic consolidation, defined 
as the process whereby democracy attains widespread acceptance as the 
preferred system for the conduct of  political affairs, since this has yet to 
be achieved in most African countries which have undergone a political 
transition. According to Diamond (1994: 7): 
Civil society is … a vital instrument for containing the power of  
democratic governments, checking their potential abuses and 
violations of  the law, and subjecting them to public scrutiny. Indeed, 
a vibrant civil society is probably more essential for consolidating and 
maintaining democracy than for initiating it.
This type of  approach finds resonance among bilateral aid agencies. 
According a recent paper published by the Development Assistance 
Committee of  the OECD (1994: 11).
[B]asic to democratization is the development of  a pluralist civil 
society comprised of  a range of  institutions and associations 
which represent diverse interests and provide a counterweight 
to government. Interaction between the formal political regime 
and civil society contributes to, and also requires, a responsive 
government, which is one of  the characteristics of  a functioning 
democracy. Supporting pluralism, e.g. the development of  
autonomous civil associations, professional and interest organizations, 
is an important step in fostering democratization.
White (1994) argues that the growth of  civil society can contribute 
to democratic governance in four complementary ways: altering the 
balance of  power between state and society to achieve a balanced 
opposition in favour of  the latter; enforcing standards of  public morality 
and performance and improving the accountability of  politicians and 
state officials; transmitting the demands and articulating the interests 
of  organized groups, in the process providing an alternative sphere 
of  representation; and instilling and upholding democratic values. 
However, as White points out, while civil society holds real potential 
to influence the process of  democratic consolidation, its role and 
significance in any given context is contingent on the specific character 
and power of  the state and the international political environment.
Civil society organizations in Africa vary considerably in their capacity 
to contribute to democratic consolidation and, in any case, many 
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of  these are neither equipped nor inclined to perform the various 
roles outlined by White. Indeed, the task of  improving the political 
system and making it more democratic is assigned by Diamond (1994) 
to a special category of  ‘civic’ organizations, although a range of  
organizations might be expected to contribute to this process, including 
womens’ groups, business associations and peasant organizations. 
At the same time it is important to recognize that not all organized 
interests will share a common view about the desirability of  democratic 
forms of  politics; indeed, the experience of  post-colonial rule in Africa 
suggests that in some circumstances social élites might perceive the 
reinstallation of  a democratic regime as an opportunity to gain special 
favours from corrupt politicians. Other sections of  civil society are 
likely to feel threatened by the prospect of  a civilian regime which 
commands authority and widespread popular support, especially those 
engaged in illegal or harmful activities such as smuggling and gun-
running. Moreover, there are many groups in African society who have 
no interest in politics or lack the time and resources to enable them 
to play an effective role in consensus-building. On the other hand, 
grassroots activity might act as a constraint on democracy by separating 
people from meaningful political participation at the national level. 
Finally, while the growth of  associational activity and the proliferation 
of  voluntary organizations can reinforce societal institutions they may 
undermine state capacity (Chazan 1992). Despite these qualifications, 
there may exist a particular set of  conditions in which a wide range of  
civil society organizations can take on constitutive and disciplinary roles 
which are supportive of  the process of  democratic consolidation. 
Bratton (1994) has identified three such conditions – material, 
organizational and ideological – which support the emergence of  active 
civil societies in the context of  political transition by giving them a base 
which is independent from that of  the state. Following the classical 
Marxist tradition, material conditions are a function of  the ability of  
groups and individuals to accumulate capital and hence are contingent 
on the growth of  an indigenous bourgeoisie. The political affiliations of  
this class are substantially affected by economic performance and the 
ability of  the government to create the conditions in which independent 
enterprises can prosper. Moreover, the existence of  a middle class is 
often held to be key to the consolidation of  a functioning democracy. 
The organizational realm refers to intermediate associations in civil 
society and the organizational linkages between them; this would 
typically include churches, trade union federations and business 
associations. The scope for these networks to emerge and establish 
an independent base is usually contingent on political and historical 
circumstances; clearly, the ending of  authoritarian rule provides them 
with political space to flourish and develop. Finally, the ideological 
dimension is a function of  the level of  discourse which mobilizes critical 
debate. In Africa, this invariably centres on problems of  economic 
mismanagement and élite corruption, although the rallying cry 
might take the form of  moral condemnation as opposed to popular 
mobilization depending on the organization which assumes the lead 
(Endnotes)
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role in the process of  political transition. But it can also take the form 
of  irredentism and fundamentalist movements which have little interest 
in democracy, as the case of  Algeria convincingly demonstrates, which 
should serve as a reminder of  the contradictory roles played by civil 
society organizations in this regard.
While these three factors are important, access to resources is a critical 
determinant of  the ability of  civic organizations to make an effective 
contribution to democratic consolidation. These take the form of  
financial as well as organizational and ideological resources. The 
resources available to civic organizations emerging from a protracted 
period of  authoritarian rule are usually fairly meagre on account 
of  suppression and limited access to outside information. Many 
organizations are formed during the process of  political liberalization 
and do not have strong social foundations. These will have considerable 
experience of  challenging authoritarian regimes but little knowledge 
of  building democratic government since; mobilizing public opinion 
against authoritarian rule is far easier than active promotion of  
democratic values and political participation. The absence of  a strong 
organizational base can limit the legitimacy they possess and the 
skills base on which they are able to draw. At the same time, while 
insufficient financial resources and limited technical expertise have 
posed problems for civil society organizations, the mobilization of  
funds through membership contributions has proved possible, especially 
for local credit unions and development groups, but also for trade 
unions and professional associations, and can enhance their legitimacy 
and accountability. In this respect Chazan (1992: 290) notes that 
‘associational autonomy is more central to the vitality of  civil societies 
than the availability of  adequate means’. Nevertheless, in situations 
where the ability to mobilize domestic financial resources is highly 
circumscribed, outside support can play a vital role in strengthening 
the capacity of  civic organizations to build and sustain democracy in 
the fragile conditions that many contemporary African societies are 
facing. External support derives principally from official aid donors, 
but historically assistance from political foundations, non-governmental 
organizations, international federations representing business and the 
professions (for example through the Rotarians and the Lions Clubs), 
trade unions, and churches have made a significant contribution. 
Although aid designed to strengthen civil society can be interpreted 
very broadly, the principal focus of  donor efforts in the context of  
democratic consolidation have been on urban-based organizations in 
six main categories: business and professional bodies, trade unions, 
womens’ organizations, human rights groups, religious organizations 
and advocacy-based NGOs.3
3 THE ROLE OF FOREIGN AID DONORS
For reasons outlined earlier, strengthening civil society has become 
a major objective of  aid donors in the 1990s, but there are historical 
precedents. The US government, for example, has funded civic 
organizations in developing countries in the past, but not always 
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with the intention of  deepening democracy. A prominent objective 
of  American political aid in the 1950s and 1960s was to counter 
Communist influence in the international trade union movement. 
Much of  this was provided by USAID and channelled through four 
regional labour institutes of  the International Department of  the 
American Federation of  Labor-Congress of  Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO) created in the 1960s. US democracy assistance programmes 
were formalized and expanded in the early 1980s and a variety of  
organizations assumed responsibility for publicly funded foreign 
political aid (see Carothers in this volume). The funds allocated for this 
purpose have increased rapidly, from US$93 million in 1990 to some 
$400 million in 1994.
Germany has also long been involved in democracy promotion 
centring on support for political parties, trade unions and civil society 
organizations. The German Stiftüngen (political foundations) aligned 
to the three major political parties, were originally founded for 
internal political education after World War II, but became active in 
international political projects in the 1950s. After the creation of  the 
German ministry for overseas development in 1961, the government 
channelled funds to the foundations for ‘socio-political education’ 
in developing countries. The bulk of  the funds are in the form of  
grants to party-based organizations, but projects to promote trade 
unions, cooperatives and other civil society organizations are also 
important. In 1989, funding from the German development ministry 
to the political foundations amounted to $156 million; a further 
$183 million was provided to German non-governmental organizations 
(Pinto-Duschinsky 1991). 
The British government has since adopted a similar model, but on 
a much smaller scale, in the form of  the Westminster Foundation 
for Democracy, which was established in 1992. Its objectives are to 
build democratic institutions overseas through support for political 
parties, human rights groups, trade unions, journalists’ and lawyers’ 
organizations, womens’ groups, and other civil society organizations. 
Half  the budget is allocated to British political parties to support 
counterparts in other countries, while the remainder is for all-party or 
no-party projects. In 1992/93 the Foundation provided grants totalling 
US$1,400,000 for 140 projects in three priority regions: Central and 
Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Anglophone Africa. 
Other bilateral aid donors and private foundations have supported 
similar activities in the past, but not on such a large scale as the 
American and German governments, and through a variety of  
institutional mechanisms.4 Most support trade union development, 
either through domestic trade union federations or through multilateral 
bodies like the ILO and the International Confederation of  Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU). In 1991 support from bilateral agencies for trade 
union development amounted to US$69 million (out of  US$92 million 
from all sources); almost half  of  this went to trade unions in Africa, 
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for a variety of  projects spanning education, health and safety, and 
capacity building (ICFTU 1993). The Danish government is among 
the larger donors in this area, allocating US$5 million annually to 
the Danish Trade Union Council for International Development 
Co-operation. USAID has assisted in the growth and development of  
business associations in several African countries as part of  an initiative 
to increase the profile of  the private sector. Canada and the Netherlands 
have given positive support to human rights organizations over a 
number of  years, usually with NGOs serving as intermediaries. Another 
important area of  donor intervention is the promotion of  womens’ 
rights, especially in the form of  legal awareness programmes, but also 
through more general capacity building and training programmes for 
womens’ organizations. 
A large proportion of  donor funding for civil society organizations 
is channelled through NGOs, although it is difficult to distinguish 
projects designed to strengthen institutional capacity and promote 
democratic development from those which have more narrowly 
focused development objectives. Examples of  the former are the 
special budget lines created by the European Commission which 
are open to NGOs: in 1992 US$8 million was allocated for human 
rights and democracy initiatives, and a further US$8 million for 
supporting the democratization process in Chile and Central America, 
primarily through Latin American and European NGOs.5 Special 
funds such as these are less common among the bilateral donors (the 
Dutch government is an exception in this regard since it has special 
programmes for human rights, trade unions and the media), although 
a number of  NGO projects funded through conventional co-financing 
mechanisms have similar objectives. For example, most human rights 
work supported by CIDA has been undertaken by NGOs, and funds 
for this have amounted to over US$100 million over the past decade 
(Riddell and Bebbington 1995: 54). 
Some donors concentrate their efforts on fostering a political and 
legislative environment which is conducive to the work of  civil society 
organizations, by ensuring that freedoms of  expression and association 
are enshrined in law, and pressing for changes in the legislative 
framework which govern their activities. A number support civic 
organizations for discrete democracy-building purposes, in the form 
of  election-monitoring, fostering accountability and transparency 
in government, and strengthening democratic political institutions. 
Another approach has been to increase the capacity of  organized 
interest groups to assume a more prominent role in policy dialogue 
and implementation, by improving their research and advocacy skills, 
strengthening their organizational base and providing them with 
equipment and office space. In some cases, increasing the involvement 
of  civic organizations in policy dialogue is designed to broaden the 
consensus behind a particular development strategy, which in much of  
Africa centres on economic liberalization and an enhanced role for the 
private sector.
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4 THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN POLITICAL AID
Although many donors are rapidly increasing the volume of  foreign 
political aid, the overall objectives of  projects designed to strengthen 
civil society organizations are not always clearly stated. For most 
donors, assisting the growth and development of  such organizations 
is intrinsically a good thing, since it contributes to political pluralism 
and draws more people into associational life. The expectation is that 
a vibrant civil society can facilitate political participation and inculcate 
democratic values by involving marginalized groups and providing 
them with access to those holding positions of  power, although in Africa 
this potential is generally latent rather than proven (Chazan 1992). 
Landell-Mills (1992: 552) identifies four ways in which civil society 
might be nurtured: (1) by facilitating the dissemination of  information; 
(2) by strengthening the rule of  law; (3) by expanding education and the 
capacity for self-expression and (4) by generating surplus resources to 
support associational activities without compromising their autonomy. 
Donor assistance efforts have ranged across all four areas, but in 
practice most support comes in the form of  financial resources and 
technical assistance.
However, since the overall objectives of  foreign political aid are often 
vague and ill-defined, it is difficult to assess the probable impact of  
interventions designed to strengthen civil society with any degree of  
precision. Nevertheless, it is possible to indicate what the probable 
effects might be in order to highlight problems that might arise if  
donors persist with a strategy premised on the pluralist notion that 
civil society organizations are working towards a common goal of  
strengthening democracy without a conflict of  interests. This would 
enable one to identify the most appropriate mechanisms for such 
assistance and to avoid interventions which might be counter-productive 
from the point of  view of  democratic consolidation or damaging in 
other respects.
The four categories outlined by White (1994) provide a framework 
through which these questions can be addressed. The first centres on 
altering the balance of  power between the state and society in favour 
of  the latter through the creation of  a dense network of  civil society 
organizations. The availability of  foreign aid can provide a powerful 
stimulus for new organizations to be formed, and can assist in increasing 
the size and membership of  existing organizations. Whether this type 
of  external assistance can contribute to democratic consolidation by 
increasing the scope for political participation is a function of  the types 
of  groups receiving external assistance, the nature of  their membership 
and the degree of  popular legitimacy. Simply encouraging the 
formation of  new groups and organizations may generate little visible 
return unless the assistance is directed towards organizations which have 
clear objectives and real potential to advance the democracy agenda. In 
this respect Chazan (1992: 303) cautions that ‘while the voluntary sector 
has helped to undermine statism and to provide a political opening 
for specific interests and norms, it has yet to establish institutional 
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foundations and normative principles essential to the consolidation of  
civil society and hence democracy.’
The dangers inherent in indiscriminate funding of  civil society 
organizations to promote political pluralism are in some ways rather 
obvious. Different donors may encourage the formation of  organizations 
which are seeking to root themselves in a similar constituency, or 
support organizations which have conflicting objectives (for example 
business associations versus trade unions). There is also a danger that 
the availability of  external aid might attract unscrupulous organizations 
possessing agendas which are antithetical to democracy, either because 
their leaders are intent on using the organization as a means of  
furthering personal political objectives, or because the organization in 
question has goals which serve to undermine political consensus and 
generate social conflict. 
These problems can be mitigated or avoided if  donors are willing 
to coordinate their actions, possibly by focusing their assistance 
programmes on organizations with which they have a particular affinity 
or for which relevant expertise is available within their own country. 
They also focus attention on the importance of  rigorous appraisal 
and informed local knowledge in preference to the rather ad hoc 
procedures utilized by most donors in which aid or diplomatic staff try 
to spot eligible organizations or filter unsolicited requests in a more 
reactive mode. This underlines the need for building capacity in donor 
organizations which may not possess the staff resources or operational 
structure to enable them to adopt such procedures.6
The second category concerns the disciplinary function performed by 
civil society organizations to ensure that the state is operating along 
democratic principles. This takes several forms: the introduction and 
enforcement of  mechanisms for holding politicians or public officials 
accountable for their actions; the protection and extension of  civil and 
political rights; and monitoring state behaviour in relation to human 
rights. These functions can only be performed by a fairly narrow 
range of  civic organizations with specialist skills, such as lawyers’ and 
journalists’ associations, and civil rights groups. The main problem here 
might be that of  too much money being made available to relatively 
few capable organizations, which could encourage the formation of  
rival associations, or detract existing organizations from their primary 
objectives. Heavy reliance on donor funding might also undermine 
their wider legitimacy and inhibit their sustainability. Landell-Mills 
(1992: 554) notes in this regard: 
External funding should always take the form of  supplementary 
assistance and ought never to be the main source of  what is needed. 
Members are easy to attract when given access to free resources, 
but if  outside grants become absolutely indispensable, then the 
sustainability of  the organization or institution becomes highly 
questionable.
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Another problem relates to the limited political agendas of  these 
organizations, especially those representing lawyers, which might 
ultimately be more interested in pursuing the narrow self-interests 
of  their members from the point of  view of  widening opportunities 
for monetary gain and enhanced status than democratic goals 
per se. Moreover, as Chazan has observed, some of  the urban-based 
middle-class groups which assumed a prominent role in movements 
campaigning for the restoration of  democratic rule were active in 
supporting authoritarian rule in the past (Chazan 1992: 303). These 
problems point to the need to establish channels for facilitating dialogue 
between donors and potential recipients to identify joint priorities and 
to enable donors to respond to requests for assistance in line with these 
priorities rather than with donor-driven policy objectives requiring 
quick and demonstrable results which could result in inappropriate 
funding decisions.
The third category of  intervention lies in the intermediary role 
performed by civic organizations between the state and society by 
transmitting and articulating interest group demands. In this capacity 
civil society organizations seek to promote greater consultation and 
popular involvement in the process of  policy formulation, especially 
by disadvantaged groups which have traditionally been denied access 
to political power. It also embraces more activist forms of  engagement 
with the state, where civic organizations employ a variety of  means 
to provide their constituents with greater ‘voice’ in order to influence 
state officials and policy decisions. These can range from advocacy 
efforts centred on the media and political lobbying through to more 
confrontational approaches involving demonstrations and other forms 
of  non-violent protest. 
Donors have placed particular emphasis on improving the scope for 
participation by marginalized social groups in the public policy process. 
At the level of  development projects this takes the form of  popular 
participation in decision making and policy implementation and NGOs 
are seen to play an important role in this regard. This concern extends 
to policy dialogue on the national plane and donors have sought to 
enhance the capacity of  organized interest groups for research and 
policy analysis to enable them to make more effective interventions 
in the policy process. Democratization presents new opportunities for 
interest groups to gain access to state policy makers and public officials, 
in order to present their particular viewpoint on policy decisions 
which are likely to affect their members. Donor assistance in the form 
of  training, technical assistance and equipment is complemented 
by helping governments set up forums through which formal policy 
dialogue can take place. 
One problem with these types of  interventions is that relatively 
small amounts of  foreign funding can have a considerable impact on 
organizational capacity, and create an imbalance in the power and 
resources available to different organizations. For example, the proclivity 
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of  the United States to support business associations is in line with its 
policy stance of  promoting free enterprise and a higher level of  support 
to such organizations can give them privileged access to policy makers 
and heightened visibility in public policy arenas. This can give rise to 
special pleading on the part of  sectional business interests in favour of  
policies which are of  immediate short-term benefit to their members 
but potentially harmful to others. 
Second, strengthening the capacity of  private sector lobby groups and 
other influential civic organizations for policy dialogue often carries 
with it an implicit ideological agenda. Efforts to involve more organized 
interests in the policy process are frequently directed towards creating 
a more active consensus in favour of  economic reform, by giving the 
potential beneficiaries of  reform a greater stake in policy outcomes, 
but also by mitigating potential opposition from the losers of  reform, 
or at least channelling active opposition into passive acceptance. This 
is obviously desirable from the point of  view of  the proponents and 
funders of  structural adjustment programmes since it increases the 
likelihood of  political sustainability, but it might squeeze out room 
for alternative perspectives and feedback on the adverse impact of  
economic reform unless provision is made for this. It might also 
conflict with the ambitions of  other donors to promote a redistributive 
agenda centred on increasing the access of  the poor and politically 
disenfranchised groups to the policy process. Hence, groups which resist 
or criticize the policy agenda of  the government might find themselves 
marginalized or deliberately sidelined as a result of  a desire among 
donors to strengthen supporters of  the prevailing agenda. 
A third problem is the possibility of  overloading the capacity of  
government policy-makers to accommodate interest group pressure 
without damaging the technical consistency of  policy initiatives. Most 
policy makers in adjusting economies in Africa are already under 
serious pressure of  work and those concerned with economic policy 
spend a considerable amount of  time attending to donor requirements 
and policy conditions; they are often not in a position to respond 
sympathetically even if  they are well disposed to increased policy 
dialogue. A more serious prospect is that of  gridlock where sustained 
interest group pressure fosters inertia and undermines the capacity of  
the government to pursue a sustained development strategy (Migdal 
1988). This is unlikely in most African contexts since organized interests 
are neither sufficiently well organized or numerous to pose a serious 
threat to state policy making capacity, but it does highlight the need to 
create some degree of  insulation for key policy makers balanced by the 
creation of  formal channels for policy dialogue.
The fourth category of  donor intervention concerns the constitutive 
role performed by civil society organizations, which takes a number 
of  different forms: increasing the legitimacy of  the political system by 
instilling and upholding democratic values through civic education 
programmes; providing people with experience of  participating 
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in democratic debate within these organizations; and in recruiting 
and training new political leaders. This is a less contentious area for 
donor intervention, since these types of  activities have been a historic 
function of  civic organizations in democratic societies. Many donors 
are supporting civic education programmes, voter registration drives 
and election monitoring. Such interventions have helped to ensure that 
elections have been reasonably free and fair, but the longer term impact 
of  civic education programmes are more difficult to assess. The problem 
might come with indiscriminate funding of  organizations which do not 
have a strong base of  legitimacy or developed membership, or which do 
not possess the technical skills and technical expertise to enable them 
to carry out such functions. Some groups might be formed in response 
to the availability of  donor funding and to further individual political 
agendas which again highlights the importance of  careful appraisal 
and the need for a thorough understanding of  the composition of  civil 
society in the countries in question.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Many of  the problems identified in the previous section are latent 
and there is as yet insufficient documented evidence to provide 
a clear picture on the impact of  donor interventions designed to 
strengthen civil society organizations. Some of  these problems have 
been encountered by donors in directly funding development NGOs, 
especially those concerning a possible erosion of  independence and 
autonomy, and there may be lessons which are of  relevance here 
(Riddell and Bebbington 1995).
There are, of  course, positive reasons why supporting civil society 
organizations is a laudable objective for aid donors, if  they are able 
to make a more effective contribution to the process of  democratic 
consolidation as a result of  external assistance. But there are also a 
number of  caveats. These fall into two groups: following on from the 
previous section, there are a series of  operational concerns relating to 
the funding relationship, but there are also a set of  more fundamental 
questions stemming from the premises on which donor interventions in 
this area are founded. 
As was argued earlier, most donors adhere to a definition of  civil 
society steeped in the liberal political tradition which holds that civic 
associations occupy a public domain located between the family and 
the state, in which there is a shared consensus on democratic norms 
and respect for political pluralism. This approach tends to obscure 
conflicts between different categories of  civic associations and fails 
to give adequate recognition to the existence of  divisive social forces 
which are averse to democracy, but nevertheless form part of  ‘civil’ 
society. Hence interventions founded on the notion that merely 
altering the balance between the state and civil society in favour of  
the latter in some quantitative sense will contribute to democratic 
consolidation, overlook potentially destructive elements in civil society 
which make such interventions both difficult and hazardous. One 
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might therefore conclude that most donors, as presently constituted, 
are poorly-equipped to intervene directly without either exacerbating 
such tendencies or creating imbalances of  power between different 
organizations. But this ignores the fact that most donors have already 
embarked on this path, and that some have amassed considerable 
experience. Given this scenario, there are a series of  operational issues 
that merit attention, which can help to ensure that donors proceed 
cautiously with modest expectations of  what might be achieved in view 
of  the limitations and potential problems sketched out earlier.
First, many of  the organizations that donors would like to support are 
small and fairly new. Large quantities of  aid resources in relation to 
their actual requirements could swamp these organizations before they 
are in a position to map out their objectives, build up an independent 
membership and gain wider legitimacy. At the same time aid 
interventions directed towards civil society strengthening are unlikely 
to be very substantial, either in terms of  the size of  projects funded or 
in terms of  their share of  official development assistance, and pressure 
on donors to allocate increased levels of  resources to meet overall good 
government policy objectives may induce recipient organizations to 
accept more funds than they require. Donor coordination is clearly 
essential when the supply of  funding exceeds the requirements of  
recipient organizations in order to avoid a situation where there is 
competition for the more attractive counterparts or where unscrupulous 
organizations can gain access to these funds. 
Second, it takes time for these activities to bear fruit, and the 
development of  a mature and robust set of  civil society organizations 
that are able to perform the various roles set out above can be an 
extremely protracted process. External funding can assist in this process 
and perhaps give it a boost, but it would be folly to presume that civil 
societies can be artificially induced when the material, organizational 
and ideological conditions prevailing in many African countries 
undergoing political transition are not conducive to the rapid growth 
of  civil society. The availability of  material resources is certainly 
important, but it may not be central to building up a robust civil society, 
since in situations where associational life has long been suppressed, 
building organizational capacity and developing a distinctive ideological 
stance are essential prerequisites for enabling civil society organizations 
to contribute effectively to the process of  democratic consolidation. 
Third, it is difficult to assess the contribution made by civil society 
organizations given the absence of  an established framework for 
evaluation. By their very nature, many organizations may not have 
developed internal procedures for documenting their work or assessing 
their impact. Insistence by donors on rigorous monitoring procedures 
could lead to the imposition of  inappropriate practices which might 
divert energy away from the main goals of  the organization and 
undermine its effectiveness. At the same time it will be necessary for 
donors to account for the use of  these funds, and evaluation can in 
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turn induce greater accountability from recipient organizations, but 
this should not be at the expense of  internal accountability to their 
members.
This last caveat raises the question of  the most appropriate mechanism 
for channelling funds and other resources to civil society organizations. 
Donors employ a variety of  mechanisms for this purpose, ranging from 
using intermediaries such as NGOs and political foundations, through 
to direct funding from overseas mission funds. NGOs are a tried and 
tested intermediary for working with local membership organizations 
and advocacy groups, but have less experience in civic and political 
education, and in supporting specialized interest groups such as trade 
unions and business associations. Political foundations often have this 
type of  expertise, but they have the disadvantage of  being perceived 
as partisan or as a potential threat by state authorities. Donors usually 
channel trade union funding through domestic trade union bodies which 
have the links and the expertise but which often lack an in-country 
presence. Using mission funds to provide support in response to locally 
generated requests is favoured by some donors but has its limitations, 
especially if  there is not good donor coordination. These various 
mechanisms will continue to be used by donors, but there are other 
mechanisms and approaches which have not been explored and which 
could help to obviate some of  the potential problems highlighted earlier. 
For example, it may be more productive for donors to specialize in 
certain categories of  organization with whom they have a certain 
familiarity or which have a particular expertise. Linking up or twinning 
domestic organizations with counterparts in developing countries, or 
between organizations from the same region is a good route to follow 
since there is much relevant experience that can be shared and they 
have skills which donors do not possess. Creating forums through which 
recipient organizations can exert some degree of  influence over the 
terms on which the support is provided can increase the legitimacy of  
external funding and ensure that it corresponds to locally defined needs. 
On balance, while democracy promotion may be a laudable objective in 
its own right, there are a number of  potential pitfalls confronting donors 
who are seeking to expand political aid programmes. Some indication 
of  the sorts of  problems that might arise has been given along with 
suggestions about action that could be taken to mitigate these. Although 
positive support for strengthening civil society organizations has many 
advantages over political conditionality as a means of  advancing good 
government objectives, donors will need to be realistic about the volume 
of  assistance that can channelled through this mechanism since civil 
society organizations cannot absorb large quantities of  funding and 
it takes time for the results to become apparent. Donor efforts in this 
field will therefore need to proceed in a cautious and in well-informed 
manner in order to avoid forcing the agenda at a pace that would 
run counter to the twin objectives of  democratic consolidation and 
promoting a pluralistic political culture in developing countries.
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NOTES
1 Important exceptions were Bayart (1986) and various essays in 
Rothchild and Chazan (1988). 
2 For a comprehensive review see Keane (1988) and Bobbio (1988).
3 NGOs represent only one category within the panoply of  
organizations supported by donors for furthering democratic 
goals, and it is primarily advocacy-based organizations rather than 
development NGOs engaged in service delivery which perform this 
role. It is also doubtful whether NGOs actually form part of  civil 
society, since they are generally function as intermediaries between 
donors and civil society organizations, as conduits of  resources and 
information. See Frantz (1987) and Fowler (1991).
4 The Ford Foundation has played a very important role in this regard, 
having provided grants to a range of  civil society organizations in 
developing countries over a number of  years.
5 In 1992 a new budget line of  US$0.8 million was established to 
support local authorities, trade unions and grassroots organizations, 
but this is small in comparison with other budget lines open to NGOs. 
6 Riddell and Bebbington (1995: 53) make a similar point in the 
context of  donor funding for southern NGOs, in arguing that 
effective support ‘requires local knowledge and an in-country 
presence over an extended period’.
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Abstract In focusing on Ain el-Sira, a low-income neighbourhood of Cairo, 
this article challenges development theorists’ ideas that civil society as a 
development partner is best able to promote women’s empowerment, 
community development and justice. This article contests that development 
can avoid the machinations of the state or ignore the power imbalances 
that litter the relationships between state, civil society, citizens and donors! 
In Egypt, where the state relegates its development duties to civil society, 
women in Ain el-Sira experience service initiatives which are duplicated, 
microcredit loans they often cannot afford to repay, and benefit criteria 
which are strict and limiting. Programmes remain unchanged for years and 
long-term plans to relieve the burdens of disempowerment and destitution 
are non-existent. To achieve real gendered justice which provides women 
with the assets and capabilities to make choices requires citizenship rights. 
This can only be gained by engaging critically with state and civil society 
dynamics and challenging the structures that obstruct empowerment.
1 Introduction
The literature on women’s empowerment has conceptualised 
empowerment as an outcome of  certain ideal institutional 
arrangements. Quotas in elected councils will yield political power, 
access to finance and markets will bring about economic empowerment 
and the right laws, and rights, education and freedom can liberate 
the body. But the outcome of  an institutional arrangement is never a 
foregone conclusion. The road that should lead to gender justice can 
lead its travellers astray. This article considers the path recommended 
by development theorists and activists that commends civil society as a 
development partner better able to promote community development, 
social justice and women’s empowerment. Like most formulas, this 
preconceived idealised remedy has failed to have an effect on people’s 
daily lives and needs. The theory may sound right but in practice, the 
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assumption that civil society is a more capable, progressive, democratic, 
or effective development partner is flawed (Jad 2007; Abdel Rahman 
2005; Bayat and Denis 2000; Joseph 1996; Al-Sayyed 1993).
The State is ever-present and ever strong in Egypt. Yet this presence has 
yet to champion women. Poverty alleviation, income generation, gender 
awareness, women’s empowerment and skills development, are domains 
in which the state has relegated its duties to civil society organisations 
(CSOs). CSOs are assumed to be community-based and community-
driven, close to the grassroots and able to express their needs, trusted by 
their clients and able to deliver better quality services at lower costs in a 
decentralised and therefore more responsive manner. Gender justice has 
been an item on the long list of  community development and poverty 
alleviation priorities. Accordingly, the role of  civil society in realising 
women’s empowerment has been a near given. Civil society can provide 
basic services for women. They can also advocate on their behalf  and 
help them act collectively or organise locally. While there have been 
calls to better define what type of  civil society or community group 
can best achieve which intervention, the assumption of  civil society as 
being the catalyst and activist in the process of  development and citizen 
empowerment persists in much of  development literature. This bias 
has percolated into Egyptian national discourses on poverty alleviation. 
Current initiatives that address poverty and citizenship rights all have 
a civil society component. The Social Contract Unit of  the cabinet is 
a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) funded project 
tasked with marketing the concept of  a social contract and monitoring 
the government’s progress towards realising this contract and working 
towards pro- poor and inclusive growth works with civil society (see  
www.socialcontract.gov.eg). Poverty reduction strategies and successive 
Egypt Human Development Reports also rely on civil society to implement 
poverty reduction and citizen empowerment projects (UNDP 2004, 
2005, 2007).
This article challenges the assumption that pervades international 
development policy discourse that implies easy transferability of  
ideas and ideals, and ignores the fact that politics and development 
are eternally intertwined. It focuses on the role of  CSOs in enabling 
and empowering women (or not) in a low-income neighbourhood of  
Cairo called Ain el-Sira. The organisations active in this area have 
programmes that include gender justice and women’s empowerment 
as either strategic or basic objectives. Some address empowerment as a 
poverty alleviation strategy, others work with women so as to empower 
them; both kinds of  organisations use the idiom of  gender to realise 
their goals. Both also provide their beneficiaries/clients with an array of  
similar services and initiatives and both identify poverty as the obstacle 
and burden that prevents women realising their personal and citizenship 
rights. On the ground and far away from the centre, the distinctions 
between civil society and the State become blurred (Joseph 1996). Class 
stratifications keep service providers, whether state or civil, on one 
side and beneficiaries on the other. The ideals and objectives of  civil 
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society service providers and activists are dictated by professional and 
personal considerations in which class identity and ideology play a role. 
Empowerment for the very poor, this article suggests, is conditioned by 
the nature of  the State, of  society and community and by the challenges 
of  implementation and sustainability.
2 Women, state and civil society in Ain el-Sira 
Ain el-Sira is a shiyakha, or district, located in Old Cairo, or Misr el 
Qadima. It is home to approximately 29,349 individuals and covers an 
area of  0.71 km2. The inhabitants are not exclusively poor, but the area 
has deep pockets of  extreme poverty. Consequently it has been the site 
of  choice for several CSOs that have been active in poverty reduction 
alleviation efforts there for decades. The area was originally the site of  
the first low-income housing project in Cairo. Popular accommodations 
or Masakin Sha’biya were built between 1958 and 1960 and comprised 
of  four- or five-storey building blocks for low-income families eligible 
for subsidised housing. They were gradually sold to their inhabitants 
as of  the 1980s. Adjacent to this nucleus of  buildings, private homes 
began to appear, some of  which were connected to the Masakin. Other 
types of  dwelling also sprang up in Ain el-Sira during that same 
period. Little more than urban slums, they comprised shelters built 
from corrugated iron, wood and mud brick. In some areas these were 
originally temporary shelters built for earthquake victims and victims 
of  other natural disasters. They have become permanent features of  
the area, with electricity and running water connected, and they house 
approximately 1,000 families. Moreover, many of  these dwellings have 
been sold or rented to their current occupants. These sales are informal 
and unregistered so there is no legal entitlement to their homes.
There are over 12 registered organisations with offices located in and 
around the study area, some inactive, as well as two community service 
centres. Other active organisations are located outside the vicinity of  the 
study area. Most of  these associations are geared towards servicing the 
poor and providing philanthropic as well as developmental programmes 
for families. They are a halfway solution for state civil society 
animosities. Civil associations that are subsidised by the state, they are 
best described as the state’s representatives in civil society. The oldest 
was founded in 1975 and is a community development association 
(CDA), headed by a respected community leader. The association 
owns large areas of  land which it has used for its services and parts of  
which are leased as shops to micro-entrepreneurs. The CDA runs a 
kindergarten, a medical centre and sports activities for youth. It receives 
funds from the Ministry of  Social Solidarity (MOSS), zakat money and 
donations, as well as its own revenue from rents on land and property.
There are another ten CSOs in the area, most of  which were set up 
in the past decade. All of  them are privately incorporated and funded 
by private and international donors. They are service providers and 
not particularly active in the field of  advocacy. None are explicitly 
feminist associations, but all have a gender narrative. Two of  these 
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organisations have an explicitly religious identity by virtue of  their 
names and location in mosques. Another two represent specific interests. 
The Street Food Vendors Association was founded over 15 years ago 
with the objective of  helping vendors get licences to sell food and enable 
them to run successful businesses. It teaches hygiene and the basics 
of  supply chains and small business management. The Association 
originated as a USAID project undertaken by a well-established 
Egyptian social consultancy office but is now independent. The 
Association has participated in a number of  programmes, some through 
the Social Fund for Development (SFD) or donors, mostly providing 
microcredit, illiteracy eradication classes, and health awareness 
initiatives. It is a participant in the New Horizons umbrella network 
that provides local CSOs with training in management and finance. 
The other organisation is the Al-Jeel Centre which was established 
in 1994 by one of  the pioneers in the service of  street and working 
children. The Centre is currently inactive due to the sudden death of  
its founder. Previously, it undertook research on and services activities in 
counselling, shelter, support, education and training, as well as providing 
play areas for street children. It has its own publication and organises 
lectures and conferences.
Despite the large number of  CSOs which provide poverty alleviation and 
welfare to inhabitants of  Ain el-Sira, there remains a profound unmet 
need among the families. Every CSO interviewed expressed a belief  that 
its work on its own could not make a dent in poverty and need in the 
area. Yet most associations appear to be duplicating each other’s work, in 
some instances working with the same families. Projects vary slightly with 
some associations having a clearer target audience and constituency such 
as the Street Food Vendors Association, but on the whole the majority 
offer microcredit, some form of  training or education and/or direct 
handouts. As a corollary to these basic programmes, many undertake 
health promotion activities and a little environmental or human rights/
civic rights training. All except the Street Food Vendors Association see 
women as their primary audience and beneficiaries.
Women interviewed in Ain el-Sira identified these associations most 
frequently as sources of  microcredit. Those interviewed in slums had 
taken microcredit and used it with varying degrees of  satisfaction and 
endorsement. Some complained of  the debts incurred and the need to 
sell basic household items such as mattresses and pots and pans so as 
to repay their loans and remain creditworthy. Both men and women 
have taken loans but there are more such schemes available to women 
through the local CSOs. Several men interviewed said that the interest 
rates on microcredit were too high and the credit cycle too short to 
benefit them. Women put up with these terms, as they consider it to 
be the only source of  credit they have and one of  the few avenues to 
cash that they can access. Microcredit has kept some families afloat but 
for others has also caused crises and cash crunches. It appears to be a 
survival strategy for some but a redeemer from poverty for none.
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Vocational training and literacy classes have also been offered by 
many CSOs, but personnel training is less effective than it could be 
because of  market conditions. That is, skills acquired do not guarantee 
employment. Literacy classes are common but one woman claimed 
that she had signed up more than three times because ‘… we do it to 
take the Ramadan food bags and other distributions’. Other women 
interviewed said that getting the certificate of  literacy helped them find 
jobs as hospital and school cleaners. Street food vendors were frustrated 
because, despite getting the training and hardware from the association, 
they had still not been able to secure licences to sell food on the streets. 
Jobs that are available do not necessarily require the skills offered by 
CSOs and cannot compete with the lucrative pay of  dangerous work 
(which includes illicit trade in drugs) or with the security provided by 
government work. Few CSOs offer vocational training that can provide 
high earnings or sustainable financial security. Meanwhile, women are 
excluded from skills development and are confined to making veils and 
headscarves and applying sequins and embroidery for private producers.
The direct hand-outs offered by CSOs and by religious foundations 
or committees/associations are very small but deemed to be essential 
by those who take them. 20LE (20 Egyptian pounds = approximately 
US$3) a month does little for a family but it is better than nothing. The 
only criterion for getting these cash transfers is to prove, or rather display, 
abject poverty. Some families have complained that the slightest evidence 
of  an acquisition, no matter how meagre, is enough to terminate their 
cash transfers. The women benefiting from these hand-outs, as far as this 
research project could ascertain, were almost exclusively widows. They 
are clearly deserving, as they have no male supporters. Individuals in 
religious organisations expressed doubt as to the eligibility of  single or 
deserted women and heads of  households for charity. A woman living 
with her partner is clearly excluded from their charity.
Despite an admirable level of  activity and spending, CSOs have not 
made a significant difference in addressing the welfare needs of  families 
and communities. The community services provided by CSOs such as 
environmental upgrading through rubbish collection, street cleaning, 
upgrading schools, small grants to fix home sanitation, etc. are sporadic 
and have not proved sustainable. The area is in desperate need of  more 
systematic efforts to address endemic problems such as the sewage and 
water leakages, the mounds of  rotting rubbish and refuse as well as the 
insecurity on the streets. Whether because of  the magnitude of  the 
need or the duplication in provision efforts, the problems of  poverty, 
low capacity, unemployment, ill-health and disability are ever- present. 
Activists and CSO staff and volunteers have good working relations with 
the various communities of  Ain el-Sira, some knowing their clients well. 
What they do not have are long-term goals or objectives to sustainably 
deliver people out of  dire need. They view their role as providers of  a 
variety of  services, the choice of  which is contingent on donor funding 
and CSO management decisions. One day they may be distributing 
school clothes or providing school fees, and the next day the task might 
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be microcredit arrangements or health awareness. All those interviewed 
nevertheless said that the needs and the scale of  poverty were so huge 
that any service, however small, is appreciated.
All the CSOs about which we obtained details are in compliance 
with the current association law and have an elected board, annual 
meetings, proper records and accounting procedures. However, since 
the law does not make CSOs accountable to their clients, all expressed 
an understanding of  accountability that excludes their clients and is 
focused only on financial and legal requirements of  donors and of  the 
Ministry of  Social Solidarity. Some of  the smaller less well- funded 
CSOs also admitted to not having a clear mandate. As is common 
practice, they list a range of  foci to ensure that their licence is not 
revoked to be free to respond to and benefit from the open calls that 
donors and larger umbrella non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
make to partners in whichever project they happen to give priority. 
The welfare activities of  CSOs on the whole are fragmented and seem 
to have precipitated dependence rather than to have liberated people 
from needs. It is fair to say that no welfare actors profess to have poverty 
eradication, empowerment or independence from charity and hand-
outs as an outright or reachable goal.
3 The possibility of empowerment
Over the course of  two years a sense of  women’s everyday lives 
and challenges began to emerge and demonstrate the weakness of  
empowerment or justice as merely a civil society initiative rather than 
a national project. The ‘irrelevance’ of  the services and transfers that 
women access through these projects and programmes became clear 
and so did the dominance of  these institutions. Life is hard and every bit 
of  help is important. But as long as this help is impossible to secure in a 
predictable manner it can be no more than an occasional opportunity 
or perk.
A representative sample of  families from Ain el-Sira were surveyed 
with a tool that aimed to gauge the extent to which families in general, 
and women in particular, felt that their needs were addressed by CSOs, 
the state welfare provisions and/or religious organisations. The three 
sources of  assistance in the area:
 l The Ministry of  Social Solidarity represented by the local Ministry 
office gives social assistance and insurance payments
 l CSOs in the area offer microcredit loans, school fees, cash transfers, 
Ramadan bags, school needs (books, pencils, bags, shoes), wedding 
trousseau for newly-weds, health awareness and assistance, illiteracy 
classes
 l Religious organisations and institutions such as mosques and zakat 
committees offer microcredit, school fees, monthly cash transfers, 
Ramadan bags, school needs, wedding trousseau, food bank 
distribution, hearse services, health assistance and illiteracy classes.
(Endnotes)
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Each source of  assistance has different eligibility criteria. For state 
benefits, eligibility is confined to three criteria. The first and most 
prevalent is widowhood and divorce or desertion, followed by disability 
or chronic ill-health and old age. The other criteria for eligibility concern 
children and orphans. The amount of  these transfers is very small. 
Beneficiaries claim that the transfers represent less than half  and more 
like one quarter of  their monthly expenditure. Elderly women pay their 
share of  family expenditures from these transfers. The cash helps make 
them less of  a burden on their families. Women with pensions are fought 
over by sons and daughters because they are an asset for the family. 
Women without pensions face desertion and neglect and become a 
burden. Elderly men keep their pensions ‘… for their cigarettes!’, as one 
woman explained. These cash transfers are important because they also 
bring to the beneficiaries other entitlements such as access to healthcare, 
the occasional distribution of  food bags, blankets, and grants.
Religious institutions have very strict notions of  who is a ‘deserving’ 
person. In focus group discussions with beneficiaries of  these institutions 
all the women invited by the CSO were widows. One of  the workers 
confessed that they have difficulty believing that a married woman needs 
support and said that Islam is clear in identifying widows and orphans as 
deserving of  charity. These benefits were sourced from 12 mosques, two 
committees and three individuals associated with religious institutions. 
The procedures for getting these services were described as simple. A 
person needs to fill in forms and bring in proof  of  eligibility. A medical 
examination is also sometimes required. The grounds for eligibility are 
similar to those of  the Ministry and include widowhood, dire poverty, 
being an orphan, old age, disability or absence of  steady income. 
Fourteen families said they had tried but failed to get help from these 
institutions. The reasons for failure included absence of  formal papers, 
possession of  a television (which was taken as proof  that they were not 
that poor) and the unavailability of  the applied for assistance.
For other CSOs, their preference was to support women and children. 
They use microcredit to help women and impose group discussions or 
nadawat (lectures) for which they pay the women 10LE per attendance 
to enlighten them on issues to do with civil rights, reproductive health 
and family planning, women’s political participation and whatever 
else required by their donors. For example, in one of  the qualitative 
study interviews, women in the slums said that Ramadan bags are 
tied to illiteracy class attendance. Many were told to get voting cards, 
one claiming that she had been told who to vote for as well, and that 
receiving certain benefits was contingent on getting voting cards.
The services were deemed to be satisfactory but unreliable, as CSOs 
often change their programmes and benefits. Moreover, people 
complained particularly of  the terms imposed on microcredit lending. 
Families who take from CSOs said that the terms were harsh, the 
interest was high, the repayment schedule too tight and the amount too 
small. Borrowing and credit are heavy burdens that women bear in the 
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course of  their daily lives. Women borrow from each other, from money 
lenders (women not men) and from CSOs.
While the microcredit movement may be a development success story in 
some parts of  the world and possibly in parts of  Egypt, the same cannot 
be said for Ain el-Sira. All CSOs have offered forms of  microcredit and 
lending. Some dispense SFD grants which are used to fix sewage and water 
supplies but can only be used by people who live in registered premises 
that they own or have some form of  legal title to, or are paying rent to a 
formal owner. That arrangement excludes practically all slum dwellers who 
bought their premises from others who did not have the right to sell these 
shacks in the first place.1 Other loans are made to women in particular to 
encourage entrepreneurial activities. But these are the loans that have led to 
debt and the liquidation of  assets. Mattresses, pots, pans, bangles and rings, 
are typical of  the household items and belongings that women can sell to 
repay debts. The interest on NGO small loans is high. One organisation 
run by a local parliamentarian gives loans of  500LE over a ten-month 
period and requires women to repay 30LE every 15 days. Not only is this 
a high interest rate but the repayment schedule is harsh and unvarying. 
The women who take loans have to borrow to repay due instalments to the 
organisation. On this, one woman explained, ‘We sometimes go hungry!’ 
Women are torn between the need to maintain their credit worthiness in 
the eyes of  the CSO and the needs of  their families and homes. It is a lot 
to ask of  women living under such stress to keep apart their business and 
private finances and accounts. There are also reports of  loan sharks in the 
area. One woman interviewed in the area is paying off a 5,000LE loan 
that she made when her husband was injured in a work accident and was 
made redundant without benefits. She pays an interest rate of  10 per cent a 
month on the loan and has been paying off the interest for years.2
Women also borrow from each other, from food vendors, vegetable 
sellers, and from wholesale suppliers. The cycle of  debt is relentless and 
causes friction and fighting. When women borrow from each other they 
feel constrained in their ability to spend money, enjoy a meal, or wear 
something nice. If  they do, the neighbour or relative to whom they 
owe money will want to claim it back immediately. CSOs are similarly 
attentive as to how their money is spent and use threats of  credit 
worthiness and the possibility of  excluding women who default on an 
instalment from future projects and benefits. In recent interviews in the 
area, all women asked said they had no savings and no CSO in the area 
encourages savings or supports saving groups. The one loan programme 
that women found ‘enabling’ (but not empowering) is one through 
which they borrow money to buy needles, thread, sequins and material 
to make and embroider veils and headscarves which are then marketed 
by the CSO. They go to the CSO offices to sew and embroider and 
then are paid by the piece. In fact they prefer the security that comes 
with this arrangement, whereby the CSO purchases the materials and 
markets the products (and pockets the profits) then pays them for their 
labour. This limits women’s liability and permits them to work when 
they can and make as much income as they need.
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4 Women and work
Because eligibility criteria for assistance favour the unemployed, women 
will claim that they do not work. It is hard, however, to find a woman 
in the area who does not work. Like many women all over the world, 
they are mostly involved in informal low paid and occasional work, for 
example Sayedda Groppi3 buys broken cakes from an intermediary 
and sells them to her neighbours and others. She feeds her children 
with them when they have nothing else to eat. Om Mohamed from 
Upper Egypt is a widow with two girls getting married and a 17-year-
old in vocational industrial training. She escaped her village as she did 
not want to remarry and have her children taken from her. She lived 
with relatives and made her living by cleaning. She used to sew, but 
she cannot do this anymore as she has eye problems. She now works 
as a cleaning lady in a hospital some distance away. She is illiterate so 
cannot get a proper contract. She is on medication for three medical 
conditions: diabetes, chronic back and gallbladder problems. Shadia is 
39 and has four children. She trades and rears goats, salts fish, peddles 
clothes, cleans houses, lends money and frequents many CSO classes 
and programmes. Some women have tiny kiosks in the slums, others 
trade in vegetables, some are domestic workers, others are tea ladies in 
offices, and many do home-based jobs such as crocheting, sealing plastic 
bags, applying sequins and making headscarves.
CSOs ignore the rights and needs of  working women. They hold their 
‘awareness’ sessions during the day. They make distributions and visits 
when women are likely to be at work, and no one has a programme 
that addresses job security, workers’ rights, or offers private pensions or 
encourages savings. The theoretical construction of  a beneficiary seems 
to be that of  an unemployed healthy female: a rarity in Ain el-Sira, 
where the real barrier to work is poor health or disability. Injuries from 
work, fading eyesight, ageing limbs and joints, diabetes, high blood 
pressure and other chronic conditions not only prevent women from 
work but they also impose heavy burdens on the household budget. The 
survey showed a high burden of  chronic and serious health conditions 
and disabilities (over 56 per cent of  households). Those lucky enough to 
have access to subsidised or nominally free healthcare said that they still 
had to make out- of-pocket expenditures on health.
Conversation on violence came easily when the subject of  work was 
under discussion. When women work they become tired and may not 
be able to respond to the partner’s requests for sex. Women work for 
up to 15 hours a day, then have to tend to the needs of  their families. 
Children have to perform some of  the mother’s responsibilities, either 
household chores or helping out at work. But the intimate aspects of  
being a wife cannot be relegated to kin or kids. This article cannot 
speak of  the prevalence of  domestic violence, but can certainly attest 
to its acceptability among women. ‘Some men do and some don’t’, 
said Mervat. ‘Some women accept it from their husbands, fathers and 
sons and some don’t’, she added. Interviewed women accepted that 
husbands and brothers who are under pressure because they have 
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no cash or job can become violent. They also conceded that when 
women work, they are entitled to have their dignity and bodily integrity 
respected. But if  women annoy their husbands or detract from their 
manhood by being tired, unavailable or snooty, ‘then they have a few 
slaps or punches coming their way’.
These burdens of  disempowerment and destitution are rarely addressed 
by CSOs. They supply certain programmes that are devised according 
to rather static notions of  what justice and entitlements should be and 
how the poor experience the burdens of  poverty. The mere fact that 
programmes can continue unchanged for years if  not decades and 
that all CSOs have similar tools and messages intimates a problem of  
relevance and initiative.
CSOs in Ain el-Sira most certainly have a higher level of  activity than 
that evinced by the survey. The Al-Jeel Centre for example is well 
known for its efforts with children who work. Moreover, many NGOs 
for women have undertaken a number of  highly acclaimed projects in 
reproductive health awareness and female genital mutilation (FGM) 
campaigns, issuing voting and identity cards for women, medical 
services, microcredit and illiteracy classes. They have also engaged 
in a number of  gender empowerment projects to encourage women 
to fight domestic violence, early marriage and access rights such as 
social security. But the lack of  sustainability of  these campaigns and 
interventions has mitigated their impact.
5 Poverty and power
Poverty and power are intertwined in the account given above of  
families in Ain el-Sira. Similarly, state, civil society and social services 
interlace to further complicate the image. In this part of  Cairo, poverty 
and the stress of  slum life have created a need for services and support. 
Families will take what is offered in terms of  material support and will 
also take on the trappings that encase this support. If  food bags are 
contingent on attending reproductive health sessions or illiteracy classes, 
then women will attend these sessions/classes. If  loans require proof  
of  destitution, prayer or other forms of  devotion, then this price will 
be paid. The state seems to be the provider with least requirements. 
Social protection entitlements rest on criteria of  eligibility that are, by 
and large, clear and consistent. But in all cases, the aspects of  poverty 
alleviation and community development that seek to forge and promote 
agency, citizenship, rights-based entitlements or gender justice have 
become routinised and even ‘corrupted’.
The limitations of  civil society in Ain el-Sira illustrate a larger story 
from Egypt; one in which the state and international donors have been 
wrestling over the prerogatives of  power. At one point, the state had 
succeeded in controlling CSOs through restrictive laws, supervision 
and regulation. Donors have sought to impose ideas concerning the 
legitimacy, efficacy and progressive nature of  CSOs and thus have made 
much funding contingent on CSO partnerships and participation. The 
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result in Ain el-Sira has been a disappointment for the families who are 
neither partners in, nor beneficiaries of, development.
In the midst of  such a struggle, should women’s empowerment initiatives 
and campaigns hold on to ideals of  civil society and reservations about 
the state, despite the complications that are precipitated by politics and 
historical context? To realise a more gendered justice that provides 
them with substantive assets and capabilities that enable them to make 
real choices, women need to secure their citizenship rights. As Phillips 
(2002: 136) puts it, ‘Choice depends on substantive conditions’. They 
need the enabling environment that is secured through state support. 
If  the state is a patriarchal one, civil society will not feminise it through 
development, but through advocacy and agitation. CSOs cannot 
facilitate, realise or support women’s empowerment through service 
provision. The supply of  cash, transient work opportunities, market 
spurned skills and credit is a weak band- aid that cannot transform the 
lives of  women and their families. Advocacy and collective action can 
change mentalities and structures that obstruct empowerment and which 
halt social justice.
Gender and development must engage with the state as well as with civil 
society when seeking to realise justice and empowerment for women 
and their families. Reproducing the patriarchal power relations that 
shape communities is a sure consequence of  an un-critical engagement 
with the reality of  state/citizen/civil society dynamics. The case of  
Ain el-Sira illustrates the profound power of  such reproductions and 
the complicity of  international donors and analysts in funding and 
promoting disempowerment. Despite the best intentions of  all parties, 
the results bear witness to the importance of  grounded, contextualised, 
and critical engagement with the institutional arrangements that are an 
assumed infrastructure for citizen empowerment and gender justice.
Notes
*  Some of  the interviews cited in this text were conducted by Heba 
Gowayed and members of  the Ain el-Sira research team.
1  The shacks that were built as emergency shelters for earthquake 
victims legally belong to the state and are not meant for sale or 
subletting. Some families have to leave shacks that they have paid for 
when council supervisors visit the area. They live on the street for a 
day or so until the bureaucrats finish their inspection. The families 
that have built their shacks have done so on land that they do not 
own so they do not have any legal title over the shack and when they 
sell it the new owners cannot register this property.
2  As reported in interviews conducted by Heba Gowayad for the Ain 
el-Sira project.
3  ‘Groppi’ is the name of  Egypt’s famous Patisserie.
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States or Markets – Twenty-Five 
Years On
Christopher Colclough
Abstract Pricist approaches to development policy reached their apogee 
under the influence of neoliberal economists in the post-Reagan/Thatcher 
years. Their version of state-minimalism was more extreme than that 
conceived by the very founders of economic liberalism two centuries earlier. 
Revisiting the themes of a critique published 25 years ago, this article finds 
that its thesis remains vitally relevant today. It argues, however, that its 
analytic approach needs to be reset to focus more sharply upon the macro 
consequences of the neoliberal legacy. 
Keywords: development theory, development policy, neoliberalism, 
structuralism, markets, states.
In 1991 a number of  us at the Institute of  Development Studies (IDS) 
came together to produce a book called States or Markets? Neoliberalism and 
the Development Policy Debate (Colclough and Manor 1991). Edited by James 
Manor and myself, it included contributions by 14 other IDS Fellows, so it 
was really very much an IDS volume (and a commentary on the state of  
development studies at that time). The theme of  the IDS 50th Anniversary 
Conference prompts us to look back and ask why we were highlighting this 
topic, and to what extent the themes of  the book are still relevant today. 
This is the focus of  this short article, which deliberately takes a broad sweep 
– albeit at some risk to the nicety of  detail. It begins by asking why, and in 
what sense, we should counterpose states and markets as alternatives.
The case for liberalism in economics and politics goes back to the 
Enlightenment. John Locke argued that every person had a right to 
life, health, liberty and property (Locke 1689). In economics Adam 
Smith, a century later, showed that, under free competition, the market 
produces prices as low as is consistent with supplying the product (Smith 
1776). He argued that life should be as untrammelled by constitutional 
legal and administrative constraints as possible, and government action 
should be limited to ensuring the maintenance of  a stable society and 
marketplace. The relative place of  states and markets in determining 
desired outcomes has been a major fulcrum for policy debate ever since.
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Neoclassical analysis is centrally about how markets would work if  
perfect competition were to prevail. But much of  its power is gained 
from analysing ways in which output, employment and pricing 
outcomes vary in the presence of  market imperfections – increasing 
returns to scale, externalities, monopoly and many others. Generally, 
these imperfections have a negative impact on desired outcomes, 
so policies to remove them should have positive results. But, as 
development economists have shown, this is less certain where they 
are widely prevalent. For example, in low-income countries, laws 
against monopoly might mean that production could never start. Some 
environmental protection policies might undermine the chance of  
industrialising. Ballots presuppose access to full and fair information 
if  they are justly to reflect people’s perceptions of  their own interests 
(arguably a lesson that should be close to our minds in the UK in 2016, 
where lack of  such information may have affected the result of  the 
referendum over whether to leave the European Union).
This structuralist tradition in economics showed that selective 
intervention is needed to achieve development goals, and by the mid-
1970s even the World Bank president had announced that development 
should not be judged by economic growth alone but by the extent to 
which poverty was reduced in the world (McNamara 1973).
However, during the 1970s the post-war Keynesian consensus on 
economic policy was breaking down. Fiscal and monetary instruments 
began to have greater impact on levels of  inflation than on output 
and employment. A series of  oil crises fuelled recession in the West 
and shifts to the right in national and in global politics began to take 
hold. Reductions in state expenditure and emphasis on the importance 
of  ‘getting prices right’ became increasingly a unifying message for 
economic policy reform in the countries of  the North.
At about the same time, a major challenge to the development policy 
orthodoxy came from a group of  economists, who sought to reassert 
the major tenets of  economic liberalism in the analysis of  development, 
extending a tradition of  economics whose origins were in Chicago 
and whose pre-eminent exponent had been Harry Johnson. These 
‘neoliberal’ economists (particularly Béla Balassa, Peter Bauer, Anne 
Krueger, Deepak Lal and Ian Little) advocated a more thoroughgoing 
rejection of  state intervention than even Adam Smith would have 
allowed. Their central message was that ‘imperfect markets are better, in 
settling matters of  resource allocation, than imperfect states’ – not that 
markets were perfect, but that, warts and all, they will allocate resources 
more efficiently than alternative mechanisms (Bauer 1981: 255–66; 
Lal 1983: 106; Little 1982).
The intellectual foundations of  their position were provided by 
orthodox neoclassical economic theory. But as States or Markets? argued, 
they differ from careful neoclassical analysts in two very important 
ways. First, neoliberals concentrate entirely on the costs imposed by 
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ill-advised government interventionism – yet precisely the same methods 
demonstrate the costs of  imperfections which are not policy induced. 
So, ‘hoist by their own petard’, where there are serious imperfections in 
the market, liberalising could actually make matters worse.
Second, neoliberals claim more for the long-run impact of  short-
run optimisation than both classical and other neoclassical writers 
would presume. Variables with enormous influence upon long-run 
outcomes – technology, labour supply, capital stock – are relegated to a 
category which will look after itself. It is not that these things are judged 
unimportant – rather, they need no separate attention other than that 
which they will get by consequence of  short-run price signals.
In these two respects, neoliberals were incautious – laying themselves 
open to attack from more careful analysts working within the orthodox 
tradition – as well as from those providing a more structuralist critique, 
as in States or Markets?, covering agriculture, industry, trade, education, 
gender, health, international finance, aid and other matters.
As we know, much progress was made during the 1990s and 2000s with 
moves to get human development more strongly enshrined as the major 
development paradigm. But orthodoxy remained resilient to these 
attacks, certainly until the financial crisis, and many neoliberal elements 
were present in the so-called Washington Consensus policy reforms, 
summarised well by Dani Rodrik as: ‘stabilise, liberalise, privatise’ 
(Rodrik 2006).
To conclude, the macro strategy of  neoliberals is: let the market do its 
work; remove tariffs and let comparative advantage hold sway; trade 
imbalances should be settled by domestic adjustment rather than by 
international concessionary finance but where there is reason to provide 
finance, the private banks will do so. This mantra is not quite so brutally 
held by the international financial institutions (IFIs), which accept the 
needs for concessionary financing and to recycle funds from surplus 
countries. But the costs of  such recycling continue to fall mainly on the 
deficit countries and, as the experience of  Greece has shown, there has 
been only limited progress in getting a wider Keynesian view accepted.
Meanwhile, inequality has risen enormously over the past two 
generations. Its consequences are patent everywhere from the ballot 
boxes of  the rich industrialised nations to the migrant boats from Africa 
and Asia. Its impact is felt in the rise of  nationalism in countries of  both 
the South and the North and even, partly, in the growth of  terrorism. 
These matters would, I think, be a closer focus for a new ‘States or 
Markets’ volume – a continued critique of  sectoral strategy, but a new 
and much sharper focus on the macro consequences of  a theory and 
policy set which assumes that those outside the reach of  the market 
are there mainly because of  their own lack of  effort, and thus deserve 
neither rights nor viable opportunities to contribute to it.
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Inequality and Exclusion in the 
New Era of Capital
Violet Barasa
Abstract The IDS 50th Anniversary Conference held in July 2016 revisited 
the age-old debate concerning the changing nature of the relationship 
between states, markets and society in relation to the problem of 
inequality. The deliberations at the conference made it clear that 
inequalities go beyond disparities between households in their income or 
asset ownership, to intersecting inequalities along the lines of age, gender, 
location and access to public services such as healthcare and education. This 
article addresses three areas of inequality that were given pre-eminence at 
the conference, namely, gender inequality, youth unemployment and social 
protection. The conclusion recaptures the main argument and suggests a 
rebalancing of power between states, markets and society because the key 
problem is that market forces have become too dominant.
Keywords: gender, inequality, youth, unemployment, social protection.
1 Introduction
The nature of  state–market–society relations and their impact on 
inequality and exclusion are of  perennial concern to scholars of  
development studies. From the end of  the Second World War into 
the 1960s, the formative period of  what is now called ‘development 
economics’, the long-running debate on development centred on why 
some countries grew rich while others languished. Thus, the relative 
merits of  financial liberalisation have come under heavy criticism 
especially in the wake of  bank panics and collapses, and the resultant 
recessions, high inflation and the accumulation of  excessive foreign debt 
in less developed countries (McKinnon 1991).
This article looks at the problem of  inequality and exclusion by 
revisiting the deliberations of  the Institute of  Development Studies 
(IDS) 50th Anniversary Conference held in July 2016. In particular, it 
looks at the challenges of  addressing inequality through three issues that 
were given pre-eminence at the conference, namely, gender inequality, 
youth unemployment and social protection. The main focus of  the 
article is how the empirical material from the conference challenges 
existing theories and conceptual frameworks that underpin state–
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market–society relations within development processes. The conclusion 
draws from this critique and suggests possible directions towards 
rebalancing power between states, markets and society.
2 The problem of inequality
Inequality is a serious issue – both for economic efficiency and for social 
stability. Inequality is rising, both horizontally and vertically between 
and within countries. Addressing the IDS 50th Anniversary Conference, 
economist Frances Stewart opened the plenary on inequality with a 
presentation on the ‘Inequality Paradox’ in which she highlighted the 
stark statistics of  growing disparities in income, employment, access to 
health care and education across a wide spectrum of  intersecting factors 
such as race, gender, location and age. Between countries, she noted 
that inequalities have increased 11 per cent in developing countries 
in the period 1990–2015 (see also UNDP 2015). Yet, paradoxically, 
state and society actors find themselves constrained by market forces to 
tackle the challenges of  inequality and exclusion. Today, almost half  of  
all the world’s household wealth is owned by 1 per cent of  the global 
population (Credit Suisse 2015), and the richest 62 individuals own as 
much as the bottom half  of  humanity (Oxfam 2016).
UN Sustainable Development Goal 10 embraces the challenge of  
inequality and exclusion, and commits to ‘reducing inequality within 
and among countries’. Inequality cuts across multiple dimensions, 
including but not limited to: economic, social, cultural, political, spatial, 
environmental and knowledge-based, and these operate differently 
depending on contexts, and affect individuals and communities in 
varying ways. Social relations of  different cultures affect levels of  
inequality, in the same way that the political climate in different 
countries creates enabling or disabling environments for justice to thrive. 
Many scholars have advanced explanatory frameworks that address the 
role of  states, markets and society actors in economic development and 
in reducing inequalities to help in the understanding of  cross-country 
variations in development trajectories (see Underhill and Zhang 2005; 
Clark and Chan 1998; Weiss and Hobson 1995). In what follows, I 
apply these frameworks to empirical material from the conference 
deliberations on gender inequality, youth unemployment and social 
protection, in order to build a nuanced understanding of  the complex 
variables at play in producing and sustaining these inequalities.
3 Gender inequality
Gender constitutes a major factor in explaining the complexity of  inequality 
in many contexts. Gender inequalities are embodied in the way dominant 
institutions operate; for instance, as we move away from developmental 
state paradigms, where states and markets operate as distinctive entities 
and market forces become more dominant, labour markets are increasingly 
becoming significant bearers of  gender. During the IDS conference, 
experts on gender and sexuality expressed that gender inequalities 
have been exacerbated by dominant market forces, and that states have 
become too constrained to reverse these trends. Bafana Khumalo and 
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Wanja Wamuguongo, gender and minority sexual rights activists from 
South Africa and Kenya respectively, noted that individual men and 
women’s rights are shrinking while the power of  markets are expanding 
exponentially at the same time. Khumalo noted that in South Africa the 
state is becoming more accountable to markets and not to the people, and 
that society actors are being marginalised in the process.
This is perhaps best understood using neostatist theories that view 
the development process as necessarily influenced by bureaucratic 
linkages between state bureaucrats and private business in what Weiss 
and Hobson (1995) appropriately termed ‘embedded autonomy’ of  
states and markets. Although proponents of  these approaches view the 
interaction between states and markets as reciprocal, complementary 
and mutually reinforcing, it is clear that markets have become too 
dominant and the state has been unable to prevent particularistic 
interests from subverting the interest of  minority social actors, including 
advancing gender equality and minority sexual rights.
In a similar vein, civil society mobilisation increasingly revolves around 
identity, not class, and the main challenge for development is how to 
open up and broaden out pathways towards equal representation of  
minority sexual rights and gender equality regardless of  class, religion, 
race or creed.
Experts at the conference cautioned that without structural reforms of  
state and market institutions, gender and sexual inequalities were likely 
to persist, because women’s empowerment requires female autonomy 
in all areas of  life – financial, economic, political, social and cultural, 
in and outside the home. Panellists in the session also noted that 
although some measures to accelerate gender parity are improving – 
reduction in gender pay gap, improved political representation, stiffer 
penalties for rape and sexual assault – this does not automatically lead 
to empowerment of  women, particularly in countries where overall 
development is low. In other words, development and gender equality 
go hand in hand.
Furthermore, questions need to be asked about the nature of  autonomy 
and empowerment itself: who is being empowered, individuals or 
communities? Which society is being empowered and for what? 
Increasing accountability of  those working towards gender equality goes 
beyond ‘adding women/gay people with an asterisk’ to interrogating the 
power relations and structures of  inequality within and across society.
4 Youth unemployment
This issue was a central theme during the IDS conference, where 
experts working with young people presented their experiences. In his 
inaugural IDS Annual Lecture at the conference on ‘Not Working: 
Rethinking and Redistribution in the Jobless City’, Stanford University 
professor James Ferguson highlighted the challenge of  unemployment 
in cities, particularly in the global South. He argued that the destructive 
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market forces driving urbanisation has given rise to slums and slum 
dwellers, a high proportion of  whom are youth, who are effectively 
becoming victims of  a decaying society. He called for alternative 
pathways to those based on wage labour, and provoked conference 
participants to start thinking of  what he termed ‘improvised livelihoods’. 
He challenged the dominant market-led narrative of  ‘real jobs’, which 
he referred to as the ‘catastrophe’ narrative, and used the example of  
Ethiopia to make a case for a return to social relationships and gift-
giving practices where appropriate reciprocities sustain societies.
Echoing James Ferguson’s sentiments, University of  Sussex professor 
Andy McKay and IDS professor Jim Sumberg noted that the challenge 
of  youth unemployment was serious, particularly for sub-Saharan 
Africa where the population is mainly made up of  young people and 
the burden of  unemployment is highest. Dinah Rajak, also from the 
University of  Sussex, noted that youth, unemployment and urbanisation 
was a triple economic and social crisis but also a market opportunity, 
where bottom-of-the pyramid schemes can offer alternatives to jobs 
through youth entrepreneurship. However, Meredith Lee from the 
MasterCard Foundation observed that, while entrepreneurship can 
play a role in alleviating youth unemployment, it offers little hope as it 
is fragmented and remains at micro-levels in the developing countries 
of  Africa, where there are high failure rates due to a lack of  access to 
critical infrastructure such as roads, markets and capital. In addition, for 
young people already living in poverty, multiple insecurities in different 
areas of  their lives such as homelessness, long-term illness or death 
of  family members are likely to exacerbate the failure of  running a 
successful business. McKay noted that there is also a great diversity of  
contextual factors affecting youth unemployment, such as gender, age, 
social connection, rural–urban divide and so forth, and these need to be 
taken into account by policymakers. In Africa, the secure salaried work 
available is often the preserve of  the well-connected, young, educated 
men living in urban areas. Young women are more likely to work in 
unpaid family labour (Kingdon, Sandefur and Teal 2006).
In other words, entrepreneurship ought not to be perceived as a blanket 
solution for youth unemployment, nor should it be used as a scapegoat 
for states’ failure to leverage market conditions and implement labour 
policies that absorb a more diverse range of  young people into paid 
work.
Although access to higher education around the world has improved 
for young people, the transition into the labour market is far from easy 
for many (ILO 2016). In 2015, a record 204 million people worldwide, 
including 74 million young people (ages 15–24), were unemployed 
(UNDP 2015; ILO 2016). Youth unemployment in European countries 
such as Spain, Portugal and Croatia stands at 53 per cent, 35 per cent 
and 46 per cent, respectively. In Africa, the figures are much higher, 
standing at 59 per cent in Egypt and 80 per cent in Zimbabwe, to 
mention but a few.
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With a projected 1.1 billion people under the age of  30 entering 
the labour market by the year 2020 (UNDP 2015), tackling youth 
unemployment is now more urgent than ever. In terms of  how states, 
markets and society can intervene to alleviate youth unemployment, it 
is crucial for states to play an activist role and harness the contributions 
of  business and society actors as functional equivalents in their ability 
to build up ties between government and the private sector (Clark 
and Chan 1998). For instance, labour unions, inter-sector networks, 
business associations and private–public consultative fora facilitate the 
exchange of  information, and enhance trust and cooperation between 
government and market actors (cited in Underhill and Zhang 2005).
5 Inequality and social protection
Social protection systems have been hailed as success stories of  
development. However, they are coming under insurmountable pressure 
in most countries both in the developed and the developing world as 
states target welfare budgets for cuts as part of  austerity measures.
Speaking during the IDS conference, Armando Barrientos, Professor of  
Poverty and Social Justice at the University of  Manchester, decried the 
state’s lax attitude to promoting social protection, arguing that private 
businesses were driving the move towards commercialisation of  welfare 
in many countries. He stressed that social protection need not be seen 
as a form of  state benevolence but should be rooted in the political 
conception of  justice and be integrated in state social economic policy. 
Isabel Ortiz, Director of  Social Protection at the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), reiterated that welfare coverage was low and 
fragmented across the world, and that in fact, states in approximately 
132 countries were cutting social welfare budgets at present.
In European countries such as Greece and Portugal, the impact of  
these cuts has been severe, but they have also been met with protests, as 
has been the case elsewhere around the world. This has included food 
riots in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and South East Asia after 
prices sky-rocketed between 2008–12, heralding new forms of  public 
accountability for hunger and malnutrition (Hossain 2009).
Box 1 Inequality in Europe
European countries have reduced a range of  social protection 
benefits and limited access to quality public services; together 
with persistent unemployment, lower wages and higher taxes, 
these measures have contributed to increases in poverty 
and social exclusion, now affecting 123 million people in the 
European Union – 24 per cent of  the population, many of  
them children, women and persons with disabilities. Several 
European courts have found cuts unconstitutional.
Source: ILO (2014) based on EUROSTAT data (in Ortiz et al. 
2015).
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Riots and protests have targeted the state, international financial 
institutions, elites, the police, and regional administrative bodies 
challenging rigid technocratic solutions to development. The state has 
been accused of  reneging on its responsibility to provide social protection 
for its most vulnerable populations, and it has instead left it to the market, 
often without regulation. As a result, there have been mass privatisations 
of  pension schemes in many countries including many in Africa such as 
Nigeria, where the state privatised the pension fund in 2005.
Panellists were in agreement that the state is the only institution that can 
pull resources together and strengthen its collaboration with the market 
and society in order to reinforce structural reforms towards universal 
welfare coverage. Ortiz cited some examples in developing countries 
where such collaborations have been successful, including in Lesotho, 
where the state pays a universal pension, and in Mongolia, a small state 
which has successfully restored universal child tax credits.
6 Conclusion
Power and politics constitute a two-way relationship between structures 
and agents in particular institutional settings. On the one hand, institutions 
shape existing structures, and on the other, institutional structures can 
limit the power of  states, markets and society actors from pursuing their 
development goals. In other words, and as this article has articulated, it 
is not the institutions of  states, markets or society that are the problem in 
the current state of  inequality and inclusion, but rather, it is the political 
processes and power dynamics within them that are to blame.
The central argument in this article then is that, rather than the view that 
states and markets work best in ‘embedded autonomy’, as some theorists 
suggest (i.e. that they are separate entities operating in a dichotomous 
relationship with little influence over each other, and society actors are an 
‘add on’ to this equation), there is a need to approach this triad as a part of  
the same integrated ensemble, separated by interests, whether individual 
or group. These interests in turn influence the types of  debate that are 
prioritised, how power is exercised and how economic and social policy 
choices are made. However, in the current capital-based configuration, the 
evidence suggests that market forces have become both too dominant and 
the ‘senior partners’ in the triad, and inequalities are an inevitable result 
of  this dominance. Thus, in order to address state, market and society 
relations, and effectively tackle the challenge of  inequalities in their various 
forms, there is a need to rebalance the power within the triad through the 
integration of  its key social constituents and their interests. This includes 
harnessing and strengthening democratic institutions and enhancing 
accountability at all levels of  state, market and societal governance. 
However challenging this may be, it is the most realistic way of  helping to 
generate a collective vision for a fair and a sustainable world.
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Inclusive Innovation, Development 
and Policy: Four Key Themes
Amrita Saha
Abstract There is widespread recognition of political economy factors 
that underline ‘inclusive innovation’. Key among these include the trio of 
states, markets and society; the conditions that lead to technology transfer, 
adoption and finally diffusion in a new context; the corresponding creation 
of indigenous capacity with participation from local actors and stakeholders; 
and socially inclusive outcomes that can thrive from complementarities of 
technology and social innovation. Building on these ideas from the IDS 
50th Anniversary Conference in July 2016, this article links them with the 
Heeks Ladder of Inclusive Innovation to discuss the prospects for further 
inclusive innovation and development.
Keywords: inclusive innovation, development, policy.
1 Introduction
There is widespread recognition of  political economy factors that 
underline innovation and its role in development. Key among these are 
interactions that span the trio of  states, markets and society governed by 
a set of  rules and institutional frameworks (Altenburg 2009); conditions 
that lead technology to be transferred, adopted and finally diffused in 
a new context; the corresponding creation of  indigenous capacity with 
participation from local actors; and socially inclusive outcomes that can 
thrive from complementarities of  technology and social innovation. The 
Institute of  Development Studies (IDS) 50th Anniversary Conference 
debated these key themes in furthering the agenda of  inclusive 
innovation and development.
As early as the 1970s, IDS and the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) 
at the University of  Sussex collaborated to produce the so-called Sussex 
Manifesto (Singer et al. 1970). This brought innovation into the centre 
of  the development discussion, stressing the role played by technology 
and research. In 2010, IDS and SPRU collaborated again to produce a 
follow-up Innovation, Sustainability, Development: A New Manifesto (STEPS 
Centre 2010). This laid emphasis on organising innovation as being 
networked, distributed and inclusive, where various groups of  people 
and stakeholders are included, especially the poor and marginalised.
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In this entire period, innovation has been hypothesised as an 
amalgamation of  various processes that emerge from the interactions 
among various actors that are involved in those processes.1 A parallel 
can be drawn with the concept of  global value chains where various 
innovations come together to bring a product or service from 
conception to the final consumers (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001). 
However, weak institutions and less formal definitions of  interactions 
among the actors often present challenges for innovation to be inclusive 
at various nodes of  the chain. As a result, excluded groups (for instance, 
smallholder farmers or the marginalised without access to health 
services) may fall outside the domain of  creation and impact from 
conventional innovations. ‘Inclusive innovation’ emerged in response to 
these challenges that emerged for excluded sections of  society.
There have been various developments of  the concept of  inclusive 
innovations since 2010. In this article, I draw on the work of  Foster 
and Heeks (2013), where inclusive innovation is defined such that 
marginalised groups are incorporated within the structures and 
processes that underline an innovation activity. The key questions 
stressed in their work are ‘who is included in innovation?’, and ‘where 
to include them?’. Both acquire importance from the perspective of  the 
political economy of  innovation that creates inclusive outcomes and is 
also inclusive in terms of  the innovation process itself, the latter alluding 
to the social shaping of  technologies (Smith 2014). This approach helps 
support the frame of  analysis for the ideas discussed in this article.
Heeks, Foster and Nugroho (2014) developed their work on innovation 
further as the ‘Ladder of  Inclusive Innovation’, outlining six levels to 
help ascertain if  an innovation was inclusive: ‘intention’ (intends to 
address the needs of  the excluded); ‘consumption’ (adopted and used 
by the excluded); ‘impact’ (positive impact on the livelihoods of  the 
excluded); ‘process’ (if  the excluded are involved in the development 
of  the innovation); ‘structure’ (created within a structure that is itself  
inclusive); and ‘post-structure’ (created within a frame of  inclusive 
knowledge). Each level involves gradual broadening of  the extent of  
inclusion of  the excluded groups and presents a useful framework to 
evaluate the extent of  inclusion encompassed in a specific innovation.
Saha (2016) outlined six aspects of  inclusive innovation and development 
that were discussed and debated at the IDS 50th Anniversary 
Conference. Attempting to draw key themes that can feed into the Heeks 
Ladder of  Inclusive Innovation, here I discuss four, as depicted in Figure 
1. First, interactions among the trio of  states, markets and society with 
links to the bottom of  the ladder; second, technology adoption, diffusion 
and upgrading in parallel with the middle of  the ladder; third, innovation 
as participation towards the top; and fourth, the complementarities of  
technology and social innovation, right at the top of  the ladder.
In discussing the four themes, I draw on recent developments in the field 
of  innovation that were also vibrant in the debate at the conference. 
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These include the emphasis on political economy of  interactions leading 
to innovations, the global systems of  innovation (Martin 2015), thinking 
of  innovation in terms of  new or incremental improvements, not only 
in products, but in terms of  processes/markets/organisation, and finally 
the social framing of  innovations (Smith 2014).
The remainder of  the article is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines 
key literature and analysis around the trio of  states, markets and 
society. In Section 3, I draw from key debates on technology transfer, 
adoption and diffusion. Section 4 discusses the idea of  innovation 
as participation. Section 5 hypothesises the complementarities of  
technology and social innovation. Section 6 concludes and highlights 
topics for further research in these areas.
2 The trio of states, markets and society
The literature on innovation has identified the range of  actors that are 
involved, varying across sectors and countries. These actors are drawn 
from state-owned institutions involved in developing new products or 
supporting them (state), the private sector that also undertake similar 
initiatives (markets); and research and education systems (Chataway, 
Hanlin and Kaplinsky 2014) as well as not-for-profit organisations 
(society).
Technology and social innovation
Innovation as participation
Technology transfer, adoption 
and diffusion
States
Markets
Society
Level 6: 
Post-structural 
inclusion
Level 5: Inclusion of 
structure
Level 4: Inclusion of 
process
Level 3: Inclusion of 
impact
Level 2: Inclusion of 
consumption
Level 1: Inclusion of 
intention
Figure 1 Four key themes from the IDS 50th Anniversary Conference to feed into the Heeks Ladder of Inclusive Innovation
Source Representation by author adapting Heeks et al. (2014) and ideas from the IDS 50th Anniversary Conference in Saha 
(2016).
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To work towards the goal of  inclusive inclusion, the trio of  states, 
markets and society play not only a primary role but comprise the set 
of  actors that are in fact an imperative to the process of  innovation for 
any country. In the Heeks et al. (2014) ladder, this trio can be situated in 
parallel with the first level of  ‘intention’, with essential support to ensure 
outcomes for the following levels, and especially to push the existing 
frontiers leading to the fourth level of  inclusion in ‘process’.
The role of  the state in innovation has received immense emphasis in 
Mazzucato (2011), where the author draws attention to the role of  the 
state in not only fixing markets but also in shaping and in fact creating 
them. She outlines ‘mission-oriented’ finance as strategic public sector 
investment to trigger economic activity and innovation, and to create 
opportunities for markets and economic growth. Such finance begins on 
the premise of  problem-specific challenges that need to be solved, and 
requires coordination across different sectors and the state. While the 
example of  the iPhone is the most popular example in Mazzucato’s work, 
the ideas are also reverberant in several other less documented instances.
One such example is the evolving progress in anti-retroviral drugs and 
therapy in Mozambique (Pfeiffer et al. 2010) where donor funding has 
been coordinated by the government following national health objectives 
on HIV/AIDS with positive spillovers to overall primary health care for 
the country. Even though the finance came from international agencies, 
the commitment to tackle the disease on the part of  the Mozambique 
government has led to significant reductions in disease burdens. The 
most recent success has been a Brazilian collaboration for a factory that 
is producing anti-retroviral drugs (Russo and de Oliveira 2016).
Innovation policy is often attributed to being about supporting 
discovery processes that necessarily involve significant trial and error 
(Rodrik 2004). However, countries may find themselves trapped in 
situations where poverty can limit the scope of  investment capacity 
to further innovation on the one hand, while the absence of  efficient 
institutions may inhibit the process further (Altenburg 2009) on the 
other. In this scenario, while the state must play a greater role to 
regulate markets and prevent market failure, it is also important that 
there are institutions that can carefully evaluate potential winners and 
lessons to learn in the playing field (Mazzucato 2011).
Therefore, arguments from existing literature point towards the role 
of  the state in furthering inclusive innovation to especially ascertain 
‘intention’ in the Heeks et al. (2014) ladder. Such ‘intention’ can be 
discovered by means of  exploratory public sector organisations that can 
identify opportunities where investments in new innovations can address 
the needs of  excluded groups. On the lines of  Mazzucato (2011), while 
strategic public finance led by the state can be key here, there is an 
essential room for careful monitoring of  such institutions to overcome 
gaps between intentions that are outlined and those that are actualised. 
Further, the role played by markets and public–private partnerships 
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cannot be discounted. Private actors often support large-scale 
investments that may include donor aid in cooperation with national 
governments to facilitate the correct channelling of  resources. Again, 
there is the need to strengthen checks and balances to prevent this from 
being skewed in the favour of  powerful corporations.
What will be key in future policies aimed at assessing the ‘intention’ 
to achieve inclusive innovation will be the synergies of  partnerships 
between states and markets. The role of  non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) is also of  importance as agents of  policy implementation 
for increased inclusion that act independently of  states or markets. 
Therefore, for the trio of  actors, each stands to make an essential 
contribution in ‘intention’ going forward with inclusive innovation, and 
to overcome gaps between stated intentions and actualising them.
3 Technology transfer, adoption and diffusion
Technology transfer, adoption and diffusion play a crucial role 
following up from the creation of  a new technology or innovation. How 
technology transfer in developing countries can lead to adoption and 
actual diffusion in terms of  building local capabilities is of  importance 
for ‘consumption’ and ‘impact’ in the Heeks et al. (2014) ladder.
To enable low-income producers and consumers to adopt the 
innovation, emerging productive activities that replace less efficient 
ones should be accessible for the most marginalised actors. Altenburg 
(2009) outlines that labour market rigidities and skills development may 
be the key binding constraints for integrating low-income workers in 
competitive industries.
Once the new technology or innovation is created and transferred to 
new settings, innovation still occurs at every stage from production or 
adoption of  the new good or service to distribution or diffusion of  the 
good or service along the value chain. Also, further innovations may 
occur on feedback from surrounding social systems that lead to the 
creation of  further innovations (Foster and Heeks 2013).
Taking the case of  agriculture as an example, transfer of  technologies 
can solve specific problems at the farm level, such as adoption of  new 
seed varieties, irrigation systems, etc. for smallholder farmers. However, 
for innovations to be inclusive, significant changes are essential in 
supporting social systems such as input services, marketing systems, 
intermediaries and others. These are necessary to support consumption 
such that small-scale farmers can adapt the innovations to local 
conditions and create positive impacts on their livelihoods.
While new technology can improve productivity and thereby create 
improved livelihoods for the excluded, investments in local capability 
are essential for the impact to be sustainable. Thereby investments in 
national technology need to focus on the objective of  diffusion such that 
adopted innovations can enable the creation of  design and capabilities 
for transforming existing knowledge into new configurations by local 
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stakeholders (Bell 2007). Therefore, while technology transfer and adoption 
is criticised for increasing reliance on foreign sources of  innovation, 
investment in local capability for diffusion of  knowledge is necessary.
Technology transfer may, however, stop at adoption without creating 
any diffusion. One example is the cut-flower industry in Ethiopia, where 
the introduction of  seed varieties and other technologies such as glass 
greenhouses from abroad created jobs for the local population and 
sparked a significant rise in cut-flower exports of  the country (Perry 2011). 
However, this has not been followed by the building of  significant local 
research capacities as most technology continues to be foreign sourced. 
Although the cut-flower value chain has witnessed some local innovations 
in other linked sectors of  transport in the use of  chilling trucks and 
warehouses, local diffusion for innovations has only been limited.
For technology transfer to lead to diffusion, innovation policies should 
focus on reaching out to wider sections of  the population of  excluded 
groups. Various types of  technology transfer and their corresponding 
pathways to diffusion lead to varied outcomes on inclusion. For 
example, the adoption of  foreign seed varieties in agriculture can lead 
to further investments in research and creation of  local production 
capability that then creates jobs for the local population, but the 
creation of  inclusion will depend on the wellbeing of  workers, impact 
for excluded groups, gender effects, etc.
In the context of  global value chains, this can be assessed for instance by 
the extent to which the small and medium enterprises and the small-scale 
farmers in least developed countries (LDCs) can actually upgrade and 
link into the existing global value chains being led by China and India.2 
This can be key to unlocking the potential of  technology transfer, leading 
to adoption and finally diffusion, especially for poorer countries that face 
constraints in forwarding the goals of  inclusive innovation.
An important policy lesson is that adoption of  foreign technology needs to 
be supported by national policies and investments in research capabilities 
to catalyse local diffusion and create wider impact for ‘consumption’ and 
‘impact’. Altenburg (2009) has emphasised the importance of  sustainable 
policies that can support the adoption and diffusion of  new technology 
to speed up the process of  learning and shifting resources to more 
productive uses. This includes developing markets for subsidies, improved 
governance of  financial markets, competition policy, simplification of  
business procedures, property rights reforms, labour market reforms, etc. 
Thereby, it also outlines the importance of  the design of  institutions to 
enable technological learning in a socially inclusive way.
4 Innovation as participation
Innovation as a process based on ‘participation’ can occur within a 
structure that is inclusive by being a combination of  new or external 
technology that adds value to existing or local structures and includes 
the excluded groups in the creation of  innovation. This furthers the 
(Endnotes)
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goal of  inclusive innovation and calls for policy conducive to creating 
structures that support the goals of  inclusivity. The emphasis on 
building local capacity can be traced to ideas of  ‘putting the last first’ 
(Chambers 1983) and of  ‘development as freedom’ (Sen 1999).
In the Heeks et al. (2014) ladder, the levels of  ‘process’ and ‘structure’ 
essentially point to the creation of  new technology or innovation with 
participation from local actors. The role of  local entrepreneurs and 
local research organisations that are better aware of  local needs creates 
actors that can contribute to this participation, and creates knowledge 
to cater to local and national needs supported by local stakeholder 
involvement. The role of  local actors is exemplified in the engagement 
of  communities and especially community health workers in health 
services provision in resource-poor countries such as the case of  anti-
retroviral treatment (ART) in Mozambique (Hog 2014).
Heeks et al. (2013) stress the hybridity of  inclusive innovations expressed 
as the combination of  external and local knowledge, seen to take place 
within a single individual, within a group, within an organisation, via 
collaboration or via intermediaries. This hybridity is important from the 
perspective of  ‘innovation as participation’ that implies broadening the 
very foundation of  innovation, to begin from neglected issues faced by 
excluded groups, but often built in collaboration with external support.
Development policy to build on the view of  innovation driven by local 
needs with support from external agencies is not without its critiques. 
Arora and Romijn (2009) discuss the nature of  participatory practice 
that determines local knowledge situated within structures of  asymmetric 
power distribution. This includes development experts and communities 
on the one hand, and the global/national corporate capital on the 
other. Therefore, for the active role of  communities in ART provision 
in Mozambique situated within donor–government–local community 
structures, the balance between the exercise of  power by international 
bodies and the potential disempowerment of  public services and local 
actors needs to be kept in check for ensuring effective participation.
Therefore, innovation seen as participation not only involves reaching 
out to the marginalised but also working with them such that technology 
is seen in its capability of  being empowering. This suggests innovation 
as a distributed activity where innovations and organisational structures 
are built on local knowledge, but also to ensure excluded groups are 
included in the process of  innovation with balanced power equations. 
Innovation can then occur within a structure that is inclusive by being a 
combination of  new or external technology that adds value to existing 
or local structures.
5 Technology and social innovation
The collaboration of  technological innovation and contribution from 
social innovation puts light on framing innovations in a social context. 
‘Social innovation’ can be defined as innovation that leads to broad-
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based outcomes for society (Gaventa and Mathie 2015). Bringing 
together the idea of  innovation that creates smart growth, with a social 
context that leads to inclusive growth and improved social welfare 
can be set within the argument that there is in fact nothing natural or 
inevitable about technological trajectories, and that these are shaped by 
social forces and actor interests (Smith 2014).
A linked concern about design–reality gaps from Heeks (2002) 
emphasises that innovation designs mismatched to the realities of  
low-income consumers can fail in adoption. The need for innovation to 
be matched with the realities of  low-income consumers is an important 
component of  the final top level of  ‘post-structure’ in the Heeks et al. 
(2014) ladder. Creation of  new ideas in an inclusive knowledge frame 
where excluded groups are involved in creation of  the knowledge that 
can build on the unmet needs of  the marginalised.
Smith (2014) outlines the role of  community-based networks, where access 
to technical advice and prototyping services to develop socially useful 
products enabled tapping into the scientific and innovation knowledge of  
communities and social networks. Examples of  community-led provision 
of  services, especially in the health sector in several African countries 
such as Kenya, Ethiopia and Mozambique, have created wider access to 
health provision for people outside the coverage of  primary health care. 
While there are often limitations to achieving socially inclusive frames of  
knowledge creation, the role of  development policy can support initiatives to 
overcome these and create a combination of  smart and inclusive growth.
The role of  cooperatives comprising smallholder farmers producing 
livestock and small-scale milk vendors is another example that stands 
out as a social frame where people-led initiatives have created success in 
dairy production in Kenya, leading to improved milk yield and nutrition 
outcomes (Staal, Pratt and Jabbar 2008). Cooperative groups have 
filled in gaps especially in providing crucial input services to small-scale 
farmers in production and transport services along the milk value chain. 
These organisation and marketing innovations have emerged from the 
unmet needs of  marginalised farmers and actors, where local research 
organisations further supported the development of  innovations. While 
small-scale farmers and the role of  women have been significant, there 
are still unmet challenges from the affordability of  input services that lie 
outside of  the scope of  public services and cooperatives.
Therefore, innovation created on the premise of  inclusive networks 
of  knowledge can contribute to activity that consciously shapes 
technology for social benefit, creating inclusive outcomes in innovation. 
Development policy, by facilitating support systems for these networks, 
has a valuable role to play in furthering inclusion.
6 Conclusion
There is now widespread recognition of  the role of  inclusive innovation in 
development and the importance of  political economy factors. This article 
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has analysed four key aspects of  inclusive innovation and shows how they 
help elaborate and modify the Heeks Ladder of  Inclusive Innovation.
The particular interactions among the trio of  states, markets and 
society is strategic for creating new technology and innovations for 
any country. State-led support, markets and donors and not-for-profit 
organisations are important contributors to its creation. What will be 
key in future policies and research aimed at inclusive innovation is 
not only to assess ‘intention’, but also to find the means to fill the gaps 
between merely stated intentions and actualised intentions, possibly 
using the synergies of  partnerships between states and markets, as well 
as non-governmental agencies.
Technology adoption, diffusion and upgrading are discussed as 
fundamental steps following the creation of  new technology or innovation. 
The adoption and actual diffusion in building local capabilities is 
emphasised for ‘consumption’ and ‘impact’. Sustainable policies by way 
of  institutions and social systems are identified as important to facilitate 
adoption and diffusion. The institutions and support to enable the creation 
of  local capability will be key in policy design.
‘Innovation as participation’ contributes to ‘process’ and ‘structure’ for 
inclusive innovation. Local entrepreneurs and research organisations 
can create knowledge that caters to local and national needs by means 
of  local stakeholder involvement. Therefore, this can ensure that 
innovation is inclusive also in terms of  the process of  creating the 
innovation within a structure that is itself  inclusive. Further research 
in this area needs a special emphasis on the system of  checks and 
balances for the exercise of  power by external agents and the potential 
disempowerment of  domestic actors to ensure effective participation.
Finally, the complementarities of  technology and social innovation is 
an overarching theme for inclusive innovation. The social frame for 
innovation with emphasis on the ‘post-structure’ of  inclusive knowledge 
stands out in the conscious shaping of  technology for social benefit, 
towards creating inclusive outcomes in innovation.
The four themes above are identified as essentials for furthering the agenda 
of  inclusive innovation, development and policy. These could provide 
valuable foci for future research to disaggregate finer nuances, and to relate 
these to policies and practices to further inclusive innovations.
Notes
1 Innovation has been outlined as emerging from a broad network of  
dynamically linked actors within a particular institutional context 
(Lundvall 2011).
2 See for instance Banga and Saha (forthcoming), where LDCs are 
examined as potential links into existing global value chains for India.
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Consequences of Inequality for 
Sustainability
Sunita Narain
Abstract In this article, I argue that sustainable development is not possible 
without affordable and inclusive growth. Inequality and unsustainability are 
linked and unless the world is able to look for environmental solutions that 
are affordable and can meet the needs of all, these will not work.
Keywords: air pollution, Delhi, inequality, sustainability, water 
pollution, development.
Fifty years of  the Institute of  Development Studies (IDS) marks an 
important opportunity to think and rethink development as the world 
practises it today. In this short opinion piece, I offer some reflections on 
the twin challenges of  inequality and unsustainability, the relationship 
between them, and the implications for understanding and action 
around states, markets and society.
We currently stand at a crossroads. The challenge of  unsustainable 
growth means that we are hurtling towards climate catastrophe, and 
the challenge of  inequitable growth means that we are hurtling towards 
increased poverty, increased marginalisation and increased anger.
The problem has been that we have believed (and continue to do so 
with conviction) that we can practise unsustainable development and 
then clean it up, make the pollution go away. Or we have believed that 
we can make environmental management a part of  growth; investment 
in pollution control is an economic activity after all. But these 
approaches do not work. We end up managing small fallouts and stay 
behind the problem: they are technocratic, and not political.
We have learnt that growth that is not affordable or in other words 
equitable, cannot be sustainable. We cannot push away the politics of  
development when we discuss sustainability.
1 The case of air pollution
Air pollution illustrates these points. Today, a miniscule number of  
people in Delhi (and indeed most other cities of  the global South) drive a 
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car. In Delhi, the proportion is 15 per cent, but air pollution is at a very 
high level and the congestion has become intolerable. The question is 
how will Delhi combat air pollution as more and more people start to 
drive? What contingencies can be put in place for the remaining 85 per 
cent? Is there space on the road and corresponding space in the airshed?
Clearly a simple technical solution is not feasible. We cannot fix the 
tailpipes of  individual cars. Instead we have to change the way people 
drive (or do not drive). We need to plan for sustainability for all, and for 
this we need to re-invent mobility at a scale not seen before. Without 
this we cannot clean our air for anybody, regardless of  their economic 
position. It is clear that solutions must work for the poor, for them to 
work for the rich. In this, managing local air pollution is no different 
from the management of  the global commons – the atmosphere mirrors 
the air pollution of  Delhi’s roads on a grand scale. Climate change 
cannot be mitigated unless we address issues of  equity and find ways of  
growth that work for all, without destroying the planet.
2 The case of water pollution
Indian rivers are increasingly polluted, but the question is, again, 
can we clean up when large numbers of  people are unconnected to 
sanitation and do not have access to clean water? We know that the 
current system of  water and waste management in cities like Delhi is 
both capital-intensive and divisive. The state has limited resources and 
can only invest in providing for some – and this is too often the rich 
and not the poor. But if  only a part of  the city has access to sanitation 
and underground sewage, pollution control will not work. The reason 
is simple – the treated waste of  a few will be mixed with the untreated 
waste of  many. The end result is pollution (Narain 2016: 138).
The greater the pollution, the higher the costs of  cleaning the water 
– even the rich cannot afford the current costs of  delivery of  water or 
of  taking back waste. This example therefore underlines again that 
solutions must work for the poor, for them to work for the rich.
3 States, markets and society – for whom?
So in the next 50 years of  development it is important to rethink the 
question of  states, markets and society. In recent decades we have 
dismembered the state, grown the market and believed that we have 
empowered society. We believed that people would be the moderating 
voices over the market, but we forgot to ask whose society is being 
empowered and for what? Slowly, the circle has closed – the state–
market and aspiring, consuming society have merged and become one. 
Anyone outside this circle has stopped being counted: these people are 
being slowly erased. The current state–market–society configuration 
is about the survival of  the fittest, in a way that drives both growing 
inequalities, and ultimately unsustainability too.
So, in the coming years, we must also ask – deliberately and insistently 
– whose society are we talking about, that of  the poor or that of  the 
rich? In most settings, electoral democracy is not proving sufficient to 
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represent the poor; it is delayed in response, and politicians can polarise 
communities and still win. It is necessary but not sufficient. A further, 
central part of  the development challenge is therefore deepening and 
strengthening democracy, not just for the socially connected but for all.
In conclusion, it is increasingly clear that sustainable development is not 
possible if  it is not equitable. Growth has to be affordable and inclusive 
for it to be sustainable. Yet none of  this will happen unless we articulate 
that the environmental challenge is not technocratic but political. We 
cannot neuter the politics of  access, justice and rights and hope to fix 
environmental – or indeed development – problems.
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Accelerating Sustainability: 
The Variations of State, Market 
and Society Dynamics in Diverse 
Contexts
Ramy Lotfy Hanna
Abstract The normative aims of sustainability seen in terms of matching 
environmental integrity, equality and social justice are clear. Yet, questioning 
how to get there is centrally about politics. This article presents two 
examples that illustrate the tensions and synergies across state, market and 
society alliances in accelerating sustainability. The first example addresses 
the question of financialization of nature by exploring the alliances created 
around offsets in international carbon markets under REDD+. The second 
example presents alliances for green transformation in Africa through 
Kenya’s pro-poor renewable energy experience. Both cases explore the 
importance of the political economy of the tripartite relationship between 
states, markets and society in tackling inequality. They also show the 
importance of inclusive transformation and the relevance of context in 
diverse sustainability pathways.
Keywords: sustainability, green transformation, financialization, 
alliances, pathways.
1 Introduction
Looking back over the last quarter of  a century since the Brundtland 
Commission report Our Common Future (WCED 1987) and the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio in 
1992, ‘sustainable development’ and ‘environmental sustainability’ 
have gained momentum in development circles globally. The recently 
adopted Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 have further 
elaborated on these notions, emphasising the integration of  social, 
economic and environmental dimensions. Yet, the mainstreaming of  
these terms has given rise to some confusion and fuzziness regarding 
‘sustainability’, leading to ‘inappropriately managerial and bureaucratic 
attempts to solve problems which are actually far more complex and 
political’ (Leach, Scoones and Stirling 2010).
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To some extent, contemporary environmental problems reflect ‘success 
resulting from the reduction of  poverty and increasing prosperity 
of  ever more people’ (Schmitz and Scoones 2015: 2). This starting 
point was emphasised during the Institute of  Development Studies 
(IDS) 50th Anniversary Conference. Prominent scholars such as 
Frances Stewart and Sunita Narain (see this IDS Bulletin) highlighted 
that environmental sustainability is one of  the most overriding 
issues relevant to today’s global development priorities, whereby the 
challenge of  unsustainable growth results in increased inequality 
and marginalisation, thus leading to an insecure future. Sustainable 
development is therefore a fundamental challenge of  our age, requiring 
‘green transformations’ (Scoones, Leach and Newell 2015), and 
moreover, needs to be linked with equity and social justice. Yet seeking 
‘just sustainabilities’ (Agyeman, Bullard and Evans 2003; Swilling 
and Annecke 2012; Newell and Mulvaney 2013), in dynamic and 
differentiated socioecological contexts, is not straightforward (Schmitz 
and Scoones 2015). The meaning of  ‘green’, and so sustainability, is 
inevitably highly contested, framed by different people in different ways 
(Leach 2015). The ideal of  a green or ‘sustainable’ economy and society 
may therefore look very different if  you are poor and marginalised, from 
an ethnic minority, or as a man, woman, or younger or older person 
(Schmitz and Scoones 2015), or even from the private sector with a dire 
need to justify certain corporate agendas and practices.
This article offers some reflections on the challenges of  embracing equity 
and diversity in accelerating sustainability, and the roles of  state–market–
society alliances. It draws on the ‘pathways approach’ developed by the 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Social, Technological 
and Environmental Pathways to Sustainability (STEPS) Centre. 
This approach pays special attention to the ‘framing’ of  problems 
and solutions, as well as the politics of  knowledge in opening up and 
broadening out pathways to sustainability (Leach et al. 2010). It starts 
with the assumption that different people, depending on their standpoint, 
position and interests, perceive sustainability in different ways, thus 
generating competing framings in a complex and diverse world. 
Exposing these framings and generating a debate about them is therefore 
an essential first step (Scoones 2015). From these framings, pathways to 
action emerge, whereby all perspectives are inevitably wrapped up in 
politics, and the interests that govern them (ibid.).
Given this background, the article presents two different examples 
that illustrate the alliances of  state, market and society in accelerating 
sustainability. The examples showcase how context-specific parameters 
and dynamics often dictate different alliances, whereby sustainability 
transformations may take different shapes and forms and are loaded 
by politics and power dynamics across geographical, political and 
socioeconomic scales. The first example addresses the question of  
‘financialization of  nature’ by exploring the alliances created around 
offsets in international carbon markets under the Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) mechanism. The 
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second example presents alliances for green transformation in Africa 
through Kenya’s pro-poor renewable energy experience. Both cases 
explore how coalitions form, highlighting the tensions and synergies 
with tackling inequality, the importance of  inclusive transformation, and 
the relevance of  context. They also show that there is no one-size-fits all 
in the development of  diverse sustainability pathways.
2 Financialization of nature: new alliances and REDD+ offsets in 
international carbon markets
Voluntary offsets in international carbon markets provide an interesting 
illustration of  the alliances between the state, market and society in 
sustainability transformations, specifically relevant to the financialization 
of  nature. Financialization here refers to ‘how the financial system itself  
has become a centre of  redistributive activity, drawing into financial 
circulation aspects of  life that previously lay outside it’ (Fairhead, Leach 
and Scoones 2012). In other words, financialization or commodification 
reflect how nature is being linked to a tradeable commodity in a 
financialized world, for instance, as a critical precondition for the 
emergence and operation of  green offset markets (ibid.). A good example 
in this respect is the development of  the mechanism prompted by 
deforestation and forest degradation known as REDD+ under the 1992 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
The purpose of  REDD+ is to provide developing countries with a 
financial incentive to reduce their level of  deforestation and forest 
degradation, and to increase their forest carbon stocks (International 
Climate Initiative 2012; REDD+ 2015). REDD+ is based on ‘results-
based finance’ (RBF) principles, whereby finance is an ‘ex-post reward’ 
conditional upon a reduction of  forest-based emissions as to incentivise 
recipient countries to take the necessary actions towards transition to 
a low-deforestation pathway (KfW 2015). As such, there are different 
possibilities for establishing REDD+ systems, which vary particularly 
in terms of  their scale and financing. In ‘national’ approaches it is 
expected that governments will receive payments linked to emissions 
reductions across the whole forest estate, whereby finance could either 
come from selling emissions reductions into global carbon markets or 
from public international funds. On the other hand, in ‘project-based’ 
approaches it is expected that those implementing the projects will 
receive payments linked to emissions reductions in the project area, 
through selling carbon credits into global carbon markets (Peskett and 
Brodnig 2011). It should be noted, however, that the REDD+ RBF 
programmes under the UNFCCC have been agreed relatively recently, 
and do not provide operational levels of  detail.
Accordingly, these RBF programmes open the door for a wide range 
of  state–market–society alliances under the umbrella of  accelerating 
sustainability and climate change mitigation. Examples of  these 
alliances include the climate-related memorandums of  understanding 
(MoUs) signed by the California governor’s office with Acre (Brazil) 
and Chiapas (Mexico), as well as the carbon deals and alliances 
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in Hurungwe in Zimbabwe through the Kariba REDD+ project 
(Dzingirai and Mangwanya 2015). Although in most of  these cases the 
implementation of  REDD+ is integrated into national biodiversity 
action plans, green economy strategies, and the global fight against 
climate change, the ‘alliances’ created behind them are open to 
question. In these alliances, the state is often viewed as creating a 
government-facilitated territory, yielding rights for polluting companies 
to grow in a weak regulatory environment on the one hand, while 
capital plays a key role in favouring corporate actors at the expense 
of  the participating countries of  the global South on the other. In this 
respect, the alliances created in international carbon markets between 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), brokers, conservation 
entrepreneurs, big private banks, transnational firms, greenhouse gas 
(GHG) credit traders, and the state, are often described as ‘forcing 
polluters to buy more credit to make more pollution’ (McAfee 2016).
Luttrell et al. (2013) further indicate that ‘REDD+ is heavily loaded 
with a wide range of  expectations on outcomes beyond carbon 
emission reductions, and expectations that lie behind the diversity 
of  rationales concerning who should benefit from REDD+’. As a 
result, one of  the key questions that has arisen in the context of  this 
debate surrounds which actors have the right to exploit the benefits 
of  GHG emissions reductions in REDD+, and the associated rights 
to international payments. As carbon is stored in trees and land, in 
many cases the answer will entail an understanding of  rights over the 
resources and services they provide, often included in the widely used 
but normally poorly defined term ‘carbon rights’ (Peskett and Brodnig 
2011). These rights can also vary based on a range of  benefit-sharing 
rationales including legal rights, emissions reductions, stewardship, 
cost-compensation, facilitation and pro-poor rationales (Lutrell et 
al. 2013). Who decides what value to be attributed to these carbon 
rights, however, often remains unclear within the architecture of  this 
financialization process.
Amidst all the existing ambiguity, emissions reductions from 
REDD+ projects are already created and traded within voluntary 
carbon markets. Most offsets are undertaken on a voluntary basis by 
corporations for PR purposes, or by conservation charities, and in some 
cases for speculation. Offset buyers include various corporate actors 
such as eBay, Walt Disney, Credit Agricole and Microsoft, amongst 
others. With the participation of  corporate actors from industrialised 
nations, the REDD+ mechanism is viewed as one that allows corporate 
emitters to buy more credit by paying rent to the state for the use of  
atmospheric carbon sinks to make more pollution in the global South. 
In this respect, a key critique of  market-based mechanisms is that it 
allows emitters to pollute more if  they pay for activities elsewhere that store 
carbon or prevent GHGs, hence resulting in a legitimised ‘right to 
pollute’. Another critique of  the REDD+ mechanism is that in these 
voluntary markets, there is an oversupply of  projects vis-à-vis offset 
buyers, thus resulting in low prices of  forest offsets in the ‘global carbon 
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market’ based on the simple economic rule of  demand and supply. 
Accordingly, prices of  forest offsets on global carbon markets remain too 
low to pay for the desired conservation efforts. As such, as long as there 
is no global ‘cap’, the supply of  offsets will exceed demand and prices 
will stay too low to pay for much conservation.
Consequently, in a financialized modern economy, it is important to 
critically examine these state–market–society alliances in accelerating 
sustainability under REDD+. Doing so is essential in order to ensure 
that those implicated in the accumulation of  value are not also those 
implicated in the attribution of  value itself, whereby value of  the 
commodity is constructed and co-produced within the architecture of  its 
financialization (Fairhead et al. 2012). Otherwise, these alliances created 
under the RBF programmes may not necessarily positively contribute to 
a pathway of  ‘just sustainabilities’.
3 Green transformations and African renewable energy initiatives
In terms of  state, market and society alliances for green transformations, 
debate often arises between the priorities of  environmental sustainability 
on the one hand, and equality, social justice and inclusion on the other. 
Green transformations in this sense do not just imply a shift towards green 
or sustainable technology that can deliver on environmental objectives; 
rather the politics shaping transformations such as towards renewable 
energy also implicate issues of  access, use and equity in these processes 
(Scoones, Leach, and Newell 2015). In African countries for instance, 
questions of  renewable energy require consideration of  pro-poor access 
to electricity, as well as inequalities, and affordability in energy supply.
In this respect, there are two dominant paradigms overtaking the issue 
of  green transformations and electricity access in Africa. The first is a 
traditional paradigm that claims that Africa cannot afford the luxury 
of  providing renewable energy due to its high cost. This view is well 
expressed by an African official as follows: ‘We don’t have the luxury of  
saying that electrification should only be done with green electricity. Our 
villages are desperate for electricity, they don’t care whether the electrons 
are green, purple, or black’ (Tenenbaum et al. 2014 in Pueyo 2016). Based 
on this view, governments tend to move towards fossil fuel for electricity 
generation, thus abandoning green transformation opportunities. An 
alternative, optimistic paradigm on the other hand claims that access to 
renewable energy is possible in Africa despite the many challenges related 
to high initial investment cost. Multiple challenges also remain, which 
require functioning states, including regulation, domestic finance, regional 
cooperation and credible off-takers, as well as coherent planning of  
centralised and decentralised power.
But even when adopting the optimists’ views about green transformation, 
trade-offs exist between ‘greening’ and ‘accessing’ electricity in Africa 
(Pueyo 2016). There is still an ongoing struggle between large-scale 
infrastructure schemes – even those providing renewable energy – 
which often exclude the poor, vis-à-vis decentralised pro-poor solutions 
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facilitating access to affordable clean energy sources. Kenya is a good 
example to illustrate the tensions between these two approaches to green 
transformation in the energy sector. Electricity generation in Kenya 
comes from both renewable and non-renewable sources: the former 
accounts for about 72 per cent of  the total electricity, most of  which is 
hydro and geothermal, while thermal energy from fossil-fuel sources 
accounts for most of  the rest of  the country’s energy supply (Spratt et al. 
2016). It is worth noting, however, that solar power in Kenya is mainly 
from off-grid, so it is not included in these estimates. As such, given the 
traditional approach based on the government’s conception of  energy 
production as dependent on large-scale infrastructure, only 30 per cent 
of  households have access to grid electricity. In this sense, despite the 
government’s efforts towards green transformation manifested in a 
larger share of  renewable energy supplies, the question of  access for the 
country’s poor and marginalised communities remains problematic.
By contrast, pro-poor solutions provided by civil society, and external 
funding to promote ‘off-grid’ access to solar energy, have achieved quite 
different results, reaching around 60 per cent of  electricity access across 
the country. At present, access to electricity in Kenya is driven by five solar 
segments: solar home systems, standalone institutional photovoltaic (PV) 
systems, telecoms and tourism, mini-grid and large-scale grid-connected 
PV systems. This green transformation in Kenya’s solar PV market has 
evolved through different phases, involving diverse alliances between 
state, business and citizens. Such alliances have formed through financing 
(albeit from external sources) and technological innovation, which in turn 
have supported policy and market innovations leading to enhanced access 
to renewable energy by a larger base of  the country’s poor.
As such, the diverse solar PV segments in Kenya can be considered 
to add up to the most transformational of  the country’s low-carbon 
energy developments, not because they are the most widely used but 
because of  the way they have transformed access to energy by the poor. 
In this respect, this transformative alliance has entailed ‘sequential’ 
evolution of  technologies, markets and policies. Alliances in accelerating 
sustainability have thus challenged traditional political, economic and 
social structures, while creating a more just and sustainable pathway 
towards green transformation.
4 Conclusion
State–market–society dynamics unfold differently in different contexts, 
through specific forms of  alliance. The REDD+ example reflects how 
alliances associated with accelerating sustainability may establish new 
green markets, thus installing a model of  financialization of  nature, 
whereby ‘those exerting power over the markets play them with loaded 
dice’ (Fairhead et al. 2012). On the other hand, the Kenya example 
shows us how low-carbon transformation in Africa is subject to the 
political economy of  the tripartite relationship between state, markets 
and society. Variation in progress in both examples often depends on 
the technical, institutional, financial, and above all, political will to 
(Endnotes)
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achieve the desired progress. The social and political negotiation of  
sustainability transformations will therefore always be complex and 
contested, compounded by uncertainties, ambiguities and forms of  
ignorance (Stirling 2008) around patterns and trends in environmental 
change. Attention to how alliances form, and the specific ways they 
emerge in different contexts, nevertheless generates the possibilities of  
lesson-learning across issues and places, towards building pathways to 
sustainability that also work for social justice.
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Political Challenges of Addressing 
Climate Change through the 
‘Entrepreneurial State’
Rachel Godfrey-Wood
Abstract This article outlines some of the limitations of existing institutions 
and their inadequacy in bringing about ‘green transformations’ to address 
climate change in order to explain the need for alternative approaches to 
institutions. It outlines the ‘entrepreneurial state’ approach, as outlined by 
Mariana Mazzucato as a promising conceptual approach with potentially 
transformative policy implications to address the issues of innovation. It 
identifies some of the political challenges to achieving entrepreneurial 
state-type institutions in contexts where configurations of power 
and existing actor networks are unfavourable. It argues that although 
entrepreneurial state-type institutions are often framed as operating by 
harnessing high degrees of cooperation between different actors according 
to commonly-held long-term objectives, achieving the right types of 
institutions is likely to require a high degree of contestation in order to 
overcome existing vested interests. Moreover, it discusses the relationship 
between green transformations and democratic participation.
Keywords: entrepreneurial state, green transformations, renewable 
energy, climate change, elite capture, path dependency.
The Institute of  Development Studies (IDS) 50th Anniversary 
Conference drew attention to the inadequacy of  the world’s institutions 
and conceptual approaches towards institutions in addressing pressing 
global challenges. In part this is due to changes in the world economy. 
Whilst conventional development studies programmes have tended 
to view challenges in developing countries as existing either in a 
separate sphere, requiring a specific type of  expertise and knowledge, 
or alternatively as representing an ideal set of  institutions to which 
developing countries should aspire, there is increasing agreement that 
these demarcations are outdated (Schmitz and Scoones 2015). The rise 
of  some middle-income countries, and in particular the middle classes 
within those countries, has led to a degree of  convergence in incomes 
between those groups enjoying greater income in developing countries 
and those in the middle and lower-middle classes of  the developed 
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world who have seen their incomes stagnate (Milanovic 2016). Second, 
it has become increasingly clear that, far from representing an ideal set 
of  institutions to which developing countries should aspire, developed 
country institutions frequently exhibit the same types of  flaws 
commonly associated with developing countries. Third, the challenges 
posed by phenomena such as inequality and climate change, which 
fundamentally threaten human wellbeing, require serious institutional 
responses, and are unlikely to be resolved by institutions which are 
based on inadequate and unrealistic conceptual frameworks.
In this article, I briefly outline some of  the limitations of  existing 
institutions and their inadequacy in bringing about ‘green 
transformations’ to address climate change in order to explain the need 
for alternative approaches to institutions. Subsequently, I outline the 
‘entrepreneurial state’ approach, as outlined by Mariana Mazzucato 
(2013) as a superior conceptual approach with more realistic and at 
the same time transformative policy implications to address the issues 
of  innovation. I identify some of  the political challenges to achieving 
entrepreneurial state-type institutions in contexts where configurations 
of  power and existing actor networks are unfavourable, comparing the 
experiences of  renewable energy policy in Germany and the UK to 
illustrate the influence of  path dependency and contextual factors on 
policymaking processes and subsequently on the long-term impacts of  
policies. I argue that although entrepreneurial state-type institutions are 
often framed as operating by harnessing high degrees of  cooperation 
between different actors according to commonly-held long-term 
objectives, achieving the right types of  institutions is likely to require 
a high degree of  contestation in order to overcome existing vested 
interests. Moreover, I highlight that there are only limited lessons which 
can be drawn from past examples of  heterodox approaches to bring 
about economic transformations, and discuss the relationship between 
green transformations and democratic participation.
1 The dysfunctionality of existing institutions
The 2008 financial crash and its aftermath, characterised by austerity 
programmes pushing the cost of  the crisis onto the majority of  the 
population, has drawn attention to the dysfunctionality of  developed 
country institutions. Existing institutions in developed countries have 
allowed for massive concentrations of  wealth at the top end of  wealth 
distribution, and the parallel dominance of  financial elites and their 
ideas in other key sectors of  society such as the media and politics. 
Elite capture is reflected most clearly in legislation which systematically 
favours capital over labour, thus institutionalising the accentuation and 
perpetuation of  inequality in law (Hsu 2014). As Stiglitz and Greenwald 
(2014) argue, economic orthodoxy has not been a positive development 
in terms of  technological or institutional innovation, as companies 
have massive incentives to focus on gaining and protecting market and 
political power rather than engaging in the riskier and more uncertain 
challenge of  long-term innovation. Far from creating the conditions 
for long-term investment, they have encouraged firms to prioritise 
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rent-seeking and the maximisation of  shareholder value, with companies 
increasingly investing more and more in buying back their own shares 
and less in long-term investment (Lazonick 2014; Haldane 2016).
Catastrophically, this has all happened at the precise moment in history 
when the world faces the unprecedented challenge of  decarbonising 
economic growth and human development. Greenhouse gas emissions 
are so heavily embedded within current paradigms of  economic 
growth that nothing less than a fundamental transformation of  policies, 
technology, institutions and modes of  innovation is necessary if  human 
wellbeing is to be secured without breaching the ‘safe operating space’ 
imposed by environmental limits (Leach et al. 2012; Zenghelis 2016). 
Achieving the target of  reducing global greenhouse gas emissions by 
50 per cent below 1990 levels by 2050 requires bringing about a ‘green 
transformation’, defined as ‘the process of  restructuring that brings 
the economy within the planetary boundaries’ (Schmitz 2015). Unlike 
historical energy transformations, green transformations will have to be 
driven explicitly by environmental concerns as opposed to profit motives 
or increased consumer benefits (Newell 2015). Such transformations will 
depend to a large degree on the capacity of  societies to direct processes of  
technological innovation towards advances which prioritise sustainability.
2 Innovation, the ‘entrepreneurial state’ and climate change
Awareness of  the inadequacies of  conventional economic and 
institutional approaches to addressing climate change has led to 
a reassessment of  how processes of  innovation and institutional 
development have actually functioned in practice. Central in this 
reassessment is the work of  Mariana Mazzucato (2013, 2016), who has 
challenged conventional narratives of  how technological innovation has 
occurred in practice, arguing that virtually all substantial technological 
advances in modern history have owed themselves to state support 
and collaboration between public and private sectors rather than the 
competition and entrepreneurialism of  self-interested actors. Central 
to this account is the understanding that markets are institutions which 
are outcomes of  interactions between different public and private 
actors and institutions rather than pre-existing ‘natural’ institutions, 
and are embedded in wider institutional structures (Mazzucato 2016; 
Polanyi 1944 [2001]). Moreover, technological innovation is not the 
result of  ‘exogenous’ technological opportunities, but rather of  active 
government policy. Key examples of  the ‘entrepreneurial state’ in 
practice include the railroads, the Internet, modern-day pharmaceutical 
companies and nanotechnology, all of  which ‘trace their most 
courageous, early and capital intensive “entrepreneurial” investments 
back to the state’ (Mazzucato 2013). This narrative therefore gives the 
state a far greater prominence in influencing not only the rate but also 
the direction of  innovation, allowing it to shape markets in favour of  
innovations which are likely to promote equality and environmental 
sustainability (Atkinson 2015; Mazzucato 2016). According to 
Mazzucato, the direction is influenced by ‘mission-oriented’ public 
policies and institutions, which establish their objectives and contribute 
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their own resources in order to fundamentally tilt the direction of  
innovation in favour of  publicly chosen goals.
3 Political challenges
The question the entrepreneurial state approach raises is precisely how 
the political conditions to allow for this are to be created. The intellectual 
argument for an alternative paradigm might be strong, but is likely to 
require disruption to come to fruition, because dominant narratives have 
a tendency to maintain power through particular framings of  problems, 
forms of  knowledge, organisational arrangements and bureaucratic 
routines, all of  which tend towards the perpetuation of  certain pathways 
and the marginalisation of  others (Leach, Scoones and Stirling 2010). 
Moreover, there are clear limitations in using historical examples of  
entrepreneurial states to shape future green transformations.
The historical examples provided by Mazzucato are contingent on 
particular historical contexts, economic and social conditions and 
coalitions of  interests which are not likely to be replicated. For example, 
the post-war conditions that facilitated the rise of  a social democratic 
consensus in much of  the Western world were facilitated by a 
combination of  a section of  the industrial capitalist class seeing benefits 
in bolstering the purchasing power of  the majority of  the population, 
the destruction of  manufacturing capacity during the war allowing for 
massive increases in expansion, and the fear of  communism. In the 
current context in the UK, for example, it is not entirely clear who 
would be the potential partners in the creation of  institutions who 
could act in the way Mazzucato envisages. Moreover, public institutions 
can be ‘mission-oriented’ in perverse ways, for example when they are 
directed towards supporting the development of  fracking, or the arms 
trade (Mazzucato 2016). In many developed countries, political capture 
of  the key institutions on which any alternative project would depend is 
extensive, ranging from the mainstream media to political parties and 
supposedly neutral public institutions such as tax collection authorities 
and regulators (Stiglitz 2012; Fuentes-Neiva and Galasso 2014). Such 
interest groups are capable of  forming powerful networks which 
have strong vested interests in the promotion of  problematic types of  
solutions to climate change, such as emissions trading, which has been 
criticised for avoiding any structural transformation of  energy systems. 
In spite of  its manifest problems, emissions trading has achieved a 
prominent place in attempts to address climate change thanks largely to 
an alliance of  large investors, professional accountants and consultants, 
and key sectors of  the aid industry (Schmitz and Scoones 2015).
Therefore, while there are unquestionably potential private sector allies 
for a progressive political project aiming to promote decarbonisation 
(Newell and Paterson 2011), forming a viable and transformative 
alliance with them may require contestatory processes because the actor 
networks in favour of  the status quo are often extremely well positioned 
and organised within structures of  power. Moreover, new political 
subjects need to be empowered to drive any serious process in order to 
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counter the inevitably conservative nature of  the nation state, captured 
as it is by key elite interests. The nation state is far from being a neutral, 
benevolent actor, and exists and intermeshes within a broader context in 
conditions fundamentally hostile to any transformative change (Miliband 
1969 [2009]). This is particularly the case in Anglo-Saxon countries 
where neoliberal narratives have become particularly hegemonic. This 
suggests that the opportunities for building an entrepreneurial state vary 
significantly across different countries and historical contexts, depending 
on the nature of  particular configurations of  power and capitalist interests 
at certain moments. This is borne out by the history of  major economic 
transformations, which shows that transformation occurs due to multiple 
changes occurring at the same time (Schmitz and Scoones 2015).
4 Renewable energy policy in Germany and the UK
The opportunities for green transformations in different countries, and 
the different challenges faced as a result, is well illustrated by the divergent 
experiences of  Germany and the UK in the development of  renewable 
energy policy. In 2012, whilst renewable energy in Germany accounted 
for 24 per cent of  total energy demand, it was under half  this in the UK. 
This difference owes itself  both to major differences in the approaches 
taken by policymakers, divergences in the types of  coalitions of  interest 
groups which were formed around renewable energy policies, and 
contextual factors which facilitated better policy in Germany than in the 
UK (Lockwood 2014). Whereas German renewable energy policy secured 
the active participation of  a broad range of  actors by offering attractive 
returns with low risk and a guaranteed market, thus building up a broad 
coalition behind renewable energy, UK policy only provided incentives 
for large energy companies to invest. As a result, Germany has established 
a relatively vibrant renewable energy sector with substantial employment 
effects and broad political buy-in, and efforts to reverse the policies have 
been countered by a broad coalition of  actors including environmental 
groups, solar industry associations and companies, trade unions and local 
politicians. By contrast, British policy has allowed subsidies to be captured 
by large and unpopular energy companies, making green energy policy 
politically unpopular and vulnerable to cutbacks (ibid.).
The implications of  the contrasting experiences of  Germany and the 
UK are twofold. On the one hand, as Lockwood argues, policymakers 
need to consider policy feedback effects, and need to implement policies 
which are likely to generate new coalitions and interest groups which 
will strive to scale up a given policy and make it successful. The second 
implication, however, is that some countries experience greater levels 
of  path dependency than others. The fact that Germany established 
more far-reaching policies in the first place was partly a consequence 
of  contextual factors. Whereas Germany could count on a network of  
regional banks, a legacy of  policy coordination between private actors 
and the state, a willingness to use non-market mechanisms to promote 
renewable energy, and a federal, decentralised democracy, the UK had 
none of  these things due to its more doctrinaire adherence to neoliberalism 
and scepticism of  deliberate industrial policy (Lockwood 2014).
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Moreover, Germany’s renewable energy policy was consistently 
promoted by the country’s relatively strong Green Party, which benefited 
from a proportional representation system, allowing smaller parties 
to exercise influence, in contrast with the UK where environmental 
concerns have been consistently marginalised in Parliament. These 
contextual differences manifested in divergences in policymaking which 
had far-reaching feedback effects.
Furthermore, high levels of  inequality which prevail in the UK make 
it harder to build the broad-based alliances necessary to address the 
challenges of  sustainability (Wilkinson, Pickett and De Vogli 2010), 
and may have caused stronger negative policy feedback effects against 
green policies, because of  greater fears of  their adverse distributional 
consequences (Lockwood 2014). The case study thus illustrates the ways 
that dominant economic structures, narratives and understandings 
of  the economy are likely to have a decisive influence over the types 
of  policies used to address climate change (ibid.). This suggests that 
countries such as the UK which suffer from high levels of  negative path 
dependency are likely to require even more thoroughgoing, radical and 
contestatory institutional transformation than other countries if  they are 
to make a serious contribution to addressing climate change.
5 The green economy and democracy
Given that achieving green transformations will inevitably require a 
degree of  contestation, it is necessary to examine the precise relationship 
between contestation, democracy and institution building in the 
formation of  the entrepreneurial state-type institutions advocated by 
Mazzucato. Mazzucato emphasises the importance of  having a state 
which can avoid bowing to the interest groups seeking rents and privileges 
in the form of  tax cuts. However, it is unclear how a state capable of  this 
degree of  autonomy can be brought into being if  it is already subject to a 
high degree of  elite capture, and how ‘mission-oriented’ public institutions 
capable of  decisively tilting the playing field in favour of  democratically 
chosen objectives can be forged in the absence of  elite acquiescence. In 
fact, many of  the positive examples of  the entrepreneurial state provided 
by Mazzucato come from contexts of  relative elite consensus around 
the need for entrepreneurial state-type institutions, in some cases linked 
to unaccountable and militaristic programmes such as the Defence 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
Meanwhile, in developing countries virtually all the successful examples 
of  the application of  heterodox economics are associated with right-wing 
authoritarian regimes which actively repressed civil society, especially 
trade unions (Selwyn 2014). Recent years have seen a continuation 
of  this trend, with Ethiopia and Rwanda increasingly lauded for their 
progress in incorporating aspects of  the success of  the East Asian 
developmentalist states whilst simultaneously charting out paths towards 
a ‘green economy’ through authoritarian models of  ‘developmental 
patrimonialism’ (Booth 2011; Kelsall 2013). Furthermore, most of  the 
successful examples of  developmental transformation clearly emerged 
(Endnotes)
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from processes which were experimental, context-specific, and based on 
transitional arrangements rather than driven by an overarching vision 
(Hobday 2003; Qian 2003), limiting the extent to which they provide a 
clear blueprint for green transformations in the future.
In other instances, governments which have successfully implemented 
elements of  the state-led developmentalism advocated by Mazzucato may 
see it in their interest to crush the nascent efforts of  other governments 
to do the same, as the German government did to Greece’s Syriza-led 
government in 2015. This indicates the limitations of  methodological 
nationalist approaches which see approaches taken in countries in 
isolation from one another. Meanwhile, there are few examples of  
countries which have successfully employed heterodox economics 
through democratic mandates and in the face of  elite opposition, with 
Ecuador standing out as a possible recent rare exception (see Ordóñez 
et al. 2015). The August 2016 coup in Brazil and subsequent threats of  
privatisation of  the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), a historically 
successful example of  an institution that has channelled finance towards 
long-term clean energy projects, show that even relatively established and 
institutionalised cases of  the entrepreneurial state can still be vulnerable 
to reversal due to elite opposition.
This raises questions of  the relationship between the green economy 
and democratic participation, as well as the potential and limitations 
of  attempting to repeat models of  innovation which were effective 
under particular configurations of  power in a different context. 
While there are historical examples of  the formation of  the types of  
collaborative institutions that are likely to be necessary to bring about 
genuinely transformative change, green coalitions depend on particular 
convergences of  different interest groups which do not exist equally 
across all societies at all times (Newell 2015). As a result, there is nothing 
even approaching a historical blueprint for processes of  change to form 
institutions which are equipped to address the challenges of  the twenty-
first century. This would require institutions which incorporate both 
elements of  long-term strategic planning, on the one hand, and are also 
capable of  democratically challenging vested interests and empowering 
the poorest and historically most excluded sectors of  society on the other. 
To date, however, most discussions of  innovation for the green economy 
have taken a top-down direction, barely considering the possibility that 
solutions could come from local people themselves (Ely et al. 2013).
In contrast with the notion of  transformation as a carefully controlled, 
strategic ‘transition’, others argue in favour of  bottom-up, unpredictable, 
unruly processes of  change – which are inherently more democratic and 
hold more transformative potential in any case (Stirling 2014). Involving 
a more diverse range of  actors and considering different approaches 
may allow better responses to complexity than top-down ones, as well 
as avoiding unwelcome path dependency and the dangers of  major 
errors that emerge from the exclusion of  key actors at key moments 
of  the innovation process (Leach et al. 2012). Top-down approaches 
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to innovation and policy change often overlook the historical role 
of  grass-roots innovators in building up the actor networks, political 
pressure and technological knowledge necessary for renewable energy 
to get off the ground in the first place, as occurred with the Danish wind 
sector (Ely et al. 2013).
There are, of  course, dangers associated with the potential for 
romanticisation of  the participation of  local ‘communities’, namely 
that decades of  uneven and in some cases contradictory experiences 
of  community-based or participatory policymaking are forgotten, 
simply due to a determination to disassociate from ‘top-down’ 
models. As Immerwahr (2015) argues, community-based approaches 
to policymaking have a history which goes back far further than is 
commonly recognised, and have frequently been associated with local-
level elite capture, exclusion, and perverse forms of  disempowerment 
which may actually inhibit people from engaging in broader structural 
issues (see, for example, Mansuri and Rao 2012, for a review of  
attempts to promote community-based approaches in developing 
countries). Even when community politics is deeply embedded in a 
society and serves as an effective instrument for achieving a variety 
of  objectives, this needs to be underpinned by a practical logic rather 
than a purely ideological or ‘visionary’ one, and may exact major 
constraints on individuals’ actions (Godfrey-Wood and Mamani-Vargas 
2016). Such initiatives also need to be genuinely political if  they are to 
avoid contradictions and have a chance at achieving lasting structural 
change, rather than becoming depoliticised, over-reliant on compromise 
and vulnerable to co-optation as occurred with the Transition Towns 
movement in the UK (Connors and McDonald 2010). In spite of  these 
significant caveats, the challenges of  climate change, the complexity of  
twenty-first century societies, the limits of  approaches which depend on 
centrally-managed, technocratic approaches, as well as the distributed 
nature of  much renewable energy means that the argument for 
decentralised, locally-run energy systems is likely to get stronger rather 
than weaker. Crucially, broad-based participation and engagement is a 
pre-requisite for green policies to be sustained, rather than experienced 
as impositions by technocrats (Schmitz and Scoones 2015).
This takes us to the role of  social movements, including trade unions, 
who have a stake in wanting to direct processes of  innovation in favour 
of  skilled and secure jobs. Historically, there is evidence to suggest 
that successful organisation by workers for better wages and working 
conditions can be used to force firms to invest in productivity-enhancing 
technology which drives the overall economy (Riley and Rosazza 
Bondibene 2015). The political sustainability of  green transformations 
is likely to depend heavily on the extent and quality of  job creation or 
destruction (Newell 2015). Massive unionisation of  the workplace, as 
well as worker representation in directing processes of  innovation, seems 
like the most direct way in which the direction of  the green economy 
can be genuinely democratised. A key example of  participatory 
decentralised green policymaking is that of  the Lucas Plan of  the 1970s, 
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which was devised by workers who proposed rechannelling public 
financing from arms production to socially useful production including 
renewable energy (Smith 2014). Of  course, advocating for this sort of  
approach will be challenging, in societies where workers’ rights have 
been relentlessly attacked, labour has been flexibilised and restructured 
away from manufacturing industries (which are most likely to mobilise), 
and the very notion of  union organisation has been undermined.
6 Conclusion
In this article, I have outlined the inadequacy of  existing institutions and 
institutional approaches to addressing the challenges of  the twenty-first 
century, with specific reference to climate change. Subsequently, I have 
discussed the potential of  employing Mazzucato’s ‘entrepreneurial 
state’ approach as a means of  allowing governments to democratically 
determine not only the rate but also the direction of  technological 
innovation in accordance with publicly defined objectives. The main 
challenges of  this approach are twofold: firstly, forging an entrepreneurial 
state in the face of  substantial elite resistance from actors which have a 
stake in perpetuating short-termist, speculative and polluting activities; 
secondly, employing it in a way which is both sufficiently democratic to 
fully harness the range of  ideas and capacities that exist in a society, as 
well as securing broad-based buy-in from diverse groups for a sustainable 
transition. In order to meet these challenges, processes attempting to 
forge ‘entrepreneurial state’-type institutions will necessarily have to 
be contestatory, and will have to actively involve non-elite actors in the 
formulation of  policy, in order to drive processes which are as ‘unruly’ 
and ‘hope inspired’ as they are ‘strategic’ and ‘mission-oriented’.
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Civil Society and Civic Engagement 
in a Time of Change
Becky Faith and Pedro Prieto-Martin
Abstract This article draws on contributions to the IDS 50th Anniversary 
Conference stream dedicated to citizen voice, agency and accountability 
to explore the shifting relationship between civil society, the state and 
the private sector, as well as looking at the nature of civic engagement. 
The role of digital technologies in civic engagement in the context of a 
turbulent new political landscape is also examined in order to understand 
the spaces that might be opened and closed by these technologies.
Keywords: digital, technology, civil society, social media, citizen 
engagement.
1 Introduction
The Institute of  Development Studies (IDS) 50th Anniversary 
Conference ‘States, Markets and Society’ was a chance to reflect from 
a global perspective on the meaning of  citizen voice, agency and 
accountability in a post-Brexit era. Through four conference sessions 
on ‘Pumping Life into Civil Society’ we saw a convergence of  debates 
between North and South, reflecting IDS’ universalist perspective on 
development. As Deborah Doane, consultant and ex-Director of  World 
Development Movement, described it at the conference: ‘… we are all 
fighting the same battles now’. Three issues in particular loomed large 
at the IDS conference: the 2016 Brexit referendum vote in the UK and 
its implications; the rise of  populist social movements; and the failure of  
the architectures of  participation to challenge political and economic 
inequality, even in promising cases like Brazil. Against the backdrop of  
these events, participants asked – what is the role for civil society?
While the very concept of  civil society is contested (Edwards 2014), at 
the conference civil society was broadly considered as an amalgamation 
of  citizen groups, networks, organisations and social movements, 
together with institutions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
which operate at local, country or international level. Each country’s 
civil society results from completely different political histories and 
regimes of  governance, and as such are complex, multi-faceted and 
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replicate the wider society they are part of; expressing progressive as 
well as conservative aims and ideologies.
This article reflects on contributions to the conference stream dedicated 
to citizen voice, agency and accountability which explored the shifting 
relationship between civil society, the state and the private sector as 
well as looking at the nature of  civic engagement. As the authors are 
both members of  IDS’ Digital and Technology research cluster, the 
article broadens out to reflect on the role of  digital technologies in civic 
engagement in the context of  a new political landscape in which ‘new 
dynamics of  collective action are injecting turbulence into politics’ 
(Margetts 2016).
2 Spaces for civil society
A conference panel discussing the role of  civil society in the relationship 
between society, markets and the state saw participants sharing 
experiences of  current political threats to civil society, and the potential 
strengths and weaknesses of  partnerships with the private sector.
In terms of  the relationship between the state and civil society, we heard 
how threats to civil society are being felt very keenly in Mozambique, 
with an increase in government control of  mainstream media and social 
media. These threats have also seen lives lost; a law professor who was 
a central figure in a sensitive debate about autonomy for Mozambique’s 
provinces and decentralising power was shot dead in 2015 (BBC News 
2015). Civil society’s traditional modes of  operation and entry points 
are under attack (CIVICUS 2016).
Numerous calls are being made for a shift in the roles and dynamics 
within the humanitarian and development landscape, whereby 
international NGOs and other more formal development and 
humanitarian organisations put themselves in the service of  social 
movements and other expressions of  local civil society. The ‘Charter 4 
Change’ is one such manifestation of  this movement which argues 
that civil society organisations (CSOs) should play a critical convening, 
bridge-building and catalytic role as supporters of  local capacities. 
The charter includes commitments to ‘support local actors to become 
robust organisations that continuously improve their role’ (C4C 2015). 
An Oxfam discussion paper suggests that the ‘supertankers’ of  big 
international NGOs might ‘back local CSOs to become more effective 
rafts’ (Green 2015: 15). However, this could be seen as implying that 
international NGOs can control social movements and local CSOs to 
direct their trajectory, which can in reality go in all kinds of  directions.
Conference participants explored ways in which civil society might 
positively influence the private sector by working together with it, while 
avoiding being co-opted. Civil society researcher Michael Edwards 
argues elsewhere in this IDS Bulletin that the most interesting examples of  
contemporary citizen action – be they Black Lives Matter in the USA or 
Podemos in Spain – are able to engage the market ‘within a framework 
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that is governed by democracy and the transformation of  power 
relations’ (see Edwards, this IDS Bulletin). Yet this could be seen to be a 
misrepresentation of  the economic policy programme issued by Black 
Lives Matter in 2016 which, rather than discussing engagement with the 
market, makes a demand for ‘economic justice for all and a reconstruction 
of  the economy to ensure Black communities have collective ownership, 
not merely access’ (The Movement for Black Lives 2016).
Reflections at the conference illuminated the positives and negatives 
of  CSO engagement with the private sector. One speaker from 
an international NGO saw that economic interests were typically 
underlying threats to organisers when they were campaigning on issues 
such as the exposure of  land grabs, suggesting that there was a company 
behind it. But another international NGO professional, reflecting on 
his experiences of  negotiating private sector/CSO partnerships, saw 
the possibility of  ‘win/win’ in these relationships and gave the examples 
of  the banking sector in financial inclusion issues and the telecoms 
sector on emergency response. Their work around youth savings in 
partnership with Barclays is reported to have had positive development 
impacts that include enabling young women to save for their education 
(Care International, Plan UK and Barclays 2016).
However, in response to these ‘win/win’ scenarios others raised concerns 
about the ability of  NGOs to maintain their values. Representatives of  
the right to food movement in India speaking at the conference talked 
in disparaging terms about the CSOs such as Save the Children taking 
money from ‘Big Cola’ in the form of  a grant from the soft drinks 
company Pepsi but simultaneously working on nutrition advocacy 
(PepsiCo India 2009). And while a recent Oxfam report on their work 
with Unilever on workers’ rights and conditions highlights the value 
of  working with companies to influence their agency in lobbying 
governments or working in multi-stakeholder fora, it also calls attention 
to the limits to this influence, indicating that the company has ‘not yet 
addressed the barriers to decent work in its employment, let alone found 
a blueprint to do so in its supply chain of  76,000 suppliers’ (Wilshaw et al. 
2016: 7) and recognising that the challenges that remain to ensure that 
human and labour rights are respected are ‘systemic in nature’ (ibid.: 71).
In terms of  civil society’s relationship with the state, discussions 
identified the failures of  conventional ‘civil society’ to achieve 
progressive change that addresses global challenges. Recent publications 
from the World Bank focusing on politics and governance (Khemani 
2016; World Bank 2017, forthcoming) signal a growing awareness by 
CSOs of  the importance of  politics for development. This represents 
a return to ideas proposed 20 years earlier in the World Bank’s World 
Development Reports (World Bank 1997), but it nonetheless recognises 
the unique role of  the state as a politically conscious actor, which 
moderates the role of  the private sector and, ultimately, is responsible 
for sustaining a healthy balance within the society, market and state 
triad. According to the World Bank, the key to achieving good 
140 | Faith and Prieto-Martin Civil Society and Civic Engagement in a Time of Change
Vol. 47 No. 2A November 2016: ‘States, Markets and Society – New Relationships for a New Development Era’
governance is first to obtain ‘good governments’, which are led by 
effective political leaders. Thus, civil society and the development sector 
should concentrate their efforts on enabling environments that promote 
the selection of  good political leadership at all administrative levels, by 
providing the public with specific, reliable and impartial information 
on the performance of  leaders (Devarajan and Khemani 2016). This 
‘technical’ fix is clearly not enough, however, given that politics is, by 
definition, political. Ideological and power-related dimensions cannot 
be so easily factored-out. There are many other reasons to explain why 
bad politicians frequently lead governments, and why good leaders with 
ethical, democratic and progressive credentials are kept out of  office.
In most of  the world, however, states are failing to play this moderator 
role, or rather, are doing the opposite. Conference participants discussed 
increasing controls on mainstream and social media, and a reduction 
in the space available for civil society space for agency in the name of  
security and internal stability (Sherwood 2015). Elsewhere, governments 
have adopted control tactics in digital spaces such as legal pushback, 
and attempts to complicate navigation of  social media sites by ‘flooding 
the space with supporters and sometimes paid ‘trolls’’ (Tufekci 2014: 6). 
Internet shutdowns during moments of  political tension have become 
commonplace in recent years (Kihara and Njeri 2016): in the first 
eight months of  2016 alone the advocacy organisation Access Now 
documented 20 incidences of  governments ordering companies to cut 
off access to communications tools – like Twitter, SMS or Facebook 
(Access Now 2016). But we have also seen a rise in challenges to these 
threats, with people using virtual private networks (VPNs) to continue 
to organise and exchange information over social networks during these 
shutdowns (Olukotun and Kenyanito 2016).
3 Citizen voice and claims in digital spaces
The growing divide between political institutions and political change 
and the diffusion of  digital technologies has given rise to new kinds of  
networked social movements (Castells 2015) that provide new means 
for the articulation of  ‘citizen voice’, mostly outside the frameworks 
of  what we historically understand as ‘civil society’. These informal 
networks often refuse to engage in the ways officially recognised as 
political and civil, resorting instead to ‘unruly politics’ (Khanna et al. 
2013) that attract mass support. Citizen voice and claims are manifested 
both through formal means such as pressure group membership and 
activism, and through informal means of  participation such as the 
‘promotion, investigation, discussion, and curation of  political material’ 
online, which could in itself  be seen as an informal means of  activism 
(Koc-Michalska, Lilleker and Vedel 2016).
Mass movements coordinated by social media which have emerged 
in recent years are a ‘general phenomenon that ranges from global 
political movements to neighbourhood campaigns’ (Margetts et al. 2015). 
These new species of  social movement have emerged thanks to 
digital tools described by Manuel Castells as ‘the fastest and most 
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autonomous, interactive, reprogrammable and self-expanding means 
of  communication in history’ (Castells 2015). These movements gather 
momentum rapidly, yet, as in the case of  Egypt, many have proved to be 
unstable and difficult to sustain. An interview with Wael Ghonim, the 
Google executive in Cairo who helped launch the Egyptian revolution, 
described recently how the promise of  the power of  networked social 
movements had not delivered: ‘Five years ago I thought the Internet was a 
power that was granted to the people and that would never be weakened. 
But I was wrong’ (Tufekci and Talbot 2016). These movements lack the 
organisational capacity, formalised or not, of  older movements which 
impacts their effectiveness after the initial phases of  protest (Tufekci 2014).
The affordances and design of  social networking platforms play an 
important role in shaping new forms of  citizen engagement and 
political mobilisation. On these platforms filter bubbles (Pariser 2011) 
control the content that users are exposed to online, and can render 
political opinions which contradict your own, invisible on social media. 
Writing on digital citizenship, Isin and Ruppert discuss what they 
describe as the ‘soft’ control of  digital spaces in which ‘the performative 
force of  filters involves directing the knowledge of  citizen subjects and 
closes off and encloses their worlds’ (Isin and Ruppert 2015). In the 
wake of  the June 2016 Brexit vote, in which the UK voted to leave 
the European Union, civic technology expert Tom Steinberg reflected 
on the political implications of  the filter bubble, which prevented 
him from being exposed to opposing views during the campaign, and 
suggested that the issue has now taken on greater urgency in the current 
political moment (Steinberg 2016). Looking at the role of  social media 
in movement-building, Geert Lovink described how earlier gains by 
networked social movements were being undermined by the affordances 
of  social media which limit the agency of  users: ‘[E]verything you say 
is rendered an “update” or “status.” All we can do in the current social 
media architectures is transmit news’ (Lovink and Meyer 2016).
New research approaches which use data science methods are also 
needed to help us understand political activity in digital spaces, as they 
can analyse the large-scale transactional data produced by platforms 
such as Twitter. For example, whilst opinion polls failed to predict the 
recent Brexit victory, an analysis of  the ‘leave’ campaign across social 
media platforms showed that the number of  tweets containing the term 
‘leave’ was nearly double the number containing ‘remain’ between 
February and June 2016 (Siegel and Tucker 2016).
Digital spaces – or the ‘networked public sphere’ (Benkler et al. 2015) – 
are also used by extremist groups with quite different aims. A new kind 
of  ‘unruly politics’ sees networked technologies used by far-right and 
anti-Muslim groups, to support their mobilisation efforts. For example, 
in Germany the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of  the 
Occident (PEGIDA) were rapidly mobilised between 2014 and 2015 
(Peschlová 2015), achieving more than 200,000 likes on their Facebook 
page (Puschmann et al. 2016). However, the same tools that PEGIDA 
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used to mobilise also proved instrumental in its undoing, when its leader 
was forced to resign because of  details from a leaked private Facebook 
conversation.
The rapid evolution of  these dynamic and diverse forms of  digitally 
mediated political activity highlight the shortcomings in both our current 
models of  governance and the theoretical frames we use to understand 
civic engagement. Political institutions struggle in the face of  ‘emotional 
bursts and populist movements that unfold on the Internet’ (Polonski 
2016). Recent work by Koc-Michalska et al. on civic engagement in 
the digital age argues for an abandonment of  the conceptual barrier 
between traditional and non-traditional forms of  engagement. So while 
political institutions using digital platforms ‘follow the political logic of  
traditional campaigning’ (Koc-Michalska et al. 2016: 1807) informal 
forms of  participation by citizens such as accessing news on Facebook 
can lead to new forms of  participation, engagement and political impact.
4 Future agendas for analysis and action
These new modes of  engagement sparked debate at the conference, 
where participants expressed a need for new mediating structures and 
‘Habermasian’ (Habermas 1991) spaces for dialogue in light of  the 
Brexit vote. Given the threats to the role of  civil society discussed above 
it is necessary to understand the spaces, institutions and frameworks 
in which citizen voice can effectively be heard. Might these enabling 
environments be found in the cities? Sheela Patel of  the Society for 
the Promotion of  Area Resource Centers (SPARC), India spoke at 
a conference session on ‘Radical Social, Political and Theoretical 
Innovation from Cities of  the “South”’, about successes in organising 
at local level with women’s collectives and slum dwellers, which then 
scaled up to national and global impact. Finally, this might be a time for 
an evolution in our theoretical frameworks to understand the new forms 
of  ‘unruly politics’ and social movements we have seen in recent years 
and the ‘openings and closings’ that digital spaces offer for political 
engagement and alliances (Isin and Ruppert 2015).
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State, Market and Society Relations: 
The Roaring Last Fifty Years
Luka Biong Deng Kuol
Abstract During the last 50 years, the world has experienced increased 
growth, inequality and a change in state–market–civil society relations 
similar to the ‘Roaring Twenties’ in the 1920s. This growing inequality can 
be attributed to the hegemony of neoliberalism that has been confronted 
by rising civil society as a ‘global conscience’ for fairer world governance. 
The high economic growth achieved in the emerging economies shows 
the centrality of the state to achieving more shared growth in developing 
countries. A new hybrid state–market–society alliance holds the potential 
for fairer global governance, checking greed and achieving equitable 
growth in the future.
Keywords: state, market, society, neoliberalism, left-wing, right-wing.
1 Introduction
Since 1966 when the Institute of  Development Studies (IDS) 
was founded, development outcomes have been encouraging but 
alarming as well. The world gross domestic product (GDP) that was 
US$2.125 trillion in 1966 increased to US$73.434 trillion in 2015, while 
the GDP of  sub-Saharan Africa that was US$0.027 trillion in 1960 
increased to US$1.573 trillion in 2015 but its share of  the world GDP 
remained almost the same (World Bank 2016). Despite such impressive 
economic growth, the majority of  developing countries experienced 
slow growth with only a few of  them witnessing unprecedented robust 
growth (Edigheji 2007).
Alarmingly, the gap between rich and poor has been widening, 
particularly in advanced economies, and with a mixed picture in 
emerging economies and developing countries (Dabla-Norris et al. 
2015). Interestingly, the level of  poverty has increased in the advanced 
economies since the 1990s, while it has paradoxically declined in 
emerging economies and developing countries (OECD 2011a). 
Inequality is more prevalent in wealth distribution as 1 per cent of  the 
world’s population is estimated to own almost half  of  the world’s wealth 
– equivalent to 65 times the total wealth owned by the bottom half  of  
the world’s population (Fuentes-Nieva and Galasso 2014).
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While this rapid economic growth can be explained by exceptional 
technological and scientific innovation and improved human capital 
development, there is no consensus on the brute causes of  rising 
inequality and diverse development outcomes. Some argue that the 
low economic growth in some developing economies reflects increased 
reliance on markets (Edigheji 2007), while others see the unbalanced 
relationship between state, market and society as the main reason for 
this rising inequality (Keping 2014).
This article offers some reflections on the implications for development 
policies and outcomes of  the relations between state–market–society 
over the last 50 years, and how such relations may evolve in the future. 
In Section 2, the hegemony of  neoliberal economic policies during the 
last 50 years is discussed and compared with the period of  the 1920s 
known as the ‘Roaring Twenties’. The rise of  global civil society to 
confront the outcomes of  neoliberal economic policies is discussed in 
Section 3. The centrality of  the state in equitable development in the 
emerging economies is discussed in Section 4. The article concludes 
by reflecting on the future trend of  new hybrids and alliances between 
state, market and society in driving the future global development 
agenda for fairer global governance.
2 Developed economies: rising inequality and the hegemony of 
neoliberalism
The pattern of  economic performance and the rising inequality 
observed during the last 50 years resemble a similar pattern that can be 
observed during the Roaring Twenties in 1920s USA (Stone et al. 2015). 
While the decade of  the 1920s started briefly with economic recession, 
the economy started booming with total national wealth doubling 
Figure 1 Rising inequality during the Roaring Twenties and the last 50 years
Source Adapted from Stone et al. (2015).
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between 1920 and 1929. The share of  the richest households of  total 
income reached its highest level of  almost 25 per cent before the end of  
the decade (Figure 1).
Similar to the Roaring Twenties in the USA, income and wealth 
concentration at the top as well as unshared prosperity has become 
predominant in recent decades. Specifically, the concentration of  income 
at the very top of  the distribution rose to the levels observed in the 1920s 
(Stone et al. 2015). The recent work of  Oxfam (2016) shows that wealth 
inequality is a global crisis that is reaching new extremes. Specifically, 
while the wealth of  the richest 62 people has been increasing since 2002, 
the wealth of  the bottom 50 per cent has been increasing since 2000 and 
reached its peak in 2010 when it started declining until it became equal 
to that of  the richest 62 people in 2015 (see Figure 2).
The last 50 years can be termed ‘roaring’ not only because of  this 
growing unshared prosperity but also because of  digital prosperity and 
the information technology revolution that have been driving economic 
growth and innovation (Atkinson and McKay 2007). Furthermore, 
the world has witnessed a surge of  international migration and 
the emergence of  a widespread global concern about immigration 
(IPSOS 2016) similar to the 1920s in the USA when there was extreme 
anxiety about immigration, resulting in the passing of  an extremely 
restrictive immigration law in 1924.
The real question is which politics have been shaping the observed 
income inequality of  the last 50 years? This question can be partially 
answered by looking at the political parties that have been governing 
Source Oxfam (2016).
Figure 2 The wealth of the richest 62 people and wealth of the bottom 50 per cent, 
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during the last 50 years, particularly in the USA and UK (see Table 1). 
In comparison to the 1920s that was monopolised by conservative 
politics such a monopoly has shrunk but the politics of  economic 
neoliberalism has grown. Neoliberal economic policies have largely 
dominated the management of  economies during the last 50 years 
(Plehwe, Walpen and Neunhoffer 2006), particularly in developed 
economies. Meanwhile, neoliberal economic policies in the form of  the 
‘Washington Consensus’ have been directly or indirectly implemented 
in emerging economies and developing countries through multilateral 
organisations (Prasad 2006).
As the main thrust of  neoliberalism is that through markets the private 
sector is the most efficient and effective way to manage the economy 
(Noam 1999), rising inequality is attributed to the market failure 
caused by imperfect property rights and information (Stiglitz 2002). 
This criticism of  neoliberalism became more pronounced during the 
economic crisis in 2007–09 and the financial crises that resulted in states 
having to rescue banks in the USA and Europe.
The bank bailout raised a fundamental question about how such greed 
went undetected (Gwyn 2009) while also renewing debate about the 
future of  capitalism and liberal democracy. Some argue that increasing 
inequality, declining productivity growth and fading trust in governing 
elites may make democracy increasingly intolerant and capitalism 
illegitimate, and that both may be headed for a divorce (Wolf  2016; 
Carter 2016). Specifically, Wolf  (2016) argues that the democratic 
political system that promotes the interests of  the few and not the many 
may founder.
Despite the increased attack on neoliberal policies, right-wing parties 
are even consolidating their hegemony through the politics of  
immigration. With the rise in international migration and refugees to 
Table 1 Who was governing during the last 50 years and the 1920s?
The governing political 
parties
Number of years  
1966–2015
Number of years  
in the 1920s
US Presidents*
Republican 28 (56%) 9 (90%)
Democratic 22 (44%) 1 (10%)
UK Prime Ministers**
Labour 22 (44%) 1 (10%)
Conservative 28 (56%) 7 (70%)
Liberal 0 2 (20%)
Source *Johnson (2016) and **AustralianPolitics.com (2016).
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Europe and the USA, certain right-wing parties and politicians are 
using this effectively to consolidate their popularity by championing 
anti-immigration agendas and projecting immigration as a threat to the 
future of  Europe and the USA (Yilmaz 2012).
3 Confronting neoliberalism: the emergence of a global conscience
This hegemony of  neoliberalism has been resisted and confronted 
in multiple ways during the last 50 years, not only by modern left-
wing liberalism but also by the rising civil society movement, itself  
informed by rigorous academic thinking and research. Thus the rise of  
neoliberalism in the 1970s came under attack not only from the political 
left but also from myriad activists and academics (Plehwe et al. 2006). 
Since the 1980s, the work of  Robert Chambers has helped inspire a 
shift in focus to people-centred participatory development (Chambers 
1983), while also helping to revolutionise research work through 
participatory methods that recognise people as the central custodians 
of  knowledge of  their life and conditions (Chambers 1994). From a 
contrasting standpoint, the work of  economists such as Joseph Stiglitz 
(2011, 2012) has also contributed to awakening civil society to the global 
threat of  rising inequality.
Despite the attempt by neoliberalism to co-opt civil society as part of  
its agenda of  building the ‘market state’, the micro-traditional role of  
civil society has evolved into a role of  nurturing a ‘global conscience’ 
through global advocacy work (Evans and Shields 2000). The number 
of  international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has increased 
astronomically from only 6,000 in 1990 to more than 68,000 in 2015 
(UIA 2015). The rise of  civil society to confront the outcomes of  
economic neoliberal policies is vividly manifested in its advocacy to 
fight corruption, debt crisis, poverty, inequality and unfair trade, as well 
as the failure of  the market in addressing global threats such as to the 
environment.
The formation of  Transparency International in 1993 to annually 
produce a corruption perception index was the first attempt by civil 
society to mobilise a global movement against corruption (Florini and 
Simmons 2000), as contributing to the empowerment of  citizens to have 
a voice in the performance of  their governments. Another example 
occurred in late 1999 during the meeting of  World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in Seattle when civil society mobilised thousands of  people 
to advocate for fairer global trade (Florini and Simmons 2000: 1). 
Civil society also succeeded in mobilising in the late 1990s a petition 
of  24 million signatures through the Jubilee 2000 campaign to create 
awareness about the debt crisis in developing countries (Pettifor and 
Greenhill 2002).
Civil society organisations (CSOs) also ran an effective advocacy 
campaign during the Millennium Summit in 2000 to support the 
recognition of  participatory and people-centred development 
approaches in the adoption of  the Millennium Development Goals 
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(MDGs). They played a leading role through the UN Millennium 
Campaign in 2002 in mobilising global efforts to combat poverty 
and ensure that governments complied with their commitments to 
achieve the MDGs by 2015. Recently, global civil society has also been 
successful in engaging with the international and regional processes that 
have resulted in the adoption of  the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) in 2015, with reduced inequality and improved social justice 
amongst the important new global goals (CIVICUS 2016: 4).
Meanwhile, the academic work of  Stiglitiz (2011), Krugman (2011) 
and others, as well as the evidence-based advocacy work of  civil 
society (Oxfam 2016), have contributed to awakening world attention 
to the threats of  growing inequality. This resulted in the emergence 
in 2011 of  ‘We are the 99 per cent!’ as a populist movement against 
growing inequality. This movement initially gained momentum in 
the USA but expanded to Europe and beyond, and its messages have 
started resonating gradually in the political discourse of  left-wing and 
democratic parties.
The international climate agreement that was reached in Paris in 2015 
was recognition not only of  the failure of  markets in addressing such 
global threats, but also a clear acknowledgement of  civil society as a real 
third force in forging a new politics of  climate change that business and 
government were previously unable to agree on. Jacobs (2016) describes 
the Paris Climate Agreement not only as a huge diplomatic achievement 
but also the product of  the emergence of  a new and strategic quadruple 
alliance of  governments, civil society, the academic community and the 
business community.
4 Emerging economies: the centrality of the state
During the last 50 years, developing countries have experienced different 
paths of  development. In the 1970s, in broad terms development 
thinking shifted from right-wing modernisation theory to the left-wing 
dependency theory of  state-led development that was easily entertained 
by the post-independent ruling elites (Edigheji 2007). However, state-
led development frequently did not produce good economic outcomes 
as post-colonial states were largely weak and dependent on institutions 
that were often alien to indigenous contexts (Menocal 2004: 768). Some 
attributed poor economic performance in post-independent Africa to the 
failure of  liberators because of  the ‘curse of  liberation’ (Clapham 2012), 
leading some to argue that Africa needs a second liberation from the 
liberators themselves (Herbst and Mills 2012).
As the state-led development approach lost intellectual and political 
legitimacy (Hirschman 1981: 7) and with a rising coalition of  reform-
minded academics, policymakers and political elites (Leftwich 2000), the 
market-led development approach re-emerged and came to dominate 
the development agenda from the 1980s in developing countries. Yet, 
neoliberalism politics in the form of  the ‘Washington Consensus’ and 
a market-led development approach has equally failed to produce 
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good economic outcomes and has produced instead low growth, high 
unemployment and inequalities (Edigheji 2007).
With the disappointing performance of  market-led development 
approaches in developing countries, the role of  the state in development 
was revisited and reconsidered in the 1990s. In particular, the World 
Bank softened its position towards the role of  the state in development 
and recognised more fully the centrality of  states in economic and social 
development – not as a direct provider of  growth but as a catalyst and 
facilitator (Leftwich 2000: 51). In the case of  Africa, it is argued that 
the real challenge to development is less about the inability of  states 
to implement neoliberal economic policies but more about building 
autonomous bureaucracy and institutions that have capacity to act on 
behalf  of  society (Menocal 2004: 775). Some studies have shown that 
the weak capacity of  the state may explain poor economic performance 
in many developing countries, but that this weak capacity may not 
justify markets as an alternative, as markets are so reliant upon the state 
to create a conducive and enabling environment (Luiz 2000: 12).
The revival of  the role of  the state in development has been well 
informed by the experience of  some emerging economies in developing 
countries that have shown impressive economic performance. On the 
basis of  the comparative analysis of  state-capacity theory, Edigheji 
(2007: 225) shows in the case of  emerging economies a strong link 
between better economic performance and a high degree of  autonomous 
state institutions with established inclusive connections and synergistic 
relations with social actors. In other words, Edigheji (2007) has shown 
the centrality of  synergistic autonomous state institutions in achieving 
egalitarianism, equality and economic growth in developing countries.
In addition to the experience of  the emerging economies, China provides 
another good example of  impressive economic performance in terms of  
high economic growth and progress in fighting poverty since its adoption 
of  economic reforms in 1978. This swift economic development is partly 
attributed to China’s prioritisation of  modernisation of  state governance, 
and establishment and restructuring of  synergistic relations that were 
carefully sequenced; first restructuring relations between state and 
market, then state and society and finally market and society (Keping 
2014). Yet despite their robust growth and considerable progress in the 
fight against poverty, there are growing concerns about the increasing 
level of  income inequality in the emerging economies, including China, 
that is significantly higher than the OECD average (OECD 2011b).
5 Conclusion: future strategic and hybrid alliances
The neoliberal economic policies that have been driving the global 
economy during the last 50 years have created increasing inequality, 
global social capital deficiency and global political unrest that may 
threaten the very survival of  humanity. With increasing inequality, 
capitalism has come under serious attack and some fear that its fate may 
be heading in the same direction as communism. Media commentary 
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illustrates this. Out of  dismay at the bank bailout, for instance, journalist 
Richard Gwyn (2009) argues that although capitalism may not head for 
the dustbin of  history like communism has, it needs to be subjected to 
radical changes so as to have an efficient and ethical economic system, 
of  the sort that Adam Smith dreamed of. With the disappointing 
performance of  capitalism and dwindling trust in governing elites, 
Wolf  (2016) paints a rather bleak picture of  either a rise of  a global 
plutocracy, illiberal democracies or outright plebiscitary dictatorships if  
liberal democracy and capitalism are not nurtured to serve the interests 
of  the many instead of  the few.
There is a growing sentiment amongst youth and the middle class against 
capitalism and neoliberalism in developed and democratic countries. 
At the time of  writing, the 2016 US general election campaign shows 
that youth and the middle class have become increasingly receptive to 
a socialist agenda (Sheehan 2016). The US Democratic presidential 
candidate, Bernie Sanders, was the most-liked presidential candidate with 
about 61 per cent of  registered voters ready to vote for him (Prupis 2016). 
This surge of  popularity shows dissatisfaction with the establishment as 
well as the appeal of  left-wing election campaign messages. Messages 
around democratic socialism as the basis for creating government that 
works for the middle class and not just for a handful of  billionaires at the 
top, as well as around regulating Wall Street, all resonate with the feelings 
of  many young and middle-class people. Although Bernie Sanders did 
not make it to the White House, his popular election campaign messages 
will shape and continue to shape the political discourse in the US and 
may mark the beginning of  the rise of  democratic socialism and modern 
liberal economic policies in the USA and beyond.
Despite this rising left-wing agenda, Donald Trump, the US Republican 
presidential candidate, emerged in 2016 with growing popularity despite 
his controversial statements about women, immigrants, refugees and 
other minorities (Cherkaoui 2016). Interestingly, supporters of  Donald 
Trump come from a wide political spectrum including liberal, moderate 
and conservative groups as well as the Tea Party Movements (Brady and 
Rivers 2015). His growing popularity may be attributed to his success 
in moving immigration to the centre of  political discourse by projecting 
it as a real threat to the future of  the USA. As opinion polls leading up 
to Election Day in 2016 showed a narrowing gap between him and his 
contestant, the emergence of  the Donald Trump phenomenon can be 
seen as marking the beginning of  an emergent right-wing populism, 
centred on immigration very much as it happened during the Roaring 
Twenties.
A similar trend of  public acceptance of  a left-wing agenda has been 
observed in other European countries, particularly in the UK. The 
election of  Jeremy Corbyn in 2015 as the new leader of  the UK Labour 
Party, with a landslide victory amongst party members, marks not only 
that the party is being led by the most left-wing leader of  the UK’s 
recent history, but an embracing of  a radical shift towards left-wing 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 2A November 2016: ‘States, Markets and Society – New Relationships for a New Development Era’ 145–156 | 153
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
agendas by some sections of  the public. Certain ‘left-wing’ policies 
of  Jeremy Corbyn such as renationalisation of  the railways, imposing 
more taxes on the rich, rent controls on landlords, a mandatory living 
wage and cuts in university tuition fees were popular and backed by the 
public (Dathan and Stone 2015).
Despite this increased support for more left-wing policies in the 
UK, there is also growing support for right-wing populist policies, 
as illustrated in the 2016 referendum about the status of  the UK in 
Europe. Although all political parties supported the choice to remain in 
Europe, the extreme right wing supported the agenda to leave Europe 
and mobilised popular support largely around the fear of  immigration 
(Vina 2016). This decision and subsequent changes in government have 
strengthened the hegemony and popularity of  right-wing agendas and 
weakened the support to the left-wing agenda.
The surge of  the hegemony and popularity of  right-wing politics 
is visible not only in the UK and the USA, but also in many other 
countries in Europe and even in some in Asia. As in the USA, the far 
right have succeeded not only in presenting immigration as a threat to 
the future of  Europe as the populist right wing did in the mid-1980s, but 
have managed to move the issue of  immigration to the centre of  political 
discourse through the appeal of  populist messages (Yilmaz 2012). If  this 
toxic and acrimonious debate about immigration continues, right-wing 
political parties may come to dominate most governments in advanced 
economies in a way similar to the period of  the Roaring Twenties.
Alongside this rising left-wing movement and the increasing hegemony 
of  right-wing agendas under the umbrella of  immigration, civil society 
movements are emerging as a formidable third force in championing a 
global agenda that is in defiance of  neoliberal economic policies. With 
the information revolution, civil society may come to play an even more 
influential role in driving the global agenda. As rightly mentioned by 
Florini and Simmons (2000: 4), the world badly needs someone to act as 
the ‘global conscience’ to articulate the interests of  large publics that are 
hardly addressed by governments or markets. Equally important, the 
academic community has become a key player and a ‘global mind’ in 
informing debate about global challenges, as well as providing options 
for overcoming these challenges.
It is likely that this emerging ‘global conscience’ movement that is 
increasingly being informed by evidence from ‘global minds’ may forge 
a new alliance with the rising left-wing movement in developed countries 
to drive the future global agenda towards fairer global governance, 
checking greed and achieving equitable growth. The failure of  
‘self-regulated’ markets, the rising left-wing agenda, the emergence of  the 
global conscience and mind and the centrality of  the state in emerging 
economies could all have important implications for restructuring new 
relations between state, market and society that will lead to a fairer global 
governance that serves the interests of  the many and not the few.
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State–Society Relations and 
the Dilemmas of the New 
Developmentalist State
Evelina Dagnino
Abstract In confronting neoliberal models and their emphasis on state–
market alliances, new developmentalism has emerged as a powerful 
alternative, received with enthusiasm by progressive forces. It has certainly 
been responsible for unquestionable advances in fighting inequalities, 
particularly in Latin America where it has been adopted by leftist 
governments from 2000 on. However, it has been unable to redefine the 
old formula of a ‘strong, self-sufficient state’ and the centralising political 
practices characteristic of the ‘old’ developmentalism. Therefore, the article 
argues that the new developmental state has ended up by draining the 
potential of participatory democracy, which had brought together hopes 
for inclusive and sustainable development policies and had announced a 
new alliance between state and society through which rights could be 
ensured and democracy deepened.
Keywords: new developmentalist state, participatory democracy, 
Latin America, leftist governments. 
1 Introduction
The new developmentalist state has been received with enthusiasm 
as an alternative to neoliberal models and their emphasis on state–
market alliances. Whereas it has been responsible for unquestionable 
advances in fighting inequalities, particularly in Latin America where 
it has been adopted by leftist governments from 2000 on, I argue that 
the integration of  social participation in its decision-making processes 
and the building of  a new balance between state and society has faced 
significant limits. Centralising political practices characteristic of  the 
‘old’ developmentalism resist confronting the alleged ‘novelty’ of  the 
new model, and drain the potential of  participatory democracy, which 
had brought together hopes for inclusive and sustainable development 
policies, and had announced a new alliance between state and society 
through which rights could be ensured and democracy deepened. 
This article will first discuss the trajectory of  participatory democracy 
and the limits and difficulties it has faced; it will then examine the 
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emergence of  leftist governments in the continent, and will conclude by 
arguing that their adoption of  a new developmental conception of  the 
state has undermined the participation of  society in sharing decisions 
concerning development directions.
2 The institutional participation of civil society: promises of a new 
relation between state and society
During at least the last two decades, the institutional participation 
of  civil society1 became largely accepted in many parts of  the world 
as a principle to ensure the deepening of  democratic construction. 
In Latin America, between the early 1990s and the early 2000s, new 
constitutions in 19 countries included some provision for citizen 
participation, 17 of  them incorporated mechanisms of  direct political 
participation, and 14 provided for public spaces with both state and civil 
society representation (Hevia 2006).
Obviously, the meanings and intentions as well as the practices of  these 
provisions vary. Different conceptions of  social participation and social 
control of  the state have been in dispute, according to different existing 
political projects (Dagnino 2004; Dagnino et al. 2006). From more radical 
views such as participation as ‘sharing power’ to notions of  participation 
as a tool to provide information and increase the state’s efficiency, or 
even as a mere rhetorical instrument for electoral purposes, a quite 
diverse set of  meanings has been attributed to the term by different 
political forces, with equally different practical political implications.2
Brazil is frequently pointed out as the country with the largest and most 
advanced experiments in participatory democracy. The creation of  the 
Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) in 1980, with its original 
strong commitment to social participation, was a central element in the 
gradual establishment of  what came to be referred to as the ‘architecture 
of  participation’ (Dagnino and Teixeira 2014). It began with the well-
known Participatory Budget created in 1989 in Porto Alegre, under 
the government of  the Workers’ Party, which became a model that was 
internationally praised, including by the World Bank. This ‘architecture’ 
comprises public policy management councils and conferences, 
established at municipal, state and national levels, involving millions of  
people to discuss public policies in several policy areas such as education, 
health, social services, children and adolescents, women, the environment, 
food security, racial equality, culture, etc. as well as a myriad of  other 
participatory mechanisms. It is worth mentioning, however, that central 
economic policies have remained immune to civil society participation.
Participatory experiments spread throughout Latin America3 in varied 
formats and travelled to many parts of  the world. Although they 
became the focus of  attention and, in countries like Brazil, had heavily 
concentrated the efforts of  social movements, given their novelty and 
the potential they represented, they did not exhaust all other modalities 
of  social participation, such as protests and other forms of  pressure 
towards the state.
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Bringing together representatives of  both state and civil society to discuss 
and deliberate about public policies in several areas, these institutions have 
been seen as new models for the relations between them. They can be considered 
new at least in two aspects: they opened space for excluded voices, 
including and mainly from popular sectors, to be heard, as compared 
to the previous monopoly of  access to decisions by dominant sectors. In 
addition, they intended to provide channels of  representation additional to 
representative electoral democracy, the traditional and dominant formula 
for relations between state and society. The already age-old – and now 
aggravated – ‘crisis of  representation’ was already present in that intention.
To what extent these institutions have been effective, their successes and 
failures, is a question that has already produced a vast literature, which 
shows largely mixed results from hundreds of  case studies throughout 
the continent. After a first wave of  enthusiasm and praise, more recent 
studies present much more nuanced and critical views, emphasising the 
limits and difficulties faced by participatory democracy.
The formats of  participatory experiments, their degrees of  formalisation, 
scope and resources, their either consulting or decision-making character, 
as well as their permanence, vary very much throughout the continent. 
Their effectiveness also varies and is deeply affected by many factors. 
These should be mentioned in order to make clear that there are 
multiple sources of  limits and difficulties faced by such experiments: the 
specific political contexts in which deliberation takes place, the political 
forces involved and the power correlation between them, and how 
conflictive are the interests at stake. Furthermore, the commitment and 
qualification of  state representatives, the organisational density of  the 
sectors of  civil society that are represented, the technical and political 
qualifications of  civil society’s representatives, and most importantly the 
frequently scarce resources available for policy implementation, are all 
relevant elements bearing on the effectiveness of  participatory spaces.
For civil society itself, institutional participation also brought mixed 
consequences. On the one hand, it required the acquisition of  new 
capacities, very different from the usual repertoires of  collective 
action; a demanding learning process, which tended to encourage a 
‘professionalisation’ of  civil society representatives. This aggravated 
the proliferation of  non-governmental organisations (NGOs), already 
under way under the neoliberal model, in which they had been 
selected as the reliable, loyal, non-conflictive interlocutors of  the 
state, especially in taking charge of  formerly public responsibilities. 
The relationship between representatives and their social bases 
suffered from this professionalisation as social mobilisation and 
political organisation tended to take second place. On the other hand, 
more positively, representatives have been able to learn the modes 
of  state operation, improve their negotiation and deliberation skills 
and extend their networking. Research has shown that, successes 
or failures notwithstanding, civil society representatives assess their 
participation in the Brazilian Policy Councils, for example, as positive 
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(Szwako 2012). On the negative side, more critical analyses point out 
the risks of  ‘co-optation’, instrumentalisation by political parties and 
clientelism emerging in this closer relationship with different political 
and economic actors.
Effectiveness, that is to say, the extent to which civil society representatives 
have impact on public policies formulated in participatory spaces, is 
very difficult to measure (Pires 2011), not least because results reflect so 
many different factors. However, despite the extremely unequal weight 
of  popular social sectors as compared to the market, participatory 
institutions did provide space for the building of  alliances between civil 
society and sectors of  the state, especially when similar political projects 
brought them together on specific issues (Dagnino 2002).
3 The emergence of leftist governments: promises renewed
This last assertion has been precisely what underlay the expectations 
of  progressive sectors of  civil society when, from the 2000s on, leftist 
governments emerged in Latin America. Social movements heavily 
supported these new governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela,4 renewing their hopes for the 
consolidation and expansion of  mechanisms of  participation of  civil 
society as well as of  democratising alliances with the state. These new 
forces occupying the state were seen as possibilities of  rupture with the 
neoliberal cycle that had increased inequalities, eliminated rights and 
taken to an extreme the alliance between state and markets.
Although this emergence of  leftist governments has been generalised 
as a ‘red’ or ‘pink’ tide, there are significant differences between them. 
Participatory experiments, in spite of  their continental and even global 
diffusion and adoption by different political forces, have traditionally 
been associated with the left. However, the emphasis they have received 
within the new governments has varied. In some cases, new mechanisms 
have been created (Uruguay and Venezuela); in others, existing 
participatory institutions have been strengthened and/or extended 
from local to national levels; in others yet these institutions ‘have been 
relatively scarce’ (Argentina and Chile) (Goldfrank 2016: 5) or appear 
prominent in the new constitutions but not so much in practice (Bolivia 
and Ecuador).5 In Brazil, changes in the conception of  participation 
itself, from more radical views of  participation as sharing power to 
milder versions of  ‘consultation’ and ‘dialogue’ closer to neoliberal 
procedures, became evident along President Lula’s mandates (2003–10) 
(Dagnino and Teixeira 2014), whereas his successor, President Dilma 
Rousseff (2011–16), has been clearly insensitive to the issue. According 
to Boaventura de Souza Santos, a Portuguese scholar well known for his 
defence of  democratic deepening,
[T]he tools of  participatory democracy that were the hallmark 
of  popular government (participatory budgeting, sectorial policy 
councils, national conferences) have been worn down, losing the 
capacity for renovation, and above all, they were relegated more 
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and more to deciding over less and less important issues. The major 
investments and large public works projects were left out of  the reach 
of  participatory democracy (Souza Santos 2014).
How to explain this relative fading of  participatory democracy when 
expectations foresaw a different trajectory? In addition to the general 
factors influencing its effectiveness, a number of  specific reasons can be 
highlighted. The correlation of  forces vis-à-vis dominant conservative 
sectors, including members of  representative democracy who felt 
their power threatened,6 the priority given to so-called ‘governability’, 
and the different degrees of  commitment to participatory democracy 
amongst leftist forces themselves (Goldfrank 2016) may help to explain 
the declining progress. However, an often-neglected but central factor, 
I argue, lies in the reconfiguration of  the state undertaken by leftist 
governments under neo-developmentalism.
4 What is new about the new developmental state?
In spite of  their differences, what all those governments had in 
common was the adoption of  a proactive conception of  the role of  
the state towards development policies: even with different emphases 
and degrees of  consistency, the new developmentalist state re-emerged 
in Latin America in reaction to the central feature of  neoliberalism: 
a ‘reduced’ state, increasingly subordinated to the market. That 
conception of  the new developmentalist state, in a rather perverse 
manner, contributed to the declining trajectory of  participatory 
democracy and installed an alliance between state and society that did 
not favour the deepening of  democracy.
New developmentalism has been the object of  heated debate in Latin 
America, involving economists almost exclusively. Efforts to distinguish 
it from both the ‘old’ developmentalism and the neoliberal model it is 
supposed/intended to replace have been key in this debate. Differences 
and similarities or ruptures and continuities with respect to the latter 
have been emphasised, particularly about the relations between state and 
market, defined by the new approach as one of  ‘complementarity’, with 
reinforced regulatory capacities of  the state, and the explicit refusal of  
any interventionist or protectionist features. To critics that stressed the 
‘ambiguity’ of  the new model, Bresser Pereira,7 a Brazilian economist 
who is one of  its leading defenders, states: ‘[N]ew developmentalism is 
pragmatic’, it ‘desires a strong market and a strong state and doesn’t see 
any contradiction between the two’ (Bresser Pereira 2010: 26, 51).
There is no ambiguity, however, in the new developmentalism’s statement 
about its redistributive goals. And indeed, it has been responsible for 
unquestionable advances in fighting inequalities, significantly abandoning 
the neoliberal targeted/focused social policies and adopting more 
universalising ones, recognising the rights of  excluded groups such as of  
the poor, indigenous people, black minorities, women, homosexuals, etc. 
The Brazilian experience offers abundant examples of  these directions.
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Rather than discussing here the several economic dimensions in 
this debate, what I want to explore is the character of  the state in 
neo-developmentalism and the kind of  alliance between state and 
society that it represents. More interested in asserting the central rupture 
with neoliberalism, neo-developmentalists basically limit this specific 
discussion to the simple affirmation of  a protagonist ‘strong state’. 
Therefore, it is in their efforts to assert the distinction between new and 
old developmentalism (Bresser Pereira 2012) that we can find interesting 
clues with respect to the new developmental conception of  the state.
The ‘old’ developmentalist model, also known as national 
developmentalism, was first established in Latin America during the 
1930s and 1940s, with the governments of  Vargas in Brazil (1930–45 
and 1950–54), Perón in Argentina (1946–55 and 1973–74) and 
Cárdenas in Mexico (1934–40). In very different economic, political, 
social and international contexts, the need for a ‘strong state’, again, 
was its key feature. At its beginning, in the Brazilian experience, where 
the model continued to prevail, more in theory than in practice, until 
the military coup in 1964, it was intended to face two main tasks: 
the building of  the nation and of  the state itself. This assessment saw 
Brazil as plagued by regionalisms, fragmentation of  political parties 
(partidarismos) and particularisms that needed a strong unifying state, 
able not only to promote development but also ‘to organise’ society and 
build a proper nation. In the huge and dense theoretical production of  
the time, defenders of  national developmentalism considered the state 
as the ‘main agent of  social transformation’ (Dagnino 1986).
After a period of  limited democratic rule, the ‘strong state’ became an 
openly authoritarian regime, from 1937 to 1945. The installation of  
industrial capitalism and the organisation of  society along corporative 
lines, yet coupled with the delivery of  social rights and the recognition 
of  labour as a legitimate political interlocutor, even if  subordinated 
to the state, were the main results of  the first Vargas period,8 also 
recognised as establishing the beginnings of  populism.
Almost 80 years later, the discourse of  new developmentalism seems to 
bring back the same conceptions, strikingly repeating the same vocabulary: 
the ‘strong state is the par excellence instrument of  the nation’s collective 
action’, states Bresser Pereira (2010: 3). More explicitly, other authors, 
referring to a needed ‘certain degree of  decentralisation’ of  the state, add:
It should be noted, however, that this doesn’t mean that the most 
important decisions referring to public policies to be implemented 
should be equally decentralized, since governmental agents, 
democratically elected, should be responsible for their definition. 
(Sicsú, Paula and Michel 2007: 513, author’s translation from the 
Portuguese)
Here, representative democracy seems to be the only envisaged channel 
for participation.
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The meaning and the implications of  the characterisation of  the nature 
of  the developmental state are perhaps further clarified by what is absent 
in them: in the discourse of  its proponents there isn’t any reference 
to the role of  society’s participation in the formulation of  public 
policies, after, in the Brazilian case, more than 20 years of  accumulated 
experience. The reduction of  social participation to representative 
democracy through voting is very much linked to the recurrence of  a 
conception of  the state as an almighty, self-sufficient entity, still very 
much rooted in the Latin American political imaginary and adopted 
and promoted by leftist governments. Having been elected with the 
strong support of  social movements, leftist governments see themselves 
as legitimately representing the interests and claims of  excluded sectors 
of  society, given basically their distributive commitment – what they 
rightfully were to a significant extent. Capitalising on their social policies 
of  recognition and distribution, there has been a gradual increasing 
closure of  decision-making in the state. The new alliance between 
state and excluded sectors of  society, announced by the experiments in 
participatory democracy, and based on sharing power and on the social 
control of  the state, has gradually assumed a limited character.
Instead, traits of  the old paternalistic alliance have showed their 
resilience. Strong charismatic leaders have transferred their legitimacy 
to a progressively self-contained state, a mechanism whose initial 
effectiveness has tended to erode as contradictions between state policies 
and social movements’ demands have become increasingly evident. As 
Gallegos states about Ecuador, ‘the articulation between decisionismo 
and new developmentalism didn’t seem favourable to the effective 
participation of  a wider sector of  social actors in the conduction of  the 
transformation process’ (Gallegos 2008: 195).
References to the ‘nation’ also resonate with old developmentalism. The 
Patria Bolivariana of  Hugo Chávez, Garcia Linera’s Bolivian Nation and 
Rousseff’s Patria Educadora indicate attempts to formulate a national 
identity from above, where the state – and not society – defines and 
incarnates the ‘nation’. The return to these conceptions maintains an 
odd relationship, to say the least, to the primacy of  social participation 
asserted in official discourse, as well as, in some cases, to the recognition 
of  pluri-culturalism (Rivera Cusicanqui 2014).
Other perverse implications followed from a conception of  the state that 
sees itself  as the ‘fundamental agent of  transformation’. The tendency 
to replace their original political projects with ‘power projects’ is visible 
in the present decline of  leftist governments. Holding state power and 
particularly remaining in power at any cost (and costs may include 
corruption and authoritarian measures, as well as all kinds of  alliances 
and concessions in order to ensure so-called ‘governability’) seem to be 
justified in the name of  that cause.
The basic requirement of  neo-developmentalism, as put by its defenders, 
is ‘the primacy of  the role of  the state as a pro-development political 
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conscious action’ (Carneiro 2012: 776). There is no question that the 
definition of  such a protagonist role configured an encouraging premise 
towards the replacement of  the dominant neoliberal model. What is in 
question is how this premise has unfolded to constitute a real rupture, not 
only with neoliberal pillars but also with the statist conception of  politics 
(Lechner 1990) that has historically plagued Latin America.
Economic policies under neo-developmentalism showed clear limits 
in pointing towards a radically new model of  development. Based on 
growing processes of  financialization and on ‘extractive rent’, through 
the intensification of  mining and other extractive industries, including 
soy agriculture (Gago and Mezzadra 2015), the neo-developmental 
states have been particularly ambiguous with respect to their 
environmental policies. This is also one area, among others, where the 
participation of  civil society and social movements has been remarkably 
bypassed. In Brazil, the approval of  the Forest Code and the building 
of  the Belo Monte hydropower plant have been clear examples of  long 
and intense social mobilisation, ignored by the government. In spite of  
heavy protest, conflicting economic and environmental policies have led 
to devastating environmental consequences as in Bolivia and Ecuador. 
In these countries, as in others, initial progressive discourses gave way 
to contradictory practices, both with respect to citizen voice and to 
sustainability concerns.
Social movements and popular sectors have become increasingly critical 
of  governments’ actions. Resort to ‘direct action’ through protests, 
occupations and invasions have intensified as the negotiation practices 
made possible by the institutional channels of  participation show 
their paralysis and inefficiency. The initial support from those sectors, 
sustained by distributive and recognition policies, is at stake. The 
advance of  neoliberal forces in countries like Brazil and Argentina show 
a backward movement that can be explained by a number of  factors. 
However, the contradictions of  the developmental state format adopted 
by leftist governments with respect to the role of  people’s voice in that 
configuration are certainly part of  that explanation.
5 Conclusion
The ambiguities and contradictions of  neo-developmentalism in Latin 
America, which has culminated in defeats and a crisis of  the left, impose 
a sober political analysis. Among the various features that can help us to 
understand such a trajectory, I have focused on the features of  its self-
defined main agent, the ‘strong state’. I have argued that the dilemmatic 
paradox of  new developmentalism implemented by leftist governments 
lies in its very conception of  the state: while its new protagonist role 
could have represented new paths towards a more equal and sustainable 
development, it has implied the ‘downgrading’ of  participatory 
democracy and the confining of  participation to representative 
democracy. By relying on ‘old’ ways of  doing politics, reviving the 
traditional state monopoly of  decision-making and emphasising the role 
of  a deteriorated mode of  social representation, new developmentalism 
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has failed to fully incorporate what represented a crucial innovative 
change in patterns of  Latin American democracy. It is not by chance 
that claims for substantive participation have been reiterated by recent 
protests throughout the continent, as in Brazil, where millions of  people 
filled up the streets of  several cities in June 2013, expressing a clear 
discrediting of  parliamentary representatives and of  an unresponsive 
and corrupted political system.
Lessons from the crises of  leftist governments under new 
developmentalism must be learned in order to push back the full 
resumption of  neoliberal models, already on course in countries 
such as Brazil and Argentina. The struggles of  social movements 
for participation in decision-making processes, intended to ensure 
democratic deepening and truly new routes for development, should 
not be ignored. The challenge posed by the construction of  democratic 
new alliances between state and society cannot be ignored, therefore, 
amidst a reconfiguration of  the role of  the state as a ‘pro-development 
political conscious action’ that is aligning with a radical redefinition of  
the decision-making power of  society.
Notes
1 Civil society is understood here as the space occupied by organised 
sectors of  society, such as social movements, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and a multiplicity of  other organisations, 
whose common characteristic is the search for access to the 
public space in order to achieve their objectives. Civil society is 
characterised by its heterogeneity and by the competition between 
different interests and projects in conflict, being, therefore, a political 
space by definition (Dagnino 2011).
2 For both radical democratic and neoliberal notions of  participation, 
see Dagnino (2004) and Dagnino et al. (2006).
3 For a thorough survey of  participatory instances in Latin America, 
including a reading list, see Eng and Perron (2013), Citizen 
Participation in Latin America: Innovations to Strengthen Governance.
4 The emergence of  leftist governments in the continent began with 
the presidency of  Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1999–2013). The 
election of  Luis Inácio Lula da Silva in 2003 launched the Workers’ 
Party governments: he was re-elected in 2006 and followed by Dilma 
Rousseff, who was elected in 2010 and again in 2014, and governed 
until 2016, when she was ousted from power. The peronista Nestor 
Kirchner governed Argentina from 2003 until his death and was 
succeeded by Cristina Kirchner (2007–15). In Uruguay, Tabaré 
Vasquez, candidate of  the Frente Amplio, was elected in 2005, 
succeeded in 2010 by Pepe Mujica and returned to the presidency in 
2015. Evo Morales and Vice-President Alvaro Garcia Linera, from 
the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement to Socialism, MAS), have 
governed Bolivia since 2006, having been re-elected in 2009 and 
2015. Rafael Correa founded the movement Alianza PAIS (Patria 
Altiva y Soberana, Proud and Sovereign Patria) to run for presidential 
election in 2006, and is now in his third mandate as president 
166 | Dagnino State–Society Relations and the Dilemmas of the New Developmentalist State
Vol. 47 No. 2A November 2016: ‘States, Markets and Society – New Relationships for a New Development Era’
of  Ecuador. In Chile, the Socialist Party’s Michelle Bachelet was 
president from 2006 to 2010, and elected again in 2014.
5 In Ecuador, for example, the moderately radical initial establishment 
of  the Council of  Citizen Participation and Social Control, 
denominated the Fifth Power, has been undermined, according to 
Moscos (2014), by ‘executive intrusions’ and ‘hyper-presidentialism’.
6 In 2014, when the Brazilian government proposed the institution 
of  a National System of  Social Participation to the Congress that 
was intended to establish common rules for the different existing 
participatory institutions, there was a very strong reaction and it 
has been accused of  trying to install a Bolivarian Revolution in the 
country. Although the System was aimed at instituting participation 
as ‘a method of  government’ (Presidency of  the Republic 2014), 
President Dilma Rousseff never engaged herself  in assuring the 
political conditions for its approval. The Congress did not even put 
the proposal to a vote.
7 Bresser Pereira, curiously, was the minister of  state reform who, under 
the Cardoso government in the 1990s, led neoliberal state reform 
in 1995, the jewel of  the crown in the implementation of  the model 
in Brazil. Among other things, it regulated the ‘social organisations’ 
in charge of  the implementation of  targeted, and restricted social 
policies while lacking any decision-making power over them.
8 Vargas became a mythical figure in the Brazilian popular imaginary, 
known as the ‘Father of  the Poor’. In Dilma Rousseff’s first electoral 
campaign in 2010, she was presented as the ‘Mother of  the Poor’(see 
http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,lula-vai-apresentar-
dilma-na-tv-como-mae-dos-pobres,596194).
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Back to the Future?
Michael Edwards
Abstract It has become fashionable to claim that institutions that blend 
elements together from civil society and the market such as social 
enterprises and social impact investing are (a) widespread empirical realities 
and (b) beneficial trends in terms of welfare, rights and equality. Neither 
assumption is correct. Confronting the key problems of development and 
transformation requires a return to traditional, separate-but-connected 
patterns of interaction between states, markets and civil societies – though 
updated to take account of new opportunities and threats.
Keywords: blended institutions, hybrids, social enterprise, civil society, 
collective action, democracy.
Blended institutions which incorporate elements of  civil society and 
business inside their own governance and operations are important 
elements of  social and economic policy today in both high- and lower-
income settings. Social enterprises, and social and environmental 
impact investing, are prime examples. Although definitions vary – with 
European models emphasising social impact and US models prioritising 
earned income – the consensus is that these institutions represent 
something that is qualitatively new, different and important (Ridley-Duff 
and Bull 2015). Such institutions are often praised for their effectiveness 
and efficiency in delivering human services and promoting social 
innovation, yet we know comparatively little about their macro-level 
effects on poverty, inequality, democracy and collective action.
These organisational hybrids are different to straightforward privatisation 
(which involves the wholesale displacement of  functions into the private 
sector), public–private partnerships for delivery and decision-making, and 
the co-production of  social and economic value by different institutions. In 
all three of  these cases, the boundaries between public, private and civic 
actors are maintained even if  they decide to work together more closely. In 
the case of  blended institutions these boundaries are deliberately blurred or 
removed completely. That’s what makes them especially interesting from a 
practical and philosophical point of  view; they provide a radical departure 
from the belief  that civil society and business, or ‘doing good and doing 
well’, are and should be kept separate from one another (Edwards 2014).
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But how important are they as compared to more traditional 
institutions, and is the enthusiasm for their achievements well founded? 
What does the rise of  blending and blurring imply for the balance of  
power in society and for the changing relationships between states, civil 
societies and markets?
1 What do the data tell us?
These are difficult questions to answer, partly because it is impossible 
to measure hybridisation with any great accuracy – the data aren’t 
classified in this way and the definitions of  the terms involved are often 
elastic. But if  we use social enterprises as a rough proxy and compare 
them with conventional enterprises and conventional charities in the 
UK (which is thought to have the most developed social economy in 
the world), we find that in 2015 there were 70,000 social enterprises (or 
1.29 per cent of  all privately registered companies) and they contributed 
0.96 per cent of  total gross domestic product (GDP) (Social Enterprise 
UK 2016; FSB 2016). Only around 2,000 social enterprises were added 
to the total between 2012 and 2015 (Floyd 2013).
By comparison there were at least 200,000 registered charities in 
the UK in 2015 and another 200,000 or so that weren’t registered 
(like church and community groups), together outnumbering social 
enterprises by almost six to one (Ainsworth 2015). They actually showed 
a much higher growth rate than social enterprises with over 60,000 
being added during the same period (The Guardian 2012).
To take another rough proxy, one can compare social and environmental 
impact investing with commercial investment and philanthropy, and 
again I will use the most developed context we know of, which in this 
case is the USA. For 2015 we find that US$10 billion went into social 
and environmental impact investing versus US$15.1 trillion for total 
private investment (or 0.06 per cent of  the total (Global Impact Investing 
Network 2016; Federal Reserve Bank of  St Louis 2016)). By comparison, 
private philanthropy generated US$358.38 billion, with giving by 
individuals making up 72 per cent of  that amount, an increase of  almost 
6 per cent over 2013 (Giving USA 2016).
The conclusion from these figures is clear: the vast majority of  
enterprises in the UK and the USA are traditional businesses; the vast 
majority of  civil society organisations are conventional charities; the 
vast majority of  resources for this sector come from giving and not from 
investment; and these patterns have not changed significantly in the 
last five years. Data from lower-income settings would no doubt paint a 
different picture, but given the much smaller size of  the social economy 
in all countries outside of  North America and Europe, it is doubtful 
whether these conclusions would be invalidated.
However, if  the numbers are small, why is there so much excitement 
around social enterprise, impact investing and related experiments? 
That question provides a clue as to what is really happening, which is as 
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much ideological as empirical – in the form of  an aggressive campaign 
to promote the philosophy of  blending as a more effective way of  
dealing with social and economic problems. However, there isn’t much 
evidence or logic to support that broader claim.
2 Is blending or separation best for tackling inequality?
Traditionally – think of  the old image of  a three-legged stool or the 
separation of  powers in a constitution – government, business and civil 
society were seen as different but equally valuable parts of  a healthy 
whole, complementary but necessarily separate from each other because 
they undertook different tasks and ran on different principles: the legal 
or bureaucratic authority of  government, the free market competitive 
mechanisms of  business, and the voluntary spirit and cooperative values 
of  non-profits and community groups. Each provided at least some level 
of  counterweight to the others.
This model – so unfashionable today that it is seen as retrograde or even 
irrelevant – was the framework that underpinned the longest period 
of  shared prosperity the North has ever seen from the late 1940s to 
the mid-1970s, and in various forms it also helped to anchor the East 
Asian ‘miracle’ and the later growth of  China, Vietnam and the more 
successful economies of  Latin America (Edwards 1999; Wade 2003).
Scaled up from the level of  individual organisations to a general 
principle, the rise of  hybridisation might weaken the ability of  society 
to function in this way when those counterweights are removed 
and the differences between institutions are watered down: blurred 
boundaries mean blurred accountability; blended institutions mean 
less of  a single-minded focus on social considerations; and distributed 
governance signifies a weakening of  central or legal authority to 
redistribute resources, curb abuses and regulate the market. In a miracle 
of  social science, enthusiasts for hybrids want to make civil society 
stronger by weakening its most important characteristics, which are its 
independence and attachment to non-market, non-bureaucratic values.
To illustrate this thesis, consider the long-term trajectory of  income 
inequality in the USA. Between 1947 and 1979, the bottom 95 per cent 
of  families in the USA received three quarters of  the growth in incomes 
that took place during that period (Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities 2015). Fast forward to the three years between 2009 and 2011 
when the top 1 per cent of  American families captured all the growth in 
incomes that occurred (ibid.). That is a remarkable turnaround in terms 
of  inequality and its associated costs. What happened?
Tax rates were much higher from the 1940s to the 1970s so governments 
were able to redistribute wealth and opportunity. Business was more 
highly regulated so the costs and benefits of  a growing economy could 
be managed more effectively. And civil society groups were stronger, 
more independent, more highly connected, more political in their 
activities, and largely financed by their own members or supporters. 
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This last point is especially important to the argument I want to 
make, because these characteristics underpinned the ability of  civil 
society groups to exert their influence separate from, but connected to, 
businesses and the state.
Just prior to the Second World War for example, there were well over 
1 million members of  the National Federation of  Women’s Clubs in 
the USA (Skocpol 2004). By 1955, 9 per cent of  all adult Americans 
were members of  a Parent Teacher Association (PTA) and 12 per cent 
were active in a labour union (ibid.). By today’s standards these figures 
represent a very high degree of  popular involvement in the nation’s 
social and political affairs.
Cross-class, non-partisan, membership-based, internally democratic 
and nationally federated networks of  voluntary organisations helped to 
animate debates and conversations in the public sphere and provided 
avenues for leadership development and accountability from the bottom 
up so that ordinary Americans were not simply governed by elites acting 
on their behalf, but were able to participate in the system directly. These 
networks helped to cement a consensus across political and religious 
interests and identities concerning the direction of  society (though they 
were heavily segregated by race), providing a strong platform from 
which pressure could be exerted on state and federal governments to 
adopt measures such as the GI Bill of  1944 which had hugely beneficial, 
broadly-based welfare effects (in that case by providing free college 
education for returning military personnel).
From the late 1950s to the mid-1970s, these achievements were 
extended by new social movements for civil rights, gay rights, equality 
for women and the birth of  environmentalism, but the 25 years or so 
after 1975 were marked by a fundamental turn away from these kinds 
of  broad-based, democratic forms of  civic action (Edwards 2014). One 
strand of  the non-profit sector moved into service delivery on contract 
to governments, and another strand moved into professional advocacy 
work which required high levels of  legal and policy expertise but much 
less of  a connection to the grass roots. Labour Union membership in 
the USA has fallen by half  since 1945, for example, and the decline is 
even greater for PTAs (which have lost 60 per cent of  their members 
(Skocpol 2004)).
The rise of  blending and blurring represents the next stage in the 
evolution of  these processes of  professionalisation, corporatisation 
and distancing from community control, with even more of  a focus 
on hierarchical, market-oriented civil society activity as states are 
retrenched and business is invited deeper and deeper into the world 
of  human services. Many of  those businesses are more mindful of  
social concerns, at least if  ‘social’ is defined as serving target groups 
that are considered vulnerable – as opposed to social transformation 
or deep-rooted social change. But in the process the characteristics that 
previously made civil society groups important actors may be eroded.
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The result is what Skocpol (2004) calls ‘diminished democracy’, or a 
hollowing out of  civil society and a loss of  capacity, connectedness and 
independence, which is linked in at least three ways to the trends that 
began to emerge in the USA in the 1970s towards rising inequality, 
concentrated economic and political power, and partisan polarisation 
(Edwards 2016).
3 Why is blending problematic?
Firstly, blending social and financial considerations together 
automatically reduces the priority that is given to one side or the other, 
since one can’t have more than 100 per cent of  anything at one time. 
Is 50 per cent good enough to make real progress on deeply embedded 
problems like inequality? What if  social considerations fall even further 
below that level? In theory, it is possible to give equal weight to social 
and financial criteria, but in practice that is very difficult to do because 
of  a second reason: money is nearly always the more powerful force in 
the equation.
The mangling of  altruism with self-interest is supposed to achieve the 
perfect mix of  both, but in reality, it usually leads to the erosion of  
social objectives over time – or their immiseration as social concerns 
become reduced to a target group in society rather than the full range 
of  social considerations concerning power, values and relationships. 
Social enterprises begin to ignore clients who are more difficult to 
reach, a problem that has also emerged with charter schools in the 
USA which are privately managed public institutions with a tendency 
to prioritise children from higher-income families (Cohen 2015; Decker 
2015). Social impact investors are more patient than the stereotype of  
Wall Street financiers or those in the City of  London, but they still need 
to make some money from their investments and that limits what they 
can support (Bugg-Levine and Emerson 2011).
The reason this happens isn’t complicated: money doesn’t only ‘talk’ 
as the old saying puts it, it jabbers incessantly in your ears until even 
the socially conscious begin to listen. There may not be a need to 
sacrifice financial returns in order to achieve a positive social impact, 
but there is a need to sacrifice social returns in order to make a profit 
(Edwards 2009). And that imperative excludes huge areas of  important 
social action that need more time and patience than can be ‘afforded’, 
or that prioritise quality over quantity regardless of  the cost, or that 
simply can’t be monetised.
That leads on to reason number three: social change and market 
mechanisms are not easily interchangeable. They are fundamentally 
different – more like ‘oil and water’ than the ‘perfect cocktail’ that 
is presented by advocates of  ‘blended value’. Take, for example, 
cooperation and competition. These are not points along the same 
continuum but opposing principles and values. This implies that choices 
must be made between such alternatives rather than assuming that they 
can be blended harmoniously together. It is the same for individualism 
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and collective action, or intrinsic and instrumental value, or gifts versus 
investments, or democratic versus market accountability.
One of  the most pernicious effects of  intrusions by market thinking 
into civil society is to make gifts and gift relationships seem suspect, 
second-rate or backward. But these relationships – expressed through 
community and solidarity and social movements – are the basis of  all 
healthy human interaction. In many societies, people’s imaginations 
have become so colonised by market thinking that they no longer know 
or care what it means to be fully human in this sense – to give freely 
with no expectation of  return; to show solidarity without the need for 
a reward; or to hold a conversation that does not degenerate into a 
transaction or a deal. The truth of  the matter – demonstrated time and 
again through the history of  privatisation and the decline of  public 
or civic values – is that markets have little useful role to play in any 
humanistic endeavour (Guinan and Hanna 2013). That includes health, 
education, politics, civil society and the arts.
4 Conclusions: alliances or blends?
By way of  conclusion let me anticipate two obvious objections to my 
argument. The first is that I am over-generalising in a way that paints 
all experiments in blended value in negative terms, whereas there is at 
least a possibility that a ‘progressive wing’ of  social enterprise and the 
like exists which combines economic and social criteria rather than 
substituting one for the other. Perhaps by promoting greater economic 
security among marginalised populations in new ways these experiments 
can actually strengthen civic and political engagement. There is 
certainly something to that argument, and it represents an interesting 
area for research.
These more positive blends, if  that is what they are, would need to 
build on and defend traditions that have been inherited from the past 
without rejecting new opportunities and innovations out of  hand, which 
would be foolish – to be as enthusiastic about community organising 
and popular protest as they are about social enterprise and social media. 
I would argue that the most interesting examples of  citizen action in 
the world today exhibit these characteristics, such as Black Lives Matter 
(2016) or Making Change at Walmart (2016) in the USA, or Podemos 
(Iglesias 2015) in Spain. Crucially, however, these examples engage the 
market within a framework that is governed by democracy and the 
transformation of  power relations. A case could also be made that older 
blended institutions like cooperatives have been more successful than 
newer social enterprises in generating a supportive mix of  economic 
security and political activism (Ridley-Duff and Bull 2015).
The second objection is that I am just being unrealistic – there is 
no alternative, no going back in time to a healthier configuration of  
states, markets and civil societies, especially because of  the impacts of  
globalisation and the relative decline of  national state authority and 
autonomy. But this ignores the fact that the emerging orthodoxy around 
(Endnotes)
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these questions is itself  manufactured, the result of  the ideological turn 
towards the market that began in the late 1970s and has continued ever 
since, and is now being supercharged in the softer language of  blending 
and blurring by a well-resourced echo chamber of  consultants, writers, 
donors, business leaders and philanthropists (Edwards 2008, 2010).
If  that is true, then it must be possible to consciously deconstruct what 
is going on now and increase the space for more radical innovations 
in the social economy which could have positive macro-level results. 
And if  that does happen, it would represent a turn ‘back to the future’ 
by re-emphasising the difference and independence of  government 
and civil society even as they enter into alliances with business and the 
market. Alliances constitute a very different modality to hybrids, and 
they correspond much more closely to the kinds of  relationships I am 
recommending, so long as they are composed of  equal and independent 
partners to avoid problems of  co-option. In an alliance, each member 
does not have to stop being what they are in order to be something else 
– in fact the opposite is true. The value of  the participants lies precisely 
in the different properties, perspectives, constituencies and capacities 
they can bring to the table. Each member can also decide to enter or 
leave at any time.
These things are not true of  blended institutions, though in terms of  the 
potential reconfiguration of  state–market–civil society relations at the 
macro level, it may be that non-blended institutional arrangements such 
as privatisation and public–private partnerships (which are much more 
extensive) are more powerful influences than the growth of  blending 
and blurring. But that is an analytical question that needs to be tested 
over time through careful, comparative research. In the meantime, and 
as history shows, alliances work best when government, business and 
civil society work as equal and complementary sets of  institutions that 
can hold each other in mutual, constant and creative tension. That is a 
better way forward than hybridisation because it creates relationships 
that add value overall rather than taking it away from one sector or 
another, with all the associated costs of  that exchange. In other words, 
it is the difference between institutions that makes the difference to 
development and social change.
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Restoring Development Dharma 
with Toad’s Eye Science?
Dipak Gyawali and Michael Thompson
Abstract While the Millennium Development Goals (and their successors, 
the Sustainable Development Goals) loom large among those who take 
a global-level approach, they elicit, at best, a confused shrug from the 
Nepali villager. We unpack this paradox by way of the distinction between 
eagle’s eye science and toad’s eye science, and go on to show how vital 
it is that the latter is not neglected. It is, for instance, household-level 
decisions that have resulted in a substantial proportion of Nepali citizens 
working in the Gulf States and elsewhere, thereby quickly establishing 
a remittance economy that makes a nonsense of the long-held view, 
among the proponents of eagle’s eye science, that it is lack of money that 
is the problem. Rather, it is the constructive engagement of the three 
‘solidarities’ – market, state and civil society – that is needed: a task (we 
call it ‘dharma restoration’) that simply cannot be accomplished without the 
bringing-in of toad’s eye science.
Keywords: cultural theory, foreign aid, development, informal economy.
Ask any Nepali villager about the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and you will be met with a confused shrug. Sahasrabdi Bikas 
Lakshya – the goals translated into Nepali – is a mouthful that only 
classical Sanskrit scholars can properly articulate and understand. 
On top of  that, it expresses a concern that has never figured in the 
everyday lives and decisions of  these citizens. This may come as a 
surprise to those who focus on the MDGs (and on their successors, the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)) because Nepal is frequently 
cited at international gatherings as a country that, to use the old 
Soviet-era terminology, has ‘over-fulfilled’ its planned targets: all the 
way from female child school enrolment to infant mortality reduction 
and increased electricity access (NPC 2013; Alkire et al. 2015). Even 
more surprisingly, this success (if  that is indeed what it is) has happened 
over the last decade and a half, during which time the country was 
engulfed in a Maoist insurgency, followed by an ongoing political 
and constitutional crisis that has seen nine prime ministers in almost 
as many years. Five-Year Plans, together with the aid programmes 
that are intended to prop them up, have stalled and the ratio of  aid 
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disbursement to aid commitment has reached an all-time low. And if  
we look at one of  those ‘successes’ – electricity access – we find that this 
has happened even as those who are served (if  you can call it that) by 
the national grid continue to endure power cuts for 15 hours a day. In 
consequence, the private sector – hotels, offices, shopping complexes 
and apartment blocks – have given up on the national grid and resorted 
to diesel generators. These generators, in total, now rival the supply 
via the grid, with the country spending some 137 per cent of  its export 
earnings on the importation of  this climate-unfriendly petroleum 
product.1 So what, we should ask, is really going on?
Nepal, with its multitude of  rivers cascading down the Himalaya, is 
indeed blessed with a rich hydropower potential.2 However, even after 
more than a half-century of  development assistance, that potential has 
not been realised. The official figure, according to the Nepal Electricity 
Authority (NEA), for the population’s access to electricity in 2003 was 
just 18 per cent; in the same year the country’s central bank (Nepal 
Rashtra Bank) declared, on the basis of  its own survey data, that access 
was double that amount: 36 per cent. The NEA, it turns out, had taken 
the number of  meters it had installed and then (assuming that these 
were almost all in households, with negligible numbers in government 
offices, hospitals and so on) multiplied it by the average Nepali family 
size of  5.5 persons. The Rashtra Bank, in its survey, had asked the 
simple question ‘Do you have access to electricity?’, without going on to 
enquire whether that electricity came from an off-grid community-owned 
micro-hydro installation, or was stolen from the grid (by creative hooking: 
‘unmetered consumption’ in World Bankese), or from a privately-owned 
solar panel, or from a neighbour who was metered and (because you 
could not afford the NEA’s installation charge) had let you pull a wire 
across for a couple of  bulbs and charged you the going ‘village rate’. 
Whether an MDG/SDG is being over-fulfilled or hopelessly fallen 
short of, evidently depends on which set of  official figures you choose to 
consider.3 With facts as malleable as that, you can have whatever you like!
1 Eagle’s eye science versus toad’s eye science
The NEA was using an eagle’s eye approach, defining the problem from the 
high perches of  its Kathmandu headquarters; the Rashtra Bank, though 
even more highly placed, was, it turns out, using a much more toad’s eye 
approach: figuring out what was actually happening down there on the 
ground.4 If  you are working in a UN or western development agency, or 
a National Planning Commission, you will very likely gravitate towards 
the eagle’s eye view, since your bosses will be thinking about policy 
measures at a global scale.5 If, on the other hand, you are working for 
a village council you will probably see the problem not so much for its 
global consequence (climate change being the current favourite) as for 
how it matters for those who are suffering from it. We can mention a 
few instances.
Bihari Krishna Shrestha – the doyen of  Nepal’s ethnographers, and who 
can claim much of  the credit for introducing to government policy the 
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concept of  ‘user groups’ in the forestry and health sectors – recounts 
how rice is grown at the highest altitude in the world in Jumla District: 
6,000 feet above sea level, where rice normally should not be growing. 
A complex nexus of  social and agricultural practices enables the Jumlis 
to make maximum use of  the short summer: they first soak the seeds 
in gunny sacks in the river and then prepare the seedling beds, not in 
the open, but inside their houses and close to the hearth. They then 
spread branches over them, placing their bedding on top so as to allow 
their body heat to transfer to the seedlings. They also require all male 
members who have migrated out for seasonal labour to come back to 
the village for Chaitra 12th (around 25 March) for the transplanting of  
the seedlings. If  they do not show up they face being declared dead, with 
their relatives being allowed to conduct their funeral rites. If  any one 
of  these complex and demanding practices fails, the entire system fails. 
None of  this crucial knowledge is accessible by way of  the eagle’s eye 
approach; it is discernible only to those who take the toad’s eye view.6
If  a high-resolution satellite was hovering over Rajasthan it could 
clearly make out what it would think was a truck (see photo). It would 
take a toad’s eye scientist, using ethnographic methods, to go down to 
the village level, look at the vehicle, talk to its owner and realise that 
it is actually an irrigation pump that has been fitted onto a makeshift 
chassis. With no registration plate, and no licensed driver, it is popularly 
known as a Jugad: literally ‘make do with’ (DST 2008). And there is a 
story behind this remarkable and now widespread innovation: India’s 
Rural Development Bank, it transpires, gives subsidised loans to 
farmers to enable them to buy three-horsepower pumps. However, the 
farmers will even pawn their wives’ jewellery so as to top up and buy a 
ten-horsepower pump. They know what India’s central planners and 
economists don’t: that a three-horsepower pump can only pump water 
for maybe 2,000 hours a year and will remain rusting in the shed for 
the remaining 6,740 hours, whereas a ten-horsepower pump can pump 
water and run as a truck, ferrying goods and earning money for the 
remaining part of  the year. Again, these facts, crucial for development, 
can only be ferreted out through toad’s eye science.
Much the same sort of  story holds for domestic water supply in Nepal’s 
Middle Hills, where villagers avoid drinking water from the streams 
Irrigation pump converted into a Jugad truck
Source DST (2008), reproduced with kind permission. Photographer M. Moench.
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because they are often polluted with domestic and wild animal waste. 
Hill hamlets rely on nearby springs for their water supply. However, no 
proper study has ever been done on springs, nor has there been any 
attempt by the national authorities to map them. The assumption has 
been that the springs are simply there, with water supply projects being 
defined as the procurement and laying of  PVC pipes from the springs 
to the settlements. ‘Access to safe drinking water’ is then seen as having 
been achieved, and it is on that assumption that the astounding increase 
in safe water coverage claimed by both national and international 
officials has been based: from 17 per cent to 90 per cent in the United 
Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) one International 
Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade ending in 1990. Nepal 
would thus have ‘over-fulfilled’ its MDG (73 per cent coverage) almost 
before it had even been set! Pokhrel (2017, forthcoming) provides a 
more nuanced breakdown which shows, by way of  field surveys, that 
the criteria – fetching time of  less than 15 minutes, at least 45 litres per 
person per day, supply available even in the dry season and so on – are 
such that the chance of  Nepal meeting this goal is vanishingly small. 
And newspaper report after report tell us that most of  these water 
supply schemes that were built during the International Decade have 
already gone dry. Villagers call them bikasey chihan: ‘development tombs’.
Since then, the springs themselves, from which the PVC pipes had been 
laid, have started drying up across the Middle Hills, with eagle’s eye 
scientists quickly jumping to the conclusion that it is climate change 
that is to blame (in much the same way that, back in the 1980s, all the 
region’s environmental woes were blamed on ‘the ignorant and fecund 
peasant’ cutting trees on fragile hill slopes and deforesting the Himalaya; 
see Thompson and Gyawali 2007). However, a toad’s eye study (Sharma 
et al. 2016) has revealed that other drivers are responsible: rampant use 
of  PVC pipes and electric pumps (where previously women carried 
water to their houses in pots and carried no more than was necessary); 
changed cropping patterns (a move away from dryland maize and millet 
and into water-intensive marketable vegetables); a decline in livestock-
keeping and hence in wallowing ponds for buffaloes (which contributes 
to the recharge of  the groundwater that fed the springs); the filling in 
of  such ponds (for malaria eradication or for building schools thereon), 
and so on. True, climate change, when it eventually impacts, will likely 
make things worse, but it is these here-and-now drivers – drivers that 
are discernible only to those who take the toad’s eye view – that need to 
be addressed. Eagle’s eye science, by itself, will foster the delusion that, 
if  it wasn’t for climate change, all would be fine.
2 Economic growth, but not as planned
Even as many were celebrating the End of  History (Fukuyama 1992) 
and the global triumph of  the neoliberal and market-led order, Nepal 
saw its first communist prime minister (in 1994) and in successive 
elections the total parliamentary strength of  parties with the words 
‘Communist’, ‘Marxist’ or ‘Maoist’ in their titles has risen to almost 
two-thirds. Concurrently, almost 3 million Nepali citizens (out of  a 
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total population of  around 28 million) are working in the Gulf  States, 
Malaysia and South Korea (up from around half  a million in 2002, and 
not counting almost 6 million working in India as seasonal or long-term 
migrants from many, many decades back at much lower salaries).7 With 
higher income remittances pouring back home, families have seen their 
incomes boosted: keeping them afloat in the midst of  all the political 
chaos (and natural disasters: e.g. earthquakes) and enabling them to 
purchase better schooling and health services, along with food and 
consumer (and, in some instances, luxury) items. Remittances now make 
up almost 30 per cent of  gross domestic product (GDP), but they are far 
from an unmixed blessing. The haemorrhaging of  the country’s youth, 
compounded by three million or more citizens having now migrated 
to Kathmandu and other urban centres from the rural hinterlands, 
has left many a village depopulated (apart from the elderly), the land 
uncultivated and the livestock much diminished: social dislocation at a 
scale and speed rarely experienced anywhere, outside of  war. But, for all 
that, people are now much richer (or, at least, much less poor) than they 
were (see Shrestha 2017, forthcoming).
Nepal’s banking system, including those institutions that provide 
microcredit to the poorest of  farmers, has also expanded dramatically 
with remittance inflow: from 178 such ‘outfits’ in 2008 to over 13,000 
in 2015 (see Chaulagain 2015). While the Nepal Rashtra Bank, 
understandably, is pushing for some merging and consolidation of  these 
evermore numerous financial institutions, the country’s banking system, 
unlike in so many other parts of  the world, has certainly not had to be 
bailed out. Even more remarkably, given the political instability and 
high level of  corruption, government revenues, between 2010 and 2015, 
have recorded an annual growth rate of  20 per cent. This has been 
largely thanks to the import and value-added taxes levied on many of  
the goods that have been purchased with the increased remittances, 
with internal uptake being as high as 90 per cent in 2014, with foreign 
grants falling to less than 9 per cent.8 That a public call, aimed at raising 
2 billion rupees for the construction of  a hydropower plant, was over-
subscribed by 42 billion rupees proves the point made by toad’s eye 
scientists, but not their eagle’s eye counterparts: that a lack of  money 
– the premise on which the aid industry has been built and the recipient 
government’s aid addiction fed – is no longer the problem.
3 Restoring the dharma, kicking the habit
Some of  us have argued that the Age of  Aid ended (or at least lost its 
élan vital) with the collapse of  the Soviet Union in 1989 (Sharma et al. 
2004). Aid, as an industry, was born at the end of  the Second World 
War, with the setting up of  the Bretton Woods ‘architecture’ in 1944/5. 
An underlying goal, once the Cold War had taken hold, was to ensure 
that the ‘Third World’ did not become part of  the ‘Second World’, 
and it was that imperative that gave us aid as we know it. But, after 
1989, that imperative was no longer present, and the ‘First World’ was 
able to redefine development as something that could best be done 
by the market. The state, especially in the global South, was forced 
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into something of  a ‘hollowed-out’ retreat, with structural adjustment 
programmes and the ‘Washington Consensus’ tightening their grip. 
A quarter-century on, there is now a growing realisation that this lurch 
into institutional monism has not delivered on its promise. And even the 
later correction that brought the state back in by way of  PPPs – public–
private partnerships – has proved inadequate. The public, at best, 
has been subsumed under the private; at worst, it has confirmed Karl 
Polanyi’s fear that things will evolve into a kind of  fascism in which the 
interest of  the market overrides that of  the society of  which it should be 
just one vital part (Polanyi 1944).
A more wholesome (and more democratic) approach, we would 
argue, drawing on the theory of  plural rationality,9 is to go beyond 
both the monisms and the dualisms and look for a more pluralistic 
framing: a triad of  public, private and civic engagement. This, we 
hasten to add, is not an entirely new idea. Polanyi (1944), for instance, 
saw the exchange of  the profit-focused market being balanced by the 
redistributive interventions of  the state only if  both were being goaded 
by the reciprocity that is fostered by civic forces. And Lukes (2005) sees 
three types of  power at work, each needing the others: the persuasive 
power of  market seduction, the procedural coercive power of  the state 
and the ethical power exercised, through moral critique, by truly civic 
movements (the ‘small platoons’, as Edmund Burke (1790) called them). 
And Nepal’s Hindu Samkhya philosophers (Gyawali 2009), reaching 
back two-and-a-half  millennia, distinguish between actors (patras) and 
the mix of  subtle characteristics (gunas) that together give rise to the 
different powers (shakti). These are: rajasik (active), tamasik (brute and 
inert) and satwik (leading the ethical way, as it were, between rajasik 
inducement and tamasik threat). Indeed, Nepal’s Constituent Assembly, 
elected in 2008 to frame the country’s new constitution, debated the 
development model in these plural rationality terms and concluded that 
it would have to be led by all three of  these primary forces: market, state 
and cooperatives (Figure 1).
In an ideal (that is, genuinely democratic) world – represented by the 
grey bordered equilateral triangle in Figure 1 – each set of  actors (each 
solidarity, as they are called) follows its dharma: markets are competitive 
and efficient (with Adam Smith’s ‘hidden hand’ ensuring that people do 
well only when others also benefit), governments behave (as Edmund 
Burke famously urged) as ‘trustees’ for the greater public good, and civil 
society’s small platoons, lik e watchdogs, are perpetually alert to any 
signs of  injustice (to both man and Mother Nature). However, in much 
of  the global South, Nepal included, just one voice (the overbearing 
hierarchism of  governments), or at best, some PPP duet, drowns out 
the civic voice that calls for fair play and moral accountability: ‘dharma 
gone wrong’ (the distorted shaded triangle in Figure 1). Government 
bureaucracies morph into a rent-extorting ‘licence raj’, markets slide 
into a ‘crony capitalism’ in which their actors do well even when others 
most certainly do not benefit, and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), abandoning their higher cause, become conniving fronts for 
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business and politics ‘by other means’. Each solidarity thus ends up 
undermining its dharma – its distinctive righteousness – and is thereby 
corrupted in its essence. Development, this plural rationality framing 
insists, will remain elusive for as long as the dharma is unrestored: for as 
long, that is, as things are out-of-line with the grey bordered equilateral 
triangle in Figure 1.
For the dharma to be restored each solidarity has to be present at the policy 
table (have accessibility, that is) and also to be engaging constructively, albeit 
argumentatively, with the others (responsiveness, that is). This is because, 
even though they are mutually antagonistic in the way they are organised, 
each seeking to disorganise the others and perceiving the risks they 
face very differently, all three are essential to the body politic. Markets 
innovate (especially in the technological realm), hierarchies regulate 
(while also needing to innovate in order to address new challenges with 
new management approaches), and civic movements too need to find 
behavioural innovations if  they are to identify and meet new dangers. 
That is where their strengths lie: in not doing what the others should be 
doing. And they would re-discover those strengths if  each of  them chose 
to practise some toad’s eye science. What, for instance, is the vast informal 
economy of  the global South doing? How are user groups managing 
complicated technologies such as electricity distribution, as the Mothers’ 
Group10 in Nepali villages are now doing? And why is it that radical 
ideologies, be they of  a Maoist or more orthodox religious flavour, are 
finding so much resonance at the local level?
And what finally, returning to our starting point, does such a reorientation 
of  thinking mean for the current global efforts in development? In 
Distortions squeeze out 
increasing numbers into 
fatalism (‘double burden’)
Government 
(as with Burke’s 
‘trustees’)
Civil society 
(as with 
Burke’s ‘small 
platoons’)
Market (hidden 
hand: genuine 
private goods)
Crony capitalism 
(club goods disguised 
as private goods)
Rent-seeking 
licence Raj
BONGOs DONGOs 
GONGOs PONGOs
 Dharma restored  (each solidarity is following its dharma)
 Dharma gone wrong  (each solidarity ends up undermining its dharma)
Figure 1 Dharma and its dynamics
Source Gyawali, Thompson and Verweij (2017, forthcoming).
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particular, what does it mean for the SDGs: the successors to the 
MDGs? Yes, those goals do matter, in so far as twenty-first century 
problems such as climate change, new pollutants, new diseases and so 
on are so immense and global in their scope as to be unsolvable without 
common effort, and such effort requires some common goals. No, they 
do not matter to the vast majority of  marginal and poor farmers, who 
can be counted on to do what they perceive themselves as having to do 
anyway, SDGs not withstanding. And governments, as we have seen 
with remittances in Nepal, will find themselves struggling to catch up 
with the public mood and its often rapid swings. Maybe SDGs will also 
matter if  lessons are learnt, past failures are critically analysed, and 
corrective measures are taken. Failure to do these vital things, however, 
will mean that development will be hijacked by the smoothest operators, 
with the goals being debased into platitudes and with ministries of  
SDGs popping up all over the world so as to give a sense – false, of  
course – of  action. So, with these daunting tasks and alarming pitfalls 
identified, it is a fundamental re-thinking of  development that is called 
for: a re-thinking that will place a sharpened, and often uncomfortable, 
focus on toad’s eye science.
Notes
1 Survey conducted by Professor Amrit Nakarmi of  the Centre for 
Renewable Energy, Institute of  Engineering, Tribhuvan University, 
Kathmandu and presented at the 41st Pani Satsang (public policy 
discourse forum) on ‘Carbon Neutral Pathways in Nepal with 
Special Focus on Ropeways and Electric Transport’ by the Nepal 
Water Conservation Foundation, Nepal Academy of  Science and 
Technology, LUCSUS/Lund University and Toni Hagen Foundation 
on 23 November 2014. See also www.ktm2day.com/2012/05/07/
diesel-provides-531-mw-of-electricity/.
2 Nepal’s national grid, with a capacity of  about 800+MW, is mostly 
hydro (some 700MW) that took over 100 years to develop since 
1911 when electricity was first generated in Nepal. Since 2008, with 
increasing power cuts plaguing the national grid, private enterprises 
have resorted to installing diesel generators that now total almost 
700MW (and growing). Hydro development programmes supported 
by foreign aid agencies, as well as by the Nepal government and 
private developers are mired in conflicts, cost and time over-runs, 
political extortion and interference, and a host of  other ills.
3 One of  us (DG) was Minister of  Water Resources then and ex-officio 
chair of  the NEA board where the first reaction to this new figure 
from the Rashtra Bank was: ‘Look at how many people are stealing 
our electricity!’
4 The term ‘toad’s eye’ is borrowed from Rudyard Kipling (1919: 53): 
The toad beneath the harrow knows where every separate tooth-point goes. The 
next line describes our ‘eagle’s eye’: The butterfly upon the road preaches 
contentment to that toad.
5 In the case of  Rashtra Bank’s fortuitous use of  toad’s eye science, the 
wider policy implications are immense regarding the decentralisation 
and democratisation of  the electricity grid. However, they were 
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not the Bank’s concern (they still are not, as they still are not of  
the energy ministry or the international development agencies 
supporting the government) but they are among reformers, who use 
them to point out the anomalies in the centralised system.
6 Recounted by Bihari Krishna Shrestha (at a Fulbright/ICIMOD/
NWCF meeting on the water–energy–food nexus) based on his 
earlier ethnographic work in Jumla (see Vasily et al. 2015).
7 See DoFE (2014) as well as the Centre for the Study of  Labour and 
Mobility website (www.ceslam.org).
8 See MoF (2015). In that year, recovery of  irregularities and defaults 
also jumped up to one and a half  per cent of  the total government 
revenue.
9 This integrative social science theory, originally developed by Mary 
Douglas, goes by various names, including cultural theory and 
neo-Durkheimian institutionalism (Douglas 1986; Thompson, Ellis 
and Wildavsky 1990; Verweij and Thompson 2006; Thompson 2008; 
Thompson and Beck 2015).
10 Mothers’ Group (in Nepali Aama Samuha) is a civic self-help users’ 
group movement in rural Nepal that organises women to manage 
their pressing needs, from childcare and cooperative shops to 
electricity distribution (see Gyawali 2014). 
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Glossary
AfDB African Development Bank
ART anti-retroviral treatment
BNDES Brazilian Development Bank
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CENAA centrum pre európske a severoatlantické vzt’ahy [Centre for 
European and Atlantic Affairs, Bratislava]
CEPR Centre for Economic Policy Research
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CSE Center for Science and Environment
CSO civil society organisation
DARPA Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency
DFID Department for International Development
DoFE Department of  Foreign Employment [Nepal]
DST Desakota Study Team
ESPA Ecosystem Services for Poverty Alleviation
ESRC Economic and Social Research Council
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
FLACSO Universidad Latinoamericana de Postgrado Líder en Ciencias 
Sociales [Latin American Social Sciences Institute]
GDP gross domestic product
GHG greenhouse gas
ICIMOD International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development
ICT information and communications technology
IDES Instituto de Desarrollo Económico y Social
IFI International Financial Institution
IIASA International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
IIED International Institute for Environment and Development
ILO International Labour Organization
ILRI International Livestock Research Institute
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISSC International Social Science Council
ITIF Information Technology and Innovation Foundation
MDG Millennium Development Goal
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MoF Ministry of  Finance [Nepal]
NEA Nepal Electricity Authority
NERC Natural Environment Research Council
NIESR National Institute of  Economic and Social Research
NGO non-governmental organisation
NPC National Planning Commission
NWCF Nepal Water Conservation Foundation
ODI Overseas Development Institute
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
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OPHI Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative
PPP public–private partnership
PT Partido dos Trabalhadores [Workers’ Party, Brazil]
PTA Parent Teacher Association
PV photovoltaic
RBF results-based finance
REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
SOAS School of  Oriental and African Studies
SPARC Society for the Promotion of  Area Resource Centers [Mumbai]
SPRU Science Policy Research Unit
STEPS Social, Technological and Environmental Pathways to 
Sustainability
UIA Union of  International Associations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNESCAP United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGS Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento [National 
University of  General Sarmiento]
USEF United States Educational Foundation
VPN virtual private network
WCED World Commission on Environment and Development
WTO World Trade Organization
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